

# THE Small Unit Tactics



Completely Updated and  
Aligned with the Army's  
New **"Doctrine 2015"**  
Initiative Publications!

## Company & Squad Platoon fire team

Tactical Mission  
Fundamentals

Offensive  
Operations

Defensive  
Operations

Stability &  
Counterinsurgency  
Operations

Tactical Enabling  
Operations

Special Purpose  
Attacks

Urban & Regional  
Environments

Patrols &  
Patrolling

Leader's  
Reference Guide  
to Conducting  
Tactical Operations  
**Second Revised Edition**

SMARTbook

The Lightning Press  
Larsen and Wade



# The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook



## Incorporating CHANGE 1 (ADRP 3-90 & Doctrine 2015 SMARTupdate)


**Change 1 (ADRP 3-90 & Doctrine 2015 SMARTupdate) to SUTS** updates/replaces material in the first edition Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook (ISBN 978-0-9742486-6-0) with new material from ADRP 3-90 (Aug '12) and ADRP 3-0 (May '12); adds new material on urban/regional environments; and provides complete and comprehensive Army Doctrine 2015 "pen and ink" reference citation and terminology changes from ADRPs 5-0, 6-0, 1-02 and ATP 3-06.11.

The Lightning Press



Christopher Larsen  
Norman M. Wade

# The Lightning Press



2227 Arrowhead Blvd.

Lakeland, FL 33813

**24-hour Voicemail/Fax/Order:** 1-800-997-8827

**E-mail:** SMARTbooks@TheLightningPress.com

**www.TheLightningPress.com**

## The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook, Second Revised Edition

Incorporating Change 1 (ADRP 3-90 & Doctrine 2015 SMARTupdate)

### Leader's Reference Guide to Conducting Tactical Operations

**Copyright © 2013, Christopher Larsen & Norman M. Wade**

**ISBN: 978-1-935886-28-0**

#### **All Rights Reserved**

No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or other means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval systems, without permission in writing by the publisher. Inquiries should be addressed to The Lightning Press.

#### **Notice of Liability**


The information in this SMARTbook and quick reference guide is distributed on an "As Is" basis, without warranty. While every precaution has been taken to ensure the reliability and accuracy of all data and contents, neither the author nor The Lightning Press shall have any liability to any person or entity with respect to liability, loss, or damage caused directly or indirectly by the contents of this book. If there is a discrepancy, refer to the source document. This SMARTbook does not contain classified or sensitive information restricted from public release. "The views presented in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense or its components."

**SMARTbook is a trademark of The Lightning Press.**

**About our cover photo:** Prepare to breach. Soldiers from Borzoi Company, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, stack outside the objective compound while Sappers from the 34th Engineer Company prepare to breach the target building during training in South Korea. (Dept of Army photo).

**Credits:** Photos courtesy of HJ Images; photos by Jeong, Hae-jung. All other photos courtesy Dept. of the Army and/or Dept. of Defense and credited individually where applicable.

**Printed and bound in the United States of America.**



# The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook

## 2nd Revised Ed.

This is the second revised edition of The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook, incorporating Change 1. **Change 1 (ADRP 3-90 & Doctrine 2015 SMARTupdate) to SUTS** updates/replaces material in the first edition Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook (ISBN 978-0-9742486-6-0) with new material from ADRP 3-90 (Aug '12) and ADRP 3-0 (May '12); adds new material on urban/regional environments; and provides complete and comprehensive Army Doctrine 2015 "pen and ink" reference citation and terminology changes from ADRPs 5-0, 6-0, 1-02 and ATP 3-06.11.

Readers of the first edition Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook (ISBN 978-0-9742486-6-0) can obtain Change 1 to SUTS online at: [www.TheLightningPress.com/SMARTupdates/](http://www.TheLightningPress.com/SMARTupdates/)

### Doctrine 2015 changes/updates to SUTS include:

**ADP/ADRP 3-90, Offense and Defense (Aug '12)**, provides the doctrine for the conduct of offensive and defensive tasks, along with additional information on the basic concepts and control measures associated with the art and science of tactics. The offensive and defensive considerations apply to small tactical units, such as companies and battalions, even though most of the figures in this manual use the division and the brigade combat team (BCT) echelons to illustrate points in the text.

**ADP 3-0 (Oct '11) and ADRP 3-0 (May '12), Unified Land Operations**, shifted the Army's operational concept from full spectrum operations to unified land operations. The doctrine of unified land operations describes how the Army demonstrates its core competencies of combined arm maneuver and wide area security through decisive action. The term decisive action replaces the term full spectrum operations as the concept of continuous, simultaneous offense, defense, stability, or defense support of civil authorities.

**ADP/ADRP 5-0, The Operations Process (May '12)**, provides a discussion of planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations. ADRP 5-0 updates doctrine on the operations process to include incorporating the Army's operational concept of **unified land operations (ADP 3-0)** and the principles of mission command (ADP 6-0).

**ADP/ADRP 6-0, Mission Command (May '12)**, presents the Army's guidance on command, control, and the mission command warfighting function. It describes how commanders, supported by their staffs, combine the art of command and the science of control to understand situations, make decisions, direct action, and accomplish missions.

**ADP/ADRP 1-02, Operational Terms and Military Symbolology (Aug '12)**, contains a compilation of Army operational terms, definitions, abbreviations, and acronyms as reflected in the latest editions of Army doctrinal publications. These terms are commonly used for the conduct of operations.

**ATP 3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain (Jun '11)**, establishes doctrine for combined arms operations in urban terrain for the brigade combat team (BCT) and battalion/squadron commanders and staffs, company/troop commanders, small-unit leaders, and individual Soldiers.

### Keep your SMARTbooks Up-to-Date!

To help readers keep abreast of revisions and changes, we have two dedicated tools:

**SMARTnews Mailing List!** Sign-up for e-mail notification of updates, revisions and doctrinal changes to our SMARTbooks, as well as notification of future titles:

[www.thelightningpress.com/reader-support/join-the-mailing-list/](http://www.thelightningpress.com/reader-support/join-the-mailing-list/)

**Check the status of your SMARTbook!** Readers can check for changes and updates for our titles at any time on our dedicated SMARTupdate page:

[www.thelightningpress.com/smartupdates/](http://www.thelightningpress.com/smartupdates/)

# Offense and Defense (Decisive Operations)

*Ref: ADP 3-90, Offense and Defense (Aug '12).*

Tactics is the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other (CJCSM 5120.01). Through tactics, commanders use combat power to accomplish missions. The tactical-level commander employs combat power in the conduct of engagements and battles. This section addresses the tactical level of war, the art and science of tactics, and hasty versus deliberate operations.

## The Tactical Level of War

ADP 3-90 is the primary manual for offensive and defensive tasks at the tactical level. It does not provide doctrine for stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks. It is authoritative and provides guidance in the form of combat tested concepts and ideas for the employment of available means to win in combat. These tactics are not prescriptive in nature, and they require judgment in application.

The tactical level of war is the level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces (JP 3-0). Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. It is important to understand tactics within the context of the levels of war. The strategic and operational levels provide the context for tactical operations. Without this context, tactical operations are just a series of disconnected and unfocused actions. Strategic and operational success is a measure of how one or more battles link to winning a major operation or campaign. In turn, tactical success is a measure of how one or more engagements link to winning a battle.

## The Offense

The offense is the decisive form of war. While strategic, operational, or tactical considerations may require defending for a period of time, defeat of the enemy eventually requires shifting to the offense. Army forces strike the enemy using offensive action in times, places, or manners for which the enemy is not prepared to seize, retain, and exploit the operational initiative. Operational initiative is setting or dictating the terms of action throughout an operation (ADRP 3-0).

The main purpose of the offense is to defeat, destroy, or neutralize the enemy force. Additionally, commanders conduct offensive tasks to secure decisive terrain, to deprive the enemy of resources, to gain information, to deceive and divert the enemy, to hold the enemy in position, to disrupt his attack, and to set the conditions for future successful operations.

## The Defense

While the offense is the most decisive type of combat operation, the defense is the stronger type. Army forces conduct defensive tasks as part of major operations and joint campaigns, while simultaneously conducting offensive and stability tasks as part of decisive action outside the United States.

Commanders choose to defend to create conditions for a counteroffensive that allows Army forces to regain the initiative. Other reasons for conducting a defense include to retain decisive terrain or deny a vital area to the enemy, to attrit or fix the enemy as a prelude to the offense, in response to surprise action by the enemy, or to increase the enemy's vulnerability by forcing the enemy to concentrate forces.

## Tactical Enabling Tasks

Commanders direct tactical enabling tasks to support the conduct of decisive action. Tactical enabling tasks are usually shaping or sustaining. They may be decisive in the conduct of stability tasks. Tactical enabling tasks discussed in ADRP 3-90 include reconnaissance, security, troop movement, relief in place, passage of lines, encirclement operations, and urban operations. Stability ultimately aims to create a condition so the local populace regards the situation as legitimate, acceptable, and predictable.

# Offense and Defense (Unifying Logic Chart)

## Unified Land Operations

Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations in order to create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution.

*Executed through...*

### Decisive Action

offensive

defensive

stability

DSCA

### Offensive tasks

- **Movement to contact**

- Search and attack
- Cordon and search

- **Attack**

- Ambush
- Counterattack
- Demonstration
- Spoiling attack
- Feint
- Raid

- **Exploitation**

- **Pursuit**

#### Forms of maneuver

- Envelopment
- Flank attack
- Frontal attack
- Infiltration
- Penetration
- Turning movement

### Defensive tasks

- **Area defense**

- **Mobile defense**

- **Retrograde operations**

- Delay
- Withdrawal
- Retirement

#### Forms of the defense

- Defense of a linear obstacle
- Perimeter defense
- Reverse slope defense

### Tactical enabling tasks

### Tactical mission tasks

Ref: ADP 3-90, *Offense and Defense*, fig. 1, p. iv.



Refer to *The Army Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook (Guide to Unified Land Operations and the Six Warfighting Functions)* for discussion of the fundamentals, principles and tenets of Army operations, plus chapters on each of the six warfighting functions: mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection.



# ADRP 3-90: Overview (What's New!)

*Ref: ADRP 3-90, Offense and Defense (Aug '12), preface and introduction.*

Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-90 provides guidance in the form of combat-tested concepts and ideas modified to exploit emerging Army and joint offensive and defensive capabilities. ADRP 3-90 expounds on the doctrine established in Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-90. It provides additional information on the basic concepts and control measures associated with the art and science of tactics. ADRP 3-90 provides the doctrine for the conduct of offensive and defensive tasks, just as ADRP 3-07 provides doctrine for the conduct of stability tasks and Field Manual (FM) 3-28 provides the doctrine for defense support of civil authorities. Offensive and defensive tasks conducted as part of joint operations within the geographic limits of the U.S. and its territories are referred to in joint doctrine as homeland defense. (See Joint Publication [JP] 3-27.)

ADRP 3-90 focuses on the organization of forces, minimum essential control measures, and general planning, preparation, and execution considerations for each primary offensive and defensive task. It is the common reference for all students of the art and science of tactics, both in the field and the Army school system. The offensive and defensive considerations in this manual apply to small tactical units, such as companies and battalions, even though most of the figures in this manual use the division and the brigade combat team (BCT) echelons to illustrate points in the text. Echelon specific field manuals and Army techniques publications address the specifics of how each tactical echelon employs these tactical concepts.

## Introduction

To understand ADRP 3-90, the reader must understand the operational art, the principles of war, and the links between the operational and tactical levels of war described in JP 1, JP 3-0, ADP 3-0, and ADRP 3-0. The reader should understand how the stability and defense support of civil authorities tasks described in ADPs and ADRPs 3-07 and 3-28 carry over and affect the conduct of offensive and defensive tasks and vice versa. The reader should understand the operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) and how that process relates to the Army's military decisionmaking process and troop-leading procedures described in ADP 3-0 and ADRP 5-0. Reviewing these publications assists the reader in understanding ADRP 3-90.

The use of an operational framework assists commanders in articulating their visualization of operations in time, space, purpose, and resources. In ADP 3-0 and ADRP 3-0 the Army established three different frameworks—deep, close, security; decisive, shaping, and sustaining; and main and supporting efforts. To avoid redundancy, this manual uses only the decisive, shaping, and sustaining framework where necessary to provide needed tactical information. This is not meant to imply that the other two frameworks are not equally valid.

*Refer to The Operations & Training SMARTbook and ADRP 3-0 for additional information on the use of the other two frameworks.*

## Organization

The five chapters of ADRP 3-90 focus on the tactics used to employ available means to win in combat (the offense and the defense) and constitute the Army's collective view of how it conducts prompt and sustained tactical offensive and defensive actions on land. Those tactics require judgment in application. As such, this manual is not prescriptive, but it is authoritative. ADRP 3-90 provides a common discussion of how commanders from the battalion task force level through the division echelon conduct tactical offensive and defensive tasks and their supporting tactical enabling tasks. The doctrine in this publication focuses on the employment of combined arms in lethal combat operations. These offensive and defensive principles and considerations apply to the conduct of operations, but they cannot be used in isolation. Their application must be tempered by the obligation to protect the civilian population within the area of operations.

ADRP 3-90 contains five chapters:

- Chapter 1 establishes the context of the art and science of tactics
- Chapter 2 defines common tactical concepts and tactical echelons
- Chapter 3 addresses offensive tasks
- Chapter 4 addresses defensive tasks
- Chapter 5 addresses those tactical enabling tasks that are not the subject of their own publication

The tactics discussed in this manual are only examples of ways to conduct a specific offensive or defensive task. Collectively they provide a set of tools that commanders employ in accordance with the exact tactical situation that they face at any one given time. The tactical situation is defined as the mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC).

## New, Rescinded, and Modified Terms

### New Army Terms

Term	Remarks
crew	New definition
deep, close, and security operational framework	Introduced in ADP 3-0
fire team	New definition
main and supporting effort operational framework	Introduced in ADP 3-0
platoon	New definition
section	New definition
squad	New definition


### Rescinded Army Terms

Term	Remarks
calculated risk	Replaced by prudent risk
civil affairs activities	Replaced by civil affairs operations
heavy brigade combat team	Replaced by armored brigade combat team
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)	Replaced by information collection when talking about these three things collectively. Individually the terms are still doctrinal terms.
light	Replaced by infantry when referring to Army forces
military gamble	Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
motorized	Replaced by Stryker when referring to Army forces

### Modified Army Terms

Term	Remarks
corps	No longer considered a tactical echelon of command
division	New definition for the division echelon
stability-centric/offensive-centric/ defensive-centric	The suffix "centric" is no longer used when talking about the elements of decisive action
subordinate tasks within the mission command, intelligence, fires, and protection warfighting functions	Subordinate task changes based on ADRP 3-0





# References

---

The following references were used in part to compile The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook. Additionally listed are related resources useful to the reader. All references are available to the general public and designated as “approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.” The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook does not contain classified or sensitive information restricted from public release.

### **Army Doctrinal Publications (ADPs) and Army Doctrinal Reference Publications (ADRP)**

ADP/ADRP 1-02	Aug 2012	Operational Terms and Military Symbols (with Chg 1, Sept 2012)
ADP/ADRP 3-0	Oct 2011/May 2012	Unified Land Operations
ADP/ADRP 3-07	Aug 2012	Stability
ADP/ADRP 3-90	Aug 2012	Offense and Defense
ADP/ADRP 5-0	May 2012	The Operations Process
ADP/ADRP 6-0	May 2012	Mission Command (with Chg 1, Sept 2012)

### **Army Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (ATTPs)**

ATTP 3-06.11	Jun 2011	Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain
ATTP 3-97.11	Jan 2011	Cold Region Operations
ATTP 5-0.1	Sept 2011	Commander and Staff Officer's Guide

### **Field Manuals (FMs)**


FM 3-19.4	Mar 2002	Military Police Leader's Handbook (change 1)
FM 3-21.8	Mar 2007	The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad
FM 3-21.10	Jul 2006	The Infantry Rifle Company
FM 3-24	Dec 2006	Counterinsurgency
FM 3-90	Jul 2001	Tactics
FM 3-97.6	Nov 2000	Mountain Operations
FM 5-19	Aug 2006	Composite Risk Management
FM 6-01.1	Jul 2012	Knowledge Management Operations
FM 7-85	Jun 1987	Ranger Operations
FM 7-92	Dec 2001	The Infantry Reconnaissance Platoon and Squad (Airborne, Air Assault, Light Infantry) w/change 1
FM 7-93	Oct 1995	Long-Range Surveillance Unit Operations
FM 90-3	Aug 1993	Desert Operations
FM 90-5	Aug 1993	Jungle Operations

### **Joint Publications**

JP 3-0	Aug 2011	Joint Operations
--------	----------	------------------

### **Additional Resources and Publications**

SH 21-76	Jul 2006	The Ranger Handbook
----------	----------	---------------------



# Table of Contents

## Chap 1

# Tactical Mission Fundamentals

<b>I. The Art of Tactics.....</b>	<b>1-1</b>
I. The Tactical Level of War.....	1-1
Individuals, Crews, and Small Units .....	1-1
Battles, Engagements and Small-Unit Actions .....	1-2
II. The Science and Art of Tactics .....	1-2
Aspects of the Art of Tactics .....	1-3
Solving Tactical Problems .....	1-3a
III. Hasty vs. Deliberate Operations .....	1-4
<b>II. The Army's Operational Concept.....</b>	<b>1-5</b>
I. Unified Land Operations .....	1-5
II. Foundations of Unified Land Operations .....	1-5
A. Seize, Retain and Exploit the Initiative.....	1-6
B. Decisive Action.....	1-6
- Tasks of Decisive Action .....	1-8
C. Army Core Competencies .....	1-10
D. Mission Command.....	1-10
<b>III. Tactical Mission Tasks .....</b>	<b>1-11</b>
A. Mission Symbols .....	1-11
B. Effects on Enemy Forces .....	1-12
C. Actions by Friendly Forces .....	1-13
Tactical Doctrinal Taxonomy .....	1-14
<b>IV. Understand, Visualize, Describe, Direct, Lead, Assess .....</b>	<b>1-15</b>
I. Understand .....	1-15
II. Visualize .....	1-16
The Operational Framework.....	1-18
III. Describe.....	1-16
A. Commander's Intent .....	1-20
B. Planning Guidance.....	1-20
C. Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR).....	1-20
D. Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) .....	1-21
IV. Direct .....	1-17
Elements of Combat Power.....	1-22
Organizing Combat Power .....	1-22
The Six Warfighting Functions .....	1-23
V. Lead.....	1-17
VI. Assess .....	1-17
Activities of the Operations Process .....	1-24
<b>V. Troop Leading Procedures .....</b>	<b>1-25</b>
I. Troop Leading Procedure Steps .....	1-26
II. METT-TC (Mission Variables).....	1-31
III. OCOKA - Military Aspects of the Terrain.....	1-32
IV. Risk Management (RM).....	1-36

<b>VI. Combat Orders .....</b>	<b>1-37</b>
I. Warning Order (WARNO) .....	1-38
II. Operations Order (OPORD) .....	1-39
III. Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) .....	1-40
Techniques for Issuing Orders .....	1-41
The Operations Order (OPORD) - A Small Unit Perspective .....	1-42
On Point .....	1-44
<b>VII. Preparation and Pre-Combat Inspection (PCI) .....</b>	<b>1-45</b>
I. Preparation .....	1-45
II. The Pre-Combat Inspection (PCI) .....	1-45
On Point .....	1-50
<b>VIII. Rehearsals .....</b>	<b>1-51</b>
I. Rehearsal Techniques .....	1-52
II. Rehearsals - Company Level & Smaller .....	1-54
<b>IX. The After Action Review (AAR) .....</b>	<b>1-55</b>
I. Types of After Action Reviews .....	1-56
II. Steps in the After Action Review .....	1-57
III. AARs - A Small Unit Perspective .....	1-58
On Point .....	1-60

## Chap 2

# The Offense

<b>The Offense .....</b>	<b>2-1</b>
I. Primary Offensive Tasks .....	2-2
II. Purposes of Offensive Tasks .....	2-3
III. Forms of Maneuver .....	2-4
A. Envelopment .....	2-4
B. Turning Movement .....	2-4
C. Infiltration .....	2-5
D. Penetration .....	2-5
E. Frontal Attack .....	2-5
IV. Common Offensive Control Measures .....	2-5a
V. Transition .....	2-5c
VI. Characteristics of Offensive Operations .....	2-6
<b>I. Movement to Contact .....</b>	<b>2-7</b>
Meeting Engagement .....	2-7
I. Organization .....	2-8
Search and Attack .....	2-8
Approach-March Technique .....	2-8
II. Planning & Preparation .....	2-9
III. Conducting the MTC - A Small Unit Perspective .....	2-10
On Point .....	2-12
<b>II. Attack .....</b>	<b>2-13</b>
I. Organization .....	2-14
II. Planning & Preparation .....	2-15
III. Conducting the Attack - A Small Unit Perspective .....	2-16
On Point .....	2-18
Maneuver Control Measures .....	2-18
Fire Control Measures .....	2-18

<b>III. Exploitation .....</b>	<b>2-19</b>
I. Organization .....	2-20
II. Planning & Preparation .....	2-20
III. Conducting the Exploitation - A Small Unit Perspective .....	2-20
On Point .....	2-22
Transition .....	2-22
<b>IV. Pursuit .....</b>	<b>2-23</b>
I. Organization .....	2-24
A. Frontal Pursuit .....	2-24
B. Combination Pursuit .....	2-25
II. Planning & Preparation .....	2-25
III. Conducting the Pursuit - A Small Unit Perspective .....	2-26
On Point .....	2-28
Transition .....	2-28
<b>V. Small Unit Offensive Tactical Tasks .....</b>	<b>2-29</b>
I. Seize .....	2-30
II. Suppress .....	2-30
III. Support by Fire .....	2-31
IV. Clear .....	2-32
V. Attack by Fire .....	2-34

## Chap 3

# The Defense

<b>The Defense .....</b>	<b>3-1</b>
I. Purposes of Defensive Operations .....	3-2
II. Defensive Tasks .....	3-2
III. Characteristics of the Defense .....	3-3
IV. Common Defensive Control Measures .....	3-3a
V. Transition .....	3-4
<b>I. Mobile Defense .....</b>	<b>3-5</b>
I. Organization .....	3-6
A. The Fixing Force .....	3-6
B. The Striking Force .....	3-6
II. Planning & Preparation .....	3-7
III. Conducting the Mobile Defense - A Small Unit Perspective .....	3-8
On Point .....	3-10
<b>II. Area Defense .....</b>	<b>3-11</b>
I. Organization .....	3-12
Primary Positions .....	3-12
Alternate Positions .....	3-12
Supplementary Positions .....	3-12
Subsequent Positions .....	3-12
II. Planning & Preparation .....	3-14
A. Range Card .....	3-14
B. Sector Sketch .....	3-14
C. Sectors of Fire .....	3-15
D. Engagement Areas .....	3-16
III. Conducting the Area Defense - A Small Unit Perspective .....	3-17
IV. Priorities of Work in the Defense .....	3-18

<b>III. Retrograde .....</b>	<b>3-19</b>
I. Delay.....	3-20
A. Delay Within a Sector .....	3-20
B. Delay Forward of a Specified Line for a Specified Time .....	3-20
II. Withdrawal .....	3-21
A. Assisted.....	3-21
B. Unassisted .....	3-21
III. Retirement .....	3-21
Conducting the Retrograde - A Small Unit Perspective .....	3-20
On Point.....	3-22
Reconstitution.....	3-22
<b>IV. Small Unit Defensive Techniques .....</b>	<b>3-23</b>
I. Defend an Area.....	3-23
II. Defend a Battle Position .....	3-24
III. Defend a Strongpoint.....	3-25
IV. Defend a Perimeter .....	3-27
V. Defend a Reverse Slope .....	3-27

## Chap 4

# Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations

<b>I. Stability Operations.....</b>	<b>4-1</b>
I. Primary Stability Tasks.....	4-2
II. Purposes of Stability Operations .....	4-2
III. Types of Stability Operations .....	4-4
IV. Use of Force in Stability Operations .....	4-6
V. Small Unit Stability Tasks.....	4-7
A. Establish and Occupy a Lodgement Area or a Forward Operating Base (FOB) .....	4-7
B. Monitor Compliance with an Agreement .....	4-7
C. Negotiations.....	4-8
D. Establishing Observation Posts and Checkpoints .....	4-10
E. Search.....	4-12
F. Patrol .....	4-12
G. Escort a Convoy .....	4-12
H. Open and Secure Routes .....	4-12
I. Conduct Reserve Operations .....	4-12
J. Control Crowds.....	4-12
<b>II. Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations .....</b>	<b>4-13</b>
I. Aspects of the Counterinsurgency .....	4-14
II. The Nature of Counterinsurgency Operations .....	4-15
Initial Stage: "Stop the Bleeding" .....	4-15
Middle Stage: "Inpatient Care--Recovery" .....	4-15
Late Stage: "Outpatient Care--Movement to Self-Sufficiency" .....	4-15
III. Historical Principles for Counterinsurgency .....	4-16
IV. Contemporary Imperatives of Counterinsurgency .....	4-18
V. Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency Operations.....	4-20
VI. Successful and Unsuccessful Counterinsurgency Practices.....	4-22

# Tactical Enabling Tasks

<b>I. Security Operations .....</b>	<b>5-1</b>
I. Forms of Security Operations.....	5-1
Security Fundamentals.....	5-2
A. Screen.....	5-1
B. Guard.....	5-4
C. Cover .....	5-5
D. Area Security .....	5-6
E. Local Security .....	5-7
* Combat Outposts .....	5-7
II. Fundamentals of Security Operations .....	5-3
On Point.....	5-8
<b>II. Reconnaissance Operations .....</b>	<b>5-9</b>
Reconnaissance Objective .....	5-9
I. Reconnaissance Fundamentals .....	5-10
II. Organization .....	5-11
III. Planning & Preparation.....	5-11
IV. Forms of the Reconnaissance.....	5-11
A. The Route Reconnaissance.....	5-12
Recon Push.....	5-13
Recon Pull .....	5-13
B. The Zone Reconnaissance.....	5-14
C. The Area Reconnaissance.....	5-16
Single-Team Method .....	5-16
Double-Team Method.....	5-17
Dissemination of Information.....	5-17
D. Reconnaissance in Force (RIF) .....	5-18
On Point.....	5-18
<b>III. Relief in Place .....</b>	<b>5-19</b>
I. Organization .....	5-20
II. Planning & Preparation.....	5-20
Hasty or Deliberate.....	5-20
III. Conducting the Relief in Place - A Small Unit Perspective .....	5-21
Techniques: Sequential, Simultaneous or Staggered.....	5-21
On Point.....	5-22
<b>IV. Passage of Lines .....</b>	<b>5-23</b>
I. Conducting the Relief in Place - A Small Unit Perspective .....	5-24
Departing the Forward Line of Troops (FLOT) .....	5-24
Reentering the Forward Line of Troops (FLOT) .....	5-25
II. Organization .....	5-26
On Point.....	5-26
<b>V. Encirclement Operations.....</b>	<b>5-27</b>
I. Offensive Encirclement Operations .....	5-27
II. Defending Encircled.....	5-27
<b>VI. Troop Movement .....</b>	<b>5-29</b>
I. Methods of Troop Movement.....	5-29
II. Movement Techniques.....	5-30



# Special Purpose Attacks

<b>Special Purpose Attacks.....</b>	<b>6-1</b>
<b>I. Ambush .....</b>	<b>6-3</b>
Near Ambush.....	6-4
Far Ambush .....	6-4
I. Organization .....	6-5
A. Near Ambush .....	6-6
B. Far Ambush.....	6-8
II. Planning & Preparation.....	6-9
A. Near Ambush .....	6-10
B. Far Ambush.....	6-10
III. Conducting the Ambush - A Small Unit Perspective .....	6-11
A. Near Ambush .....	6-12
B. Far Ambush.....	6-14
IV. Ambush Categories .....	6-16
Deliberate .....	6-16
Hasty .....	6-16
Area Ambush.....	6-16
Point Ambush .....	6-16
<b>II. Raid.....</b>	<b>6-17</b>
I. Organization .....	6-18
A. Security Team .....	6-18
B. Support Team.....	6-18
C. Assault Team .....	6-18
II. Planning & Preparation.....	6-19
III. Conducting the Raid - A Small Unit Perspective.....	6-20
A. Infiltrate to the Objective.....	6-20
B. Actions on the Objective .....	6-21
On Point.....	6-22

# Urban & Regional Environments

<b>Urban &amp; Regional Environments (Overview).....</b>	<b>7-1</b>
<b>I. Urban Operations .....</b>	<b>7-3</b>
- Urban Operations (UO) .....	7-4
- Understanding the Urban Environment .....	7-6
- Threat .....	7-8
I. Find.....	7-3
II. Isolate the Building .....	7-3
Cordon.....	7-10

III. Assault a Building .....	7-10
A. Entering a Building .....	7-11
B. Clearing Rooms .....	7-13
C. Moving in the Building .....	7-14
IV. Follow Through .....	7-16
<b>II. Fortified Areas .....</b>	<b>7-17</b>
Characteristics .....	7-17
I. Find .....	7-18
II. Fix .....	7-18
III. Finish (Fighting Enemies in Fortifications) .....	7-18
A. Securing the Near and Far Side--Breaching Protective Obstacles .....	7-18
B. Knocking out Bunkers .....	7-19
C. Assaulting Trench Systems .....	7-20
IV. Follow Through .....	7-22
<b>III. Desert Operations .....</b>	<b>7-23</b>
I. Desert Environments .....	7-23
II. Desert Effects on Personnel .....	7-25
III. Mission Command Considerations .....	7-27
IV. Tactical Considerations .....	7-28
<b>IV. Cold Region Operations .....</b>	<b>7-31</b>
I. Cold Regions .....	7-31
II. Cold Weather Effects on Personnel .....	7-34
III. Mission Command Considerations .....	7-35
IV. Tactical Considerations .....	7-36
<b>V. Mountain Operations .....</b>	<b>7-39</b>
I. Mountain Environments .....	7-39
II. Effects on Personnel .....	7-40
III. Tactical Considerations .....	7-44
IV. Mission Command Considerations .....	7-46
<b>VI. Jungle Operations .....</b>	<b>7-47</b>
I. Jungle Environments .....	7-47
II. Effects on Personnel .....	7-50
III. Mission Command Considerations .....	7-51
IV. Tactical Considerations .....	7-52

# Patrols & Patrolling

<b>Patrols and Patrolling .....</b>	<b>8-1</b>
Combat Patrols .....	8-1
Reconnaissance Patrols .....	8-1
I. Organization of Patrols .....	8-2
II. Planning & Conducting a Patrol .....	8-4
III. Elements of a Combat Patrol .....	8-6
A. Assault Element .....	8-6
B. Support Element .....	8-6
C. Security Element .....	8-6

<b>I. Traveling Techniques .....</b>	<b>8-7</b>
I. Traveling .....	8-8
II. Traveling Overwatch .....	8-8
III. Bounding Overwatch .....	8-9
On Point .....	8-10
<b>II. Attack Formations .....</b>	<b>8-11</b>
Fire Team Formations .....	8-11
Attack Formation Considerations .....	8-12
I. The Line .....	8-13
II. The File .....	8-14
Variation: The Staggered Column .....	8-15
III. The Wedge .....	8-16
Variation: The Diamond .....	8-17
On Point .....	8-18
Security Checks While on Patrol .....	8-18
5 and 20 Meter Checks .....	8-18
<b>III. Crossing a Danger Area .....</b>	<b>8-19</b>
Types of Danger Areas .....	8-19
I. Patch-to-the-Road Method .....	8-20
II. Heart-Shaped Method .....	8-22
III. Bypass Method .....	8-24
IV. Box Method .....	8-25
V. Crossing Large Open Areas .....	8-25
On Point .....	8-26
Enemy Contact .....	8-26
<b>IV. Establishing a Security Halt .....</b>	<b>8-27</b>
I. Cigar-Shaped Method .....	8-29
II. Wagon Wheel Method .....	8-30
III. Priorities of Work at the Objective Rally Point (ORP) .....	8-31
On Point .....	8-32
En Route Rally Point (ERP) .....	8-32
Objective Rally Point (ORP) .....	8-32
<b>V. Establishing a Hide Position .....</b>	<b>8-33</b>
Considerations .....	8-33
I. Back-to-Back Method .....	8-34
II. Star Method .....	8-35
On Point .....	8-36
Site Selection .....	8-36
Site Sterilization .....	8-36
<b>VI. Establishing a Patrol Base .....</b>	<b>8-37</b>
Site Selection .....	8-37
The Triangle Method .....	8-38
Planning Considerations .....	8-39
Security Measures .....	8-39
Priorities of Work .....	8-40

## Tactical Mission Fundamentals

# I. The Art of Tactics

Ref: ADRP 3-90, *Offense & Defense* (Aug '12), chap. 1.



*Tactics is the employment of units in combat. It includes the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other, the terrain and the enemy to translate potential combat power into victorious battles and engagements. (Dept. of Army photo by Staff Sgt. Russell Bassett).*

## I. The Tactical Level of War

Through tactics, commanders use combat power to accomplish missions. The tactical-level commander employs combat power to accomplish assigned missions. The tactical level of war is the level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces (JP 3-0). Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. It is important to understand tactics within the context of the levels of war. The strategic and operational levels provide the context for tactical operations. Without this context, tactical operations are reduced to a series of disconnected and unfocused actions.

Tactical operations always require judgment and adaptation to the unique circumstances of a specific situation. Techniques and procedures are established patterns that can be applied repeatedly with little or no judgment in a variety of circumstances. Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) provide commanders and staffs with a set of tools to use in developing the solution to a tactical problem.

### Individuals, crews, and small units

Individuals, crews, and small units act at the tactical level. At times, their actions may produce strategic or operational effects. However, this does not mean these elements are acting at the strategic or operational level. Actions are not strategic unless they contribute directly to achieving the strategic end state. Similarly, actions are considered operational only if they are directly related to operational movement or the sequencing of battles and engagements. The level at which an action occurs is determined by the perspective of the echelon in terms of planning, preparation, and execution.

## Battles, Engagements and Small-Unit Actions

Tactics is the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other. Through tactics, commanders use combat power to accomplish missions. The tactical-level commander uses combat power in battles, engagements, and small-unit actions. A battle consists of a set of related engagements that lasts longer and involves larger forces than an engagement. Battles can affect the course of a campaign or major operation. An engagement is a tactical conflict, usually between opposing, lower echelons maneuver forces (JP 1-02). Engagements are typically conducted at brigade level and below. They are usually short, executed in terms of minutes, hours, or days.

## II. The Science and Art of Tactics

The tactician must understand and master the science and the art of tactics, two distinctly different yet inseparable concepts. Commanders and leaders at all echelons and supporting commissioned, warrant, and noncommissioned staff officers must be tacticians to lead their soldiers in the conduct of full spectrum operations.

### A. The Science

The science of tactics encompasses the understanding of those military aspects of tactics—capabilities, techniques, and procedures—that can be measured and codified. The science of tactics includes the physical capabilities of friendly and enemy organizations and systems, such as determining how long it takes a division to move a certain distance. It also includes techniques and procedures used to accomplish specific tasks, such as the tactical terms and control graphics that comprise the language of tactics. While not easy, the science of tactics is fairly straightforward. Much of what is contained in this manual is the science of tactics—techniques and procedures for employing the various elements of the combined arms team to achieve greater effects.

Mastery of the science of tactics is necessary for the tactician to understand the physical and procedural constraints under which he must work. These constraints include the effects of terrain, time, space, and weather on friendly and enemy forces. However—because combat is an intensely human activity—the solution to tactical problems cannot be reduced to a formula. This realization necessitates the study of the art of tactics.

### B. The Art

The art of tactics consists of three interrelated aspects: the creative and flexible array of means to accomplish assigned missions, decision making under conditions of uncertainty when faced with an intelligent enemy, and understanding the human dimension—the effects of combat on soldiers. An art, as opposed to a science, requires exercising intuitive faculties that cannot be learned solely by study. The tactician must temper his study and evolve his skill through a variety of relevant, practical experiences. The more experience the tactician gains from practice under a variety of circumstances, the greater his mastery of the art of tactics.

Military professionals invoke the art of tactics to solve tactical problems within his commander's intent by choosing from interrelated options, including—

- Types and forms of operations, forms of maneuver, and tactical mission tasks
- Task organization of available forces, to include allocating scarce resources
- Arrangement and choice of control measures
- Tempo of the operation
- Risks the commander is willing to take

# Aspects of the Art of Tactics

Ref: ADRP 3-90, *Offense & Defense* (Aug '12), pp. 1-2 to 1-3 (not labeled in ADRP 3-90).

There are three aspects to the art of tactics that define a competent tactician:

## 1. Domain Knowledge

*Note: For more complete discussion of domain knowledge, see The Leader's SMARTbook or FM 6-22 Army Leadership, pp. 6-5 to 6-9.*

The first is the creative and flexible application of the tools available to the commander, such as doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, training, organizations, materiel, and soldiers in an attempt to render the enemy's situational tactics ineffective. The tactician must understand how to train and employ his forces in full spectrum operations. The factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) are variables whose infinite mutations always combine to form a new tactical pattern.

They never produce exactly the same situation; thus there can be no checklists that adequately address each unique situation. Because the enemy changes and adapts to friendly moves during the planning, preparation, and execution of an operation, there is no guarantee that a technique which worked in one situation will work again. Each tactical problem is unique and must be solved on its own merits.

## 2. Decision Making Under Conditions of Uncertainty

The second aspect of the art of tactics is decision making under conditions of uncertainty in a time-constrained environment and demonstrated by the clash of opposing wills—a violent struggle between two hostile, thinking, and independent opposing commanders with irreconcilable goals. Each commander wants to impose his will on his opponent, defeat his opponent's plans, and destroy his opponent's forces. Combat consists of the interplay between these two opposing commanders, with each commander seeking to accomplish his mission while preventing the other from doing the same. Every commander needs a high degree of creativity and clarity of thought to outwit a willing and able opponent. He must quickly apply his judgment to a less than omniscient common operational picture provided by his command and control (C2) system to understand the implications and opportunities afforded him by the situation. The commander always uses the most current intelligence in order to facilitate his visualization of the enemy and environment. That same C2 system transmits the decisions resulting from his situational understanding to those individuals and units required to engage and destroy the enemy force.

## 3. The Human Dimension

The third and final aspect of the art of tactics is understanding the human dimension—what differentiates actual combat from the problems encountered during training and in a classroom. Combat is one of the most complex human activities, characterized by violent death, friction, uncertainty, and chance. Success depends at least as much on this human aspect as it does on any numerical and technological superiority.

The tactician cannot ignore the human aspect. He seeks to recognize and exploit indicators of fear and weakness in his enemy, and to defeat the enemy's will, since soldiers remain key to generating combat power. More than any other human activity, continuous combat operations against an intelligent enemy takes a toll on soldiers, severely straining their physical and mental stamina. This creates in soldiers the tangible and intangible effects of courage, fear, combat experience, exhaustion, isolation, confidence, thirst, and anger.

Leaders must be alert to indicators of fatigue, fear, lapses in discipline standards, and reduced morale in friendly and enemy soldiers. These conditions can have a cumulative effect on units that can lead to collapse. The tactician must understand how they affect human endurance and factor them into his plans. He must understand the limits of human endurance in combat.



# II. The Army's Operational Concept

*Ref: ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations (May '12), chap. 1 and 2.*

## I. Unified Land Operations (Defined)

Unified land operations describes how the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution (ADP 3-0). Unified land operations is the Army's operational concept and the Army's contribution to unified action.

### Goal of Unified Land Operations

The goal of unified land operations is to apply land power as part of unified action to defeat the enemy on land and establish conditions that achieve the joint force commander's end state. Today's operational environments require commanders to demonstrate the core competencies of combined arms maneuver and wide area security conducted through offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks to reach this goal.

Unified land operations is the Army's operational concept and the Army's contribution to unified action. The central idea of unified land operations is how the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution. Where possible, military forces working with unified action partners seek to prevent or deter threats. However, if necessary, military forces possess the capability in unified land operations to prevail over aggression.

## II. Foundations of Unified Land Operations

By integrating the four foundations of unified land operations—initiative, decisive action, Army core competencies, and mission command—Army commanders can achieve strategic success. Strategic success requires full integration of U.S. military operations with the efforts of unified action partners. The foundations of unified land operations begin and end with the exercise of individual and operational initiative. Initiative is used to gain a position of advantage that degrades and defeats the enemy throughout the depth of an organization. The Army demonstrates its core competencies through decisive action.

The **Army's two core competencies—combined arms maneuver and wide area security**—provide the means for balancing the application of Army war fighting functions within the tactical actions and tasks inherent in the offense, defense, and stability overseas, or defense support of civil authorities in the United States. By demonstrating the two core competencies, Army forces:

- Defeat or destroy an enemy,
- Seize or occupy key terrain,
- Protect or secure critical assets and populations, and
- Prevent the enemy from gaining a position of advantage


## A. Seize, Retain and Exploit the Initiative

All Army operations aim to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and achieve decisive results. **Operational initiative** is setting or dictating the terms of action throughout an operation. Individual initiative is the willingness to act in the absence of orders, when existing orders no longer fit the situation, or when unforeseen opportunities or threats arise. Initiative gives all operations the spirit, if not the form, of the offense. It originates in the principle of war of the offensive. This principle goes beyond simply attacking. It requires action to change the situation on the ground. Risk and opportunity are intrinsic in seizing the initiative. To seize the initiative, commanders evaluate and take prudent risks as necessary to exploit opportunities. Initiative requires constant effort to control tempo and momentum while maintaining freedom of action. This offensive mindset, with its focus on initiative, is central to the Army's operational concept and guides all leaders in the performance of their duty. It emphasizes opportunity created by developing the situation through decisive action, whether in offensive, defensive, stability, or defense support of civil authorities tasks. In combined arms maneuver, commanders compel the enemy to respond to friendly action. In the offense, it involves taking the fight to the enemy and never allowing enemy forces to recover from the initial shock of the attack. In the defense, it involves preventing the enemy from achieving success and then counterattacking to seize the initiative. The object is more than just killing enemy personnel and destroying their equipment. Combined arms maneuver forces the enemy to react continuously and finally to be driven into untenable positions. Seizing the initiative pressures enemy commanders into abandoning their preferred courses of action, accepting too much risk, or making costly mistakes. As enemy mistakes occur, friendly forces seize opportunities and create new avenues for exploitation. Ultimately, combined arms maneuver aims to break the enemy's will through relentless and continuous pressure.

## B. Decisive Action

Army forces demonstrate the Army's core competencies through decisive action—the continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks. In unified land operations, commanders seek to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative while synchronizing their actions to achieve the best effects possible. Operations conducted outside the United States and its territories simultaneously combine three elements—offense, defense, and stability. Within the United States and its territories, decisive action combines the elements of defense support of civil authorities and, as required, offense and defense to support homeland defense.

See following pages (pp. \*1-8 to \*1-9) for further discussion.



*The mission determines the relative weight of effort among the elements.*

# Tasks of Decisive Action

Ref: ADRP 3-0, Operations (Mar '12), pp. 2-4 to 2-8 (and table 2-1, p. 2-5).

Decisive action requires simultaneous combinations of offense, defense, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks.

## 1. Offensive Tasks

An offensive task is a task conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers. Offensive tasks impose the commander's will on the enemy. In combined arms maneuver, the offense is a task of decisive action. Against a capable, adaptive enemy, the offense is the most direct and a sure means of seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative to gain physical and psychological advantages and achieve definitive results. In the offense, the decisive operation is a sudden, shattering action against an enemy weakness that capitalizes on speed, surprise, and shock. If that operation does not destroy the enemy, operations continue until enemy forces disintegrate or retreat to where they no longer pose a threat. Executing offensive tasks compels the enemy to react, creating or revealing additional weaknesses that the attacking force can exploit.

*For discussion of offensive tasks, see chap. 2, pp. 2-1 to 2-34.*

## 2. Defensive Tasks

A defensive task is a task conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability tasks. Normally the defense alone cannot achieve a decision. However, it can set conditions for a counteroffensive or counterattack that enables

Army forces to regain the initiative. Defensive tasks can also establish a shield behind which wide area security can progress. Defensive tasks are a counter to the enemy offense. They defeat attacks, destroying as much of the attacking enemy as possible. They also preserve and maintain control over land, resources, and populations. The purpose of defensive tasks is to retain terrain, guard populations, and protect critical capabilities against enemy attacks. Commanders can conduct defensive tasks to gain time and economize forces so offensive tasks can be executed elsewhere.

*For discussion of defensive tasks, see chap. 3, pp. 3-1 to 3-28.*

### Offensive Tasks

#### Primary Tasks

- Movement to contact
- Attack
- Exploitation
- Pursuit

#### Purposes

- Dislocate, isolate, disrupt and destroy enemy forces
- Seize key terrain
- Deprive the enemy of resources
- Develop intelligence
- Deceive and divert the enemy
- Create a secure environment for stability operations

### Defensive Tasks

#### Primary Tasks

- Mobile defense
- Area defense
- Retrograde

#### Purposes

- Deter or defeat enemy offensive operations
- Gain time
- Achieve economy of force
- Retain key terrain
- Protect the populace, critical assets and infrastructure
- Develop intelligence

### 3. Stability Tasks

Stability is an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (See JP 3-0.) Army forces conduct stability tasks during both combined arms maneuver and wide area security. These tasks support a host-nation or an interim government or part of a transitional military authority when no government exists. Stability tasks involve both coercive and constructive actions. They help to establish or maintain a safe and

#### Stability Tasks

##### Primary Tasks

- Establish civil security (including security force asst)
- Establish civil control
- Restore essential services
- Support to governance
- Support to economic and infrastructure development

##### Purposes

- Provide a secure environment
- Secure land areas
- Meet the critical needs of the populace
- Gain support for host-nation government
- Shape the environment for interagency and host-nation success

secure environment and facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries. Stability tasks can also help establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions while supporting the transition to legitimate host-nation governance. Stability tasks cannot succeed if they only react to enemy initiatives. Stability tasks must maintain the initiative by pursuing objectives that resolve the causes of instability.

*For discussion of stability tasks, see chap. 4, pp. 4-1 to 4-12.*

#### Defense Support of Civil Authorities Tasks

##### Primary Tasks

- Provide support for domestic disasters
- Provide support for domestic CBRN incidents
- Provide support for domestic civilian law enforcement agencies
- Provide other designated support

##### Purposes

- Save lives
- Restore essential services
- Maintain or restore law and order
- Protect infrastructure and property
- Maintain or restore local government
- Shape the environment for interagency success

### 4. Defense Support of Civil Authority Tasks

DSCA is support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, Department of Defense civilians, Department of Defense contract personnel, Department of Defense component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces

in Title 32, U.S. Code, status). This support is in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. Defense support of civil authorities is a task that takes place only in the homeland, although some of its tasks are similar to stability tasks. Defense support of civil authorities is always conducted in support of another primary or lead federal agency.

*Refer to JP 2-28 for further discussion.*

# Tactical Doctrinal Taxonomy

*Ref: ADRP 3-90, Offense and Defense (Aug '12), fig. 2-1, p. 2-3.*

The following shows the Army's tactical doctrinal taxonomy for the four elements of decisive action (in accordance with ADRP 3-0) and their subordinate tasks. The commander conducts tactical enabling tasks to assist the planning, preparation, and execution of any of the four elements of decisive action. Tactical enabling tasks are never decisive operations in the context of the conduct of offensive and defensive tasks. (They are also never decisive during the conduct of stability tasks.) The commander uses tactical shaping tasks to assist in conducting combat operations with reduced risk.

## Elements of Decisive Action (and subordinate tasks)

### Offensive Tasks

#### Movement to Contact

Search and attack  
Cordon and search

#### Attack

Ambush\*  
Counterattack\*  
Demonstration\*  
Spoiling attack\*  
Feint\*  
Raid\*

*\*Also known as special purpose attacks*

#### Exploitation Pursuit

### Forms of Maneuver

Envelopment  
Frontal attack  
Infiltration  
Penetration  
Turning Movement

### Defensive Tasks

#### Area defense

#### Mobile defense

#### Retrograde operations

Delay  
Withdrawal  
Retirement

### Forms of the Defense

Defense of linear obstacle  
Perimeter defense  
Reverse slope defense

### Stability Tasks

Civil security  
Civil control  
Restore essential services  
Support to governance  
Support to economic and infrastructure development

### Defense Support to Civil Authorities

Provide support for domestic disasters  
Provide support for domestic CBRN incidents  
Provide support for domestic law enforcement agencies  
Provide other designated support

## Tactical Enabling Tasks

### Reconnaissance Operations

Zone  
Area  
Route  
Recon in force

### Security Operations

Screen  
Guard  
Cover  
Area (also route & convoy)  
Local

### Troop Movement

Administrative movement  
Approach march  
Road march

### Encirclement Operations

### Passage of Lines

### Relief in Place

### Mobility Operations

Breaching operations  
Clearing operations (area and route)  
Gap-crossing operations  
Combat roads and trails  
Forward airfields and landing zones  
Traffic operations

## Tactical Mission Tasks

### Actions by Friendly Forces

Attack-by-Fire  
Breach  
Bypass  
Clear  
Control  
Counterreconnaissance  
Disengage  
Exfiltrate  
Follow and Assume  
Follow and Support

Occupy  
Reduce  
Retain  
Secure  
Seize  
Support-by-Fire

### Effects on Enemy Force

Block  
Canalize  
Contain  
Defeat  
Destroy  
Disrupt  
Fix  
Interdict  
Isolate  
Neutralize  
Suppress  
Turn


# IV. Understand, Visualize, Describe, Direct, Lead, Assess

Ref: ADRP 5-0, *The Operations Process* (Mar '12), chap. I.

## Commander's Activities

Commanders are the most important participants in the operations process. While staffs perform essential functions that amplify the effectiveness of operations, **commanders drive the operations process** through understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing operations.

See p. 1-24 for an overview and discussion of the operations process.



Ref: ADRP 5-0, *The Operations Process*, fig. 1-2, p. 1-3.

## I. Understand

Understanding is fundamental to the commander's ability to establish a situation's context. It is essential to effective decision making during planning and execution. Analysis of the operational and mission variable provides the information used to develop understanding and frame the problem. In addition, conceptual and detailed planning assist commanders in developing their initial understanding of the operational environment and the problem. To develop a better understanding of an operational environment, commanders circulate within the area of operations as often as possible, collaborating with subordinate commanders and with Soldiers. Using personal observations and inputs from others (to include running estimates from the staff), commanders improve their understanding of their operational environment throughout the operations process.

Information collection (to include reconnaissance and surveillance) is indispensable to building and improving the commander's understanding. Formulating CCIRs, keeping them current, determining where to place key personnel, and arranging for liaison also contribute to improving the commander's understanding. Greater understanding enables commanders to make better decisions throughout the conduct of operations.



# The Operational Framework (Visualize)

ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Mar '12), pp. 1-9 to 1-13 (and fig. 1-1, p. 1-10).

The **operations structure**—the operations process, warfighting functions, and operational framework—is the Army's common construct for operations. It allows Army leaders to rapidly and effectively organize effort in a manner commonly understood across the Army. The operations process provides a broadly defined approach to developing and executing operations. The war fighting functions provide an intellectual organization for common critical functions. The operational framework provides Army leaders with basic conceptual options for visualizing and describing operations.


Army leaders are responsible for clearly articulating their visualization of operations in time, space, purpose, and resources. An established **operational framework** and associated vocabulary can assist greatly in this task. Army leaders are not bound by any specific framework for conceptually organizing operations, but three operational frameworks have proven valuable in the past. The higher headquarters will direct the specific framework or frameworks to be used by subordinate headquarters.

## Area of Operations

When establishing the operational framework, commanders use control measures to assign responsibilities, coordinate fires and maneuver, and control combat operations. One of the most important control measures is the area of operations. An area of operations is an operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and maritime forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces (JP 3-0). For land operations, an area of operations includes subordinate areas of operations as well. The Army command or joint force land component commander is the supported commander within an area of operations designated by the joint force commander for land operations. Within their areas of operations, commanders integrate and synchronize combat power. To facilitate this integration and synchronization, commanders have the authority to designate targeting priority, effects, timing, and effects of fires within their areas of operations.

## Area of Influence

Commanders consider a unit's area of influence when assigning it an area of operations. An area of influence is a geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander's command or control (JP 3-0). The area of influence normally surrounds and includes the area of operations. Understanding the area of influence helps the commander and staff plan branches to the current operation in which the force uses capabilities outside the area of operations. An area of opera-



tions should not be substantially larger than the unit's area of influence. Ideally, the area of influence would encompass the entire area of operations.

## Area of Interest

An area of interest is that area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission (JP 3-0). An area of interest for stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks may be much larger than that area associated with the offense and defense.

## Deep–Close–Security

The deep-close-security operational framework has historically been associated with terrain orientation but can be applied to temporal and organizational orientations as well.

- **Deep operations** involve efforts to prevent uncommitted enemy forces from being committed in a coherent manner. The purpose of deep operations is frequently tied to other events distant in time, space or both. Deep operations might aim to disrupt the movement of operational reserves, for example, or prevent the enemy from employing long-range cannon, rocket, or missile fires.
- **Close operations** are operations that are within a subordinate commander's area of operations. Operations projected in close areas are usually against hostile forces in immediate contact and are often the decisive operation. A close operation requires speed and mobility to rapidly concentrate overwhelming combat power at the critical time and place and to exploit success.
- **Security operations** involve efforts to provide an early and accurate warning of enemy operations and to provide time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy. These operations protect the force from surprise and develop the situation to allow the commander to use the force effectively. Security operations include necessary actions to retain freedom of action and ensure uninterrupted support or sustainment of all other operations.
- In deep, close, and security operations, a commander may refer to a **support area**.

## Decisive–Shaping–Sustaining

The decisive-shaping-sustaining framework lends itself to a broad conceptual orientation.

- **The decisive operation** is the operation that directly accomplishes the mission. It determines the outcome of a major operation, battle, or engagement. The decisive operation is the focal point around which commanders design an entire operation. Decisive operations lead directly to the accomplishment of a commander's intent. Commanders typically identify a single decisive operation, but more than one subordinate unit may play a role in a decisive operation.
- **A shaping operation** is an operation that establishes conditions for the decisive operation through effects on the enemy, other actors, and the terrain. Inform and influence activities, for example, may integrate Soldier and leader engagement tasks into the operation to reduce tensions between Army units and different ethnic groups through direct contact between Army leaders and local leaders. Shaping operations preserve conditions for the success of the decisive operation. Commanders may designate more than one shaping operation.
- **A sustaining operation** is an operation at any echelon that enables the decisive operation or shaping operation by generating and maintaining combat power. Sustaining operations differ from decisive and shaping operations in that they focus internally (on friendly forces) rather than externally (on the enemy or environment). Sustaining operations include personnel and logistics support, rear area security, movement control, terrain management, and infrastructure development.

## Main and Supporting Efforts

The main and supporting efforts operational framework—simpler than other organizing frameworks—focuses on prioritizing effort among subordinate units. Therefore, leaders can use the main and supporting efforts with either the deep-close-security framework or the decisive-shaping-sustaining framework.


- **The main effort** is a designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success. It is usually weighted with the preponderance of combat power. Typically, commanders shift the main effort one or more times during execution. Designating a main effort temporarily prioritizes resource allocation. When commanders designate a unit as the main effort, it receives priority of support and resources.
- **A supporting effort** is a designated subordinate unit with a mission that supports the success of the main effort. Commanders may provide augmentation to the main effort or develop a supporting plan synchronized with the higher plan. They resource supporting efforts with the minimum assets necessary to accomplish the mission. Forces often realize success of the main effort through success of supporting efforts.

# Activities of the Operations Process

Ref: ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process* (Mar '12), pp. 2 to 6.

The Army's framework for exercising mission command is the operations process -- the major mission command activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing the operation.

## The Operations Process (Underlying Logic)



### Central idea...

Commanders, supported by their staffs, use the **operations process** to drive the conceptual and detailed planning necessary to understand, visualize, and describe their operational environment; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and assess military operations.

### Principles

- guided by...
- Commanders drive the operations process
  - Apply critical and creative thinking
  - Build and maintain situational understanding
  - Encourage collaboration and dialogue

Ref: ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process*, fig. 1, p. iv.



Refer to *The Battle Staff SMARTbook (Guide to Designing, Planning & Conducting Military Operations)* for discussion of the operations process. Commanders, supported by their staffs, use the operations process to drive the conceptual and detailed planning necessary to understand, visualize, and describe their operational environment; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and assess military operations.

# V. Troop Leading Procedures (TLP)

*Ref: ATTP 5-0.1, Commander and Staff Officer Guide (Sept. '11), chap. 5.*

Troop leading procedures extend the MDMP to the small-unit level. The MDMP and TLP are similar but not identical. They are both linked by the basic Army problem solving methodology explained. Commanders with a coordinating staff use the MDMP as their primary planning process. Company-level and smaller units lack formal staffs and use TLP to plan and prepare for operations. This places the responsibility for planning primarily on the commander or small-unit leader.



*Leaders project their presence and guidance through troop leading procedures. TLP is the process a leader goes through to prepare the unit to accomplish a tactical mission. It begins when the mission is received. (Photo by Jeong, Hae-jung).*

Troop leading procedures are a dynamic process used by small-unit leaders to analyze a mission, develop a plan, and prepare for an operation (ADP 5-0). These procedures enable leaders to maximize available planning time while developing effective plans and preparing their units for an operation. TLP consist of eight steps. The sequence of the steps of TLP is not rigid. Leaders modify the sequence to meet the mission, situation, and available time. Leaders perform some steps concurrently, while other steps may be performed continuously throughout the operation.




*Refer to The Battle Staff SMARTbook (Guide to Designing, Planning & Conducting Military Operations) for complete discussion of the three Army planning methodologies. Additional related topics include the operations process, integrating processes and continuing activities, plans and orders, mission command, rehearsals, after action reviews (AARs), and operational terms and military symbols.*

# I. Performing Troop Leading Procedures

TLP provide small unit leaders a framework for planning and preparing for operations. This section discusses each step of TLP.

Army leaders begin TLP when they receive the initial WARNO or perceive a new mission. As each subsequent order arrives, leaders modify their assessments, update tentative plans, and continue to supervise and assess preparations. In some situations, the higher headquarters may not issue the full sequence of WARNOs; security considerations or tempo may make it impractical. In other cases, Army leaders may initiate TLP before receiving a WARNO based on existing plans and orders (contingency plans or be-prepared missions), and an understanding of the situation.



Ref: ATP 5-0.1, Commander and Staff Officer's Guide, fig. 5-2, p. 5-3.

## 1. Receive The Mission

Receipt of a mission may occur in several ways. It may begin with the initial WARNO from higher or when a leader receives an OPORD. Frequently, leaders receive a mission in a FRAGO over the radio. Ideally, they receive a series of WARNOs, the OPORD, and a briefing from their commander. Normally after receiving an OPORD, leaders are required to give a confirmation brief to their higher commander to ensure they understand the higher commander's concept of operations and intent for his unit.

Upon receipt of mission, Army leaders perform an initial assessment of the situation (METT-TC analysis) and allocate the time available for planning and preparation. (Preparation includes rehearsals and movement.) This initial assessment and time allocation form the basis of their initial WARNO. Army leaders issue the initial WARNO quickly to give subordinates as much time as possible to plan and prepare.

Ideally, a battalion headquarters issues at least three WARNOs to subordinates when conducting the MDMP. WARNOs are issued upon receipt of mission, completion of mission analysis, and when the commander approves a COA. WARNOs serve a function in planning similar to that of fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) during execution.



## Tactical Mission Fundamentals

## VI. Combat Orders

*Ref: FM 3-21.8 The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, pp. 5-4 to 5-5 and ATTP 5-0.1, Commander and Staff Officer Guide (Sept. '11), chap. 12.*

Combat orders are the means by which the small unit leader receives and transmits information from the earliest notification that an operation will occur through the final steps of execution. WARNOs, OPORDs, and FRAGOs are absolutely critical to mission success. In a tactical situation, the small unit leaders work with combat orders on a daily basis, and they must have precise knowledge of the correct format for each type of order. At the same time, they must ensure that every Soldier in the unit understands how to receive and respond to the various types of orders.

Plans and orders are the means by which commanders express their visualization, commander's intent, and decisions. They focus on results the commander expects to achieve. Plans and orders form the basis commanders use to synchronize military operations. They encourage initiative by providing the "what" and "why" of a mission, and leave the how to accomplish the mission to subordinates. They give subordinates the operational and tactical freedom to accomplish the mission by providing the minimum restrictions and details necessary for synchronization and coordination.



*The OPORD provides the troops with the essential information required to conduct the operation and to carry out the commander's intent. This format allows the team to see the big picture and orient on key information. (Photo by Jeong, Hae-jung).*



*Refer to The Battle Staff SMARTbook (Guide to Designing, Planning & Conducting Military Operations) for discussion of the plans and orders. Topics include mission orders, types and characteristics, task organization, administrative instructions and examples of plan and order formats.*



# Preparation Activities

Ref: ADRP 5-0, *The Operations Process* (Mar '12), pp. 3-1 to 3-5.

Preparation consists of those activities performed by units and Soldiers to improve their ability to execute an operation (ADP 5-0). Preparation creates conditions that improve friendly forces' opportunities for success. It requires commander, staff, unit, and Soldier actions to ensure the force is trained, equipped, and ready to execute operations. Preparation activities help commanders, staffs, and Soldiers understand a situation and their roles in upcoming operations.

## Preparation Activities

Continue to coordinate and conduct liaison	Conduct rehearsals
Initiate information collection	Conduct plans-to-operations transitions
Initiate security operations	Refine the plan
Initiate troop movement	Integrate new Soldiers and units
Initiate sustainment preparations	Complete task organization
Initiate network preparations	Train
Manage terrain	Perform pre-operations checks and inspections
Prepare terrain	Continue to build partnerships and teams
Conduct confirmation briefs	

Ref: ADRP 5-0, *The Operations Process*, table 3-1, p. 3-1.

Preparation activities vary in accordance with the factors of METT-TC. For a listing and discussion of unit preparation activities from ADRP 5-0 (Aug '12), refer to *The Battle Staff SMARTbook*. The following list is adapted from FM 6-0 (Aug '03):

### Reconnaissance Operations

During preparation, commanders take every opportunity to improve their situational understanding about the enemy and environment. Reconnaissance is often the most important part of this activity, providing data that contribute to answering the CCIR. As such, commanders conduct it with the same care as any other operation. They normally initiate reconnaissance operations before completing the plan.

### Security Operations

Security operations during preparation prevent surprise and reduce uncertainty through security operations (see FM 3-90), local security, and operations security (OPSEC; see FM 3-13). These are all designed to prevent enemies from discovering the friendly force's plan and to protect the force from unforeseen enemy actions. Security elements direct their main effort toward preventing the enemy from gathering essential elements of friendly information (EEFI). As with reconnaissance, security is a dynamic effort that anticipates and thwarts enemy collection efforts. When successful, security operations provide the force time and maneuver space to react to enemy attacks.

### Force Protection

Force protection consists of those actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against DoD personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force's fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporates the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy.

## Revising and Refining the Plan

Plans are not static; commanders adjust them based on new information. During preparation, enemies are also acting and the friendly situation is evolving: Assumptions prove true or false. Reconnaissance confirms or denies enemy actions and dispositions. The status of friendly units changes. As these and other aspects of the situation change, commanders determine whether the new information invalidates the plan, requires adjustments to the plan, or validates the plan with no further changes.

## Coordination and Liaison

Coordination is the action necessary to ensure adequately integrated relationships between separate organizations located in the same area. Coordination may include such matters as fire support, emergency defense measures, area intelligence, and other situations in which coordination is considered necessary (Army-Marine Corps). Coordination takes place continuously throughout operations and fall into two categories: external and internal. Available resources and the need for direct contact between sending and receiving headquarters determine when to establish liaison. The earlier liaison is established, the more effective the coordination.

## Rehearsals

A rehearsal is a session in which a unit or staff practices expected actions to improve performance during execution. Rehearsals occur during preparation. Is.

## Task Organizing

Task organizing is the process of allocating available assets to subordinate commanders and establishing their command and support relationships (FM 3-0). Receiving commands act to integrate units that are assigned, attached, under operational control (OPCON), or placed in direct support under a task organization.

## Training

Training develops the teamwork, trust, and mutual understanding that commanders need to exercise mission command and forces need to achieve unity of effort. During repetitive, challenging training, commanders enhance their tactical skills and learn to develop, articulate, and disseminate their commander's intent.

## Troop Movement

Troop movement is the movement of troops from one place to another by any available means (FM 3-90). Troop movements to position or reposition units for execution occur during preparation. Troop movements include assembly area reconnaissance by advance parties and route reconnaissance.

## Pre-operation Checks and Inspections

Unit preparation includes completing pre-combat checks and inspections. These ensure that soldiers, units, and systems are as fully capable and ready to execute as time and resources permit. This preparation includes precombat training that readies soldiers and systems to execute the mission.

## Logistic Preparation

Resupplying, maintaining, and issuing special supplies or equipment occurs during preparation. So does any repositioning of logistic assets. In addition, there are many other possible activities. These may include identifying and preparing forward bases, selecting and improving lines of communications, and identifying resources available in the area and making arrangements to acquire them. Commanders direct OPSEC measures to conceal preparations and friendly intentions.

## Integrating New Soldiers and Units

Commanders and staffs ensure that new soldiers are assimilated into their units and new units into the force in a posture that allows them to contribute effectively. They also prepare new units and soldiers to perform their roles in the upcoming operation.

## Tactical Mission Fundamentals

## VIII. Rehearsals

*Ref: ATP 5-0.1, Commander and Staff Officer Guide (Sept. '11), chap. 8. For complete discussion of rehearsals, refer to The Battle Staff SMARTbook.*

A rehearsal is a session in which a staff or unit practices expected actions to improve performance during execution. Rehearsing key combat actions before execution allows participants to become familiar with the operation and to translate the relatively dry recitation of the tactical plan into visual impression. This impression helps them orient themselves to their environment and other units when executing the operation. Moreover, the repetition of combat tasks during the rehearsal leaves a lasting mental picture of the sequence of key actions within the operation. This section contains guidelines for conducting rehearsals. It describes rehearsal types and techniques. It lists responsibilities of those involved.



*For units to be effective and efficient in combat, rehearsals need to become habitual in training. All commands at every level should routinely train and practice a variety of rehearsal types and techniques. (Photo by Jeong, Hae-jung).*

Rehearsals allow staff officers, subordinate commanders, and other leaders to practice executing the course of action (COA) the commander chose at the end of the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). Rehearsals are the commander's tool. Commanders use them to ensure staffs and subordinates understand the commander's intent and the concept of operations. Rehearsals also synchronize operations at times and places critical to successful mission accomplishment.

Local standing operating procedures (SOPs) should identify appropriate rehearsal types, techniques, and standards for their execution. Leaders at all levels conduct periodic after-action reviews (AARs) to ensure that units conduct rehearsals to standard and that substandard performance is corrected. AARs also provide opportunities to incorporate lessons learned into existing plans and orders, or into subsequent rehearsals.

# I. Rehearsal Techniques

Ref: ATTP 5-0.1, *Commander and Staff Officer Guide* (Sept. '11), pp. 8-2 to 8-6.

Generally, six techniques are used for executing rehearsals.

## A. Full-dress Rehearsal

A full-dress rehearsal produces the most detailed understanding of the operation. It involves every participating soldier and system. If possible, organizations execute full-dress rehearsals under the same conditions-weather, time of day, terrain, and use of live ammunition-that the force expects to encounter during the actual operation.

- **Time.** Full-dress rehearsals are the most time consuming of all rehearsal types. For companies and smaller units, the full-dress rehearsal is the most effective technique for ensuring all involved in the operation understand their parts. However, brigade and task force commanders consider the time their subordinates need to plan and prepare when deciding whether to conduct a full-dress rehearsal.
- **Echelons involved.** A subordinate unit can perform a full-dress rehearsal as part of a larger organization's reduced-force rehearsal.
- **OPSEC.** Moving a large part of the force may attract enemy attention. Commanders develop a plan to protect the rehearsal from enemy surveillance and reconnaissance. One method is to develop a plan, including graphics and radio frequencies, that rehearses selected actions but does not compromise the actual OPORD. Commanders take care to not confuse subordinates when doing this.
- **Terrain.** Terrain management for a full-dress rehearsal can be difficult if it is not considered during the initial array of forces. The rehearsal area must be identified, secured, cleared, and maintained throughout the rehearsal.

## B. Reduced-force Rehearsal

A reduced-force rehearsal involves only key leaders of the organization and its subordinate units. It normally takes fewer resources than a full-dress rehearsal. The commander first decides the level of leader involvement. The selected leaders then rehearse the plan while traversing the actual or similar terrain. A reduced-force rehearsal may be used to prepare key leaders for a full-dress rehearsal.

- **Time.** A reduced-force rehearsal normally requires less time than a full-dress rehearsal. Commanders consider the time their subordinates need to plan and prepare when deciding whether to conduct a reduced-force rehearsal.
- **Echelons involved.** A small unit can perform a full-dress rehearsal as part of a larger organization's reduced-force rehearsal.
- **OPSEC.** A reduced-force rehearsal is less likely to present an OPSEC vulnerability than a full-dress rehearsal because the number of participants is smaller. However, the number of radio transmissions required is the same as for a full-dress rehearsal and remains a consideration.
- **Terrain.** Terrain management for the reduced-force rehearsal can be just as difficult as for the full-dress rehearsal. The rehearsal area must be identified, secured, cleared, and maintained throughout the rehearsal.

## C. Terrain-model Rehearsal

The terrain-model rehearsal takes less time and fewer resources than a full-dress or reduced-force rehearsal. (A terrain-model rehearsal takes a proficient brigade from one to two hours to execute to standard.) It is the most popular rehearsal technique. An accurately constructed terrain model helps subordinate leaders visualize the commander's intent and concept of operations. When possible, commanders place the terrain model where it overlooks the actual terrain of the area of operations (AO).

- **Time.** Often, the most time-consuming part of this technique is constructing the terrain model.
- **Echelons involved.** Because a terrain model is geared to the echelon conducting the rehearsal, multiechelon rehearsals using this technique are difficult.
- **OPSEC.** This rehearsal can present an OPSEC vulnerability if the area around the site is not secured. The collection of troops and vehicles can draw enemy attention.
- **Terrain.** Terrain management is less difficult than with the previous techniques. An optimal location overlooks the terrain where the operation will be executed.

## D. Sketch-map Rehearsal

Commanders can use the sketch-map technique almost anywhere, day or night. The procedures are the same as for a terrain-model rehearsal, except the commander uses a sketch map in place of a terrain model. Effective sketches are large enough for all participants to see as each participant walks through execution of the operation. Participants move markers on the sketch to represent unit locations and maneuvers.

- **Time.** Sketch-map rehearsals take less time than terrain-model rehearsals and more time than map rehearsals.
- **Echelons involved.** Because a sketch map is geared to the echelon conducting the rehearsal, multiechelon rehearsals using this technique are difficult.
- **OPSEC.** This rehearsal can present an OPSEC vulnerability if the area around the site is not secured. The collection of troops and vehicles can draw enemy attention.
- **Terrain.** This technique requires less space than a terrain-model rehearsal. A good site is easy for participants to find, yet concealed from the enemy. An optimal location overlooks the terrain where the unit will execute the operation.

## E. Map Rehearsal

A map rehearsal is similar to a sketch-map rehearsal, except the commander uses a map and operation overlay of the same scale used to plan the operation.

- **Time.** The most time-consuming part is the rehearsal itself. A map rehearsal is normally the easiest technique to set up, since it requires only maps and current operational graphics.
- **Echelons involved.** Because a map is geared to the echelon conducting the rehearsal, multiechelon rehearsals using this technique are difficult.
- **OPSEC.** This rehearsal can present an OPSEC vulnerability if the area around the site is not secured. The collection of troops and vehicles can draw enemy attention.
- **Terrain.** This technique requires the least space. An optimal location overlooks the terrain where the operations will be executed, but is concealed from the enemy.

## F. Network Rehearsal

Network rehearsals can be executed over wide-area networks (WANs) or local-area networks (LANs). Commanders and staffs execute network rehearsals by talking through critical portions of the operation over communications networks in a sequence the commander establishes. Only the critical parts of the operation are rehearsed.

- **Time.** If the organization does not have a clear SOP and if all units are not up on the net, this technique can be very time consuming.
- **Echelons involved.** This technique lends itself to multiechelon rehearsals. Participation is limited only by commander's desires and the availability of INFOSYSs.
- **OPSEC.** If a network rehearsal is executed from current unit locations, the volume of the communications transmissions and potential compromise of information through enemy monitoring can present an OPSEC vulnerability.
- **Terrain.** If a network rehearsal is executed from unit locations, terrain considerations are minimal.

# The Offense

Ref: ADRP 3-90, *Offense and Defense* (Aug '12), chap. 3.

Offensive actions are combat operations conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers. They impose the commander's will on the enemy. A commander may also conduct offensive actions to deprive the enemy of resources, seize decisive terrain, deceive or divert the enemy, develop intelligence, or hold an enemy in position. This chapter discusses the basics of the offense. The basics discussed in this chapter apply to all offensive tasks.

The commander seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative when conducting offensive actions. Specific operations may orient on a specific enemy force or terrain feature as a means of affecting the enemy. Even when conducting primarily defensive actions, wresting the initiative from the enemy requires offensive actions.



*Offensive operations are combat operations conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers. They impose the commander's will on the enemy. (Photo by Jeong, Hae-jung).*

Effective offensive operations capitalize on accurate intelligence regarding the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. Commanders maneuver their forces to advantageous positions before making contact. However, commanders may shape conditions by deliberately making contact to develop the situation and mislead the enemy. In the offense, the decisive operation is a sudden, shattering action against enemy weakness that capitalizes on speed, surprise, and shock. If that operation does not destroy the enemy, operations continue until enemy forces disintegrate or retreat to where they are no longer a threat.



# I. Primary Offensive Tasks

An offensive task is a task conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers (ADRP 3-0). The four primary offensive tasks are movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit.

## A. Movement to Contact

Movement to contact is an offensive task designed to develop the situation and to establish or regain contact. The goal is to make initial contact with a small element while retaining enough combat power to develop the situation and mitigate the associated risk. A movement to contact also creates favorable conditions for subsequent tactical actions. The commander conducts a movement to contact when the enemy situation is vague or not specific enough to conduct an attack. Forces executing this task seek to make contact with the smallest friendly force feasible. A movement to contact may result in a meeting engagement. Once contact is made with an enemy force, the commander has five options: attack, defend, bypass, delay, or withdraw. The Army includes search and attack and cordon and search operations as part of movement to contact operations.

## B. Attack

An attack is an offensive task that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both. Attacks incorporate coordinated movement supported by fires. They may be either decisive or shaping operations. Attacks may be hasty or deliberate, depending on the time available for assessing the situation, planning, and preparing. However, based on mission variable analysis, the commander may decide to conduct an attack using only fires. An attack differs from a movement to contact because, in an attack, the commander knows part of the enemy's disposition. This knowledge enables the commander to better synchronize and employ combat power more effectively in an attack than in a movement to contact.

Subordinate forms of the attack have special purposes and include the ambush, counterattack, demonstration, feint, raid, and spoiling attack. The commander's intent and the mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) determine which of these forms of attack are employed. The commander can conduct each of these forms of attack, except for a raid, as either a hasty or a deliberate operation.

*See pp. 2-13 to 2-18.*

## C. Exploitation

Exploitation is an offensive task that usually follows the conduct of a successful attack and is designed to disorganize the enemy in depth. Exploitations seek to disintegrate enemy forces to the point where they have no alternative but to surrender or take flight. Exploitations take advantage of tactical opportunities. Division and higher headquarters normally plan exploitations as branches or sequels.

*See pp. 2-19 to 2-22.*

## D. Pursuit

A pursuit is an offensive task designed to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it. A pursuit normally follows a successful exploitation. However, any offensive task can transition into a pursuit, if enemy resistance has broken down and the enemy is fleeing the battlefield. Pursuits entail rapid movement and decentralized control. Bold action, calculated initiative, and accounting for the associated risk are required in the conduct of a pursuit.

*See pp. 2-23 to 2-28.*

## II. Purposes of Offensive Operations

*Ref: Adapted from FM 3-0 Operations (2008) and ADRP 3-90 (Aug '12).*

The main purpose of the offense is to defeat, destroy, or neutralize the enemy force. Additionally, commanders conduct offensive tasks to secure decisive terrain, to deprive the enemy of resources, to gain information, to deceive and divert the enemy, to hold the enemy in position, to disrupt the enemy's attack, and to set up the conditions for future successful operations.

### 1. Defeat, Destroy, or Neutralize the Enemy force

Well-executed offensive operations dislocate, isolate, disrupt, and destroy enemy forces. If destruction is not feasible, offensive operations compel enemy forces to retreat. Offensive maneuver seeks to place the enemy at a positional disadvantage. This allows friendly forces to mass overwhelming effects while defeating parts of the enemy force in detail before the enemy can escape or be reinforced. When required, friendly forces close with and destroy the enemy in close combat. Ultimately, the enemy surrenders, retreats in disorder, or is eliminated altogether.

### 2. Seize Decisive Terrain

Offensive maneuver may seize terrain that provides the attacker with a decisive advantage. The enemy either retreats or risks defeat or destruction. If enemy forces retreat or attempt to retake the key terrain, they are exposed to fires and further friendly maneuver.

### 3. Deprive the Enemy of Resources

At the operational level, offensive operations may seize control of major population centers, seats of government, production facilities, and transportation infrastructure. Losing these resources greatly reduces the enemy's ability to resist. In some cases, Army forces secure population centers or infrastructure and prevent irregular forces from using them as a base or benefitting from the resources that they generate.

### 4. To Gain Information

Enemy deception, concealment, and security may prevent friendly forces from gaining necessary intelligence. Some offensive operations are conducted to develop the situation and discover the enemy's intent, disposition, and capabilities.

### 5. Disrupt the Enemy's Attack


Offensive operations distract enemy ISR. They may cause the enemy to shift reserves away from the friendly decisive operation.

### 6. Set up the Conditions for Future Successful Operations



# I. MTC - Organization

A movement to contact is organized with an offensive covering force or an advance guard as a forward security element and a main body as a minimum. Based on the factors of METT-TC, the commander may increase his security forces by having an offensive covering force and an advance guard for each column, as well as flank and rear security (normally a screen or guard).



*The MTC may use multiple teams to find the enemy. When a team makes contact, they report the information. The commander decides when to commit the body of the main force.*

A movement to contact is conducted using one of two techniques: approach march, or search and attack. The approach march technique is used when the enemy is expected to deploy using relatively fixed offensive or defensive formations, and the situation remains vague. The search and attack technique is used when the enemy is dispersed, when he is expected to avoid contact or quickly disengage and withdraw, or when the higher unit needs to deny him movement in an area of operation.

## 1. Search and Attack

Search and attack is a technique for conducting a MTC; this technique shares many of the same characteristics of an area security mission. Conducted primarily by Infantry forces and often supported by heavy forces, a commander employs this form of a MTC when the enemy is operating as small, dispersed element, or when the task is to deny the enemy the ability to move within a given area. The battalion is the echelon that normally conducts a search and attack. (Note: See also p.2-12)

## 2. Approach-March Technique

A unit normally uses this technique when it conducts a MTC as part of a battalion. Depending on its location in the formation and its assigned mission, the company can act as the advance guard, move as part of the battalion main body, or provide flank or rear guards for the battalion. (Note: See also p.2-12)

# II. Attack

*Ref: FM 3-90 Tactics, chap 5 and FM 3-21.10 (FM 7-10) The Infantry Rifle Company, chap 4. Note: See also chap. 6 for discussion of special purpose attacks: the ambush, raid and swarming attacks.*

An attack is an offensive operation that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both. When the commander decides to attack or the opportunity to attack occurs during combat operations, the execution of that attack must mass the effects of overwhelming combat power against selected portions of the enemy force with a tempo and intensity that cannot be matched by the enemy. The resulting combat should not be a contest between near equals.



*The support team masses together combat power in weaponry. Machineguns, grenade launchers, and rockets are employed to suppress enemy defenses while the assault team moves forward to destroy key positions. (Dept. of Army photo by Arthur McQueen).*

Platoons and squads normally conduct an attack as part of the Infantry company. An attack requires detailed planning, synchronization, and rehearsals to be successful. The company commander designates platoon objectives with a specific mission for his assault, support, and breach elements. To ensure synchronization, all leaders must clearly understand the mission, with emphasis on the purpose, of peer and subordinate elements. Leaders must also know the location of their subordinates and adjacent units during the attack.

## Hasty vs. Deliberate Attacks

In addition to having different forms based on their purposes, attacks are characterized as hasty, or deliberate. The primary difference between the hasty and deliberate attack is the planning and coordination time available to allow the full integration and synchronization of all available combined arms assets.

# IV. Pursuit

*Ref: FM 3-90 Tactics, chap 7 and FM 3-21.10 (FM 7-10) The Infantry Rifle Company, p. 4-3.*

The pursuit is a follow-on form of attack, or counterattack when conducted from a defense. Pursuits are normally conducted at the brigade or higher level. A pursuit typically follows a successful exploitation. Ideally, it prevents a fleeing enemy from escaping and then destroys him. Companies and platoons will participate in a larger unit's exploitation and may conduct attacks as part of the higher unit's operation. Therefore, it must be planned as a branch or a sequel of other operations. The primary operation must be prepared to transition into a pursuit at an appropriate time.



*The pursuit seeks to find, fix, and finish a fleeing enemy force. To do this, an enveloping force moves quickly forward along a parallel route of the escaping enemy and suppresses the enemy in their escape routes. (Photo by Jeong, Hae-jung).*

Unlike an exploitation, which may focus on seizing key or decisive terrain instead of the enemy force, the pursuit always focuses on destroying the fleeing enemy force. This is seldom accomplished by directly pushing back the hostile forces on their lines of communication (LOCs). The commander in a pursuit tries to combine direct pressure against the retreating forces with an enveloping or encircling maneuver to place friendly troops across the enemy's lines of retreat. This fixes the enemy in positions where he can be defeated in detail. If it becomes apparent that enemy resistance has broken down entirely and the enemy is fleeing the battlefield, any type of offensive operation can transition to a pursuit.

Pursuit operations begin when an enemy force attempts to conduct retrograde operations. At that point, it becomes most vulnerable to the loss of internal cohesion and complete destruction. A pursuit aggressively executed leaves the enemy trapped, unprepared, and unable to defend, faced with the options of surrendering or complete destruction. The rapid shifting of units, continuous day and night movements, hasty attacks, containment of bypassed enemy forces, large numbers of prisoners, and a willingness to forego some synchronization to maintain contact with and pressure on a fleeing enemy characterize this type of offensive operation. Pursuit requires swift maneuver and attacks by forces to strike the enemy's most vulnerable areas. A successful pursuit requires flexible forces, initiative by commanders at all levels, and the maintenance of a high operational tempo during execution.

The enemy may conduct a retrograde when successful friendly offensive operations have shattered his defense. In addition, the enemy may deliberately conduct a retrograde when—

- He is reacting to a threat of envelopment
- He is adjusting his battlefield dispositions to meet changing situations
- He is attempting to draw the friendly force into fire sacks, kill zones, or engagement areas
- He is planning to employ weapons of mass destruction

## I. Organization

Normally, the commander does not organize specifically for a pursuit ahead of time, although he may plan for a pursuit as a branch or sequel to his offensive operation. Therefore, he must be flexible to react when the situation presents itself. The commander's maneuver and sustainment forces continue their ongoing activities while he readjusts their priorities to better support the pursuit. He acquires additional support from his higher headquarters in accordance with the factors of METT-TC.

For most pursuits, the commander organizes his forces into security, direct-pressure, encircling, follow and support, and reserve forces.

Given sufficient resources, there can be more than one encircling force. The follow and support force polices the battlefield to prevent the dissipation of the direct-pressure force's combat power. Appendix B addresses the duties of a follow and support force. The reserve allows the commander to take advantage of unforeseen opportunities or respond to enemy counterattacks.

There are two basic organizational options in conducting a pursuit; each involves a direct-pressure force. The first is a frontal pursuit that employs only a direct-pressure force. The second is a combination that uses a direct-pressure force and an encircling force. The combination pursuit is generally more effective. Either the direct-pressure force or the encircling force can conduct the decisive operation in a combination pursuit.

### A. Frontal Pursuit

In a frontal pursuit, the commander employs only a direct-pressure force to conduct operations along the same retrograde routes used by the enemy. The commander chooses this option in two situations. The first is when he cannot create an encircling force with enough mobility to get behind the enemy force. The second is when he cannot create an encircling force capable of sustaining itself until it links up with the direct-pressure force. Either situation can occur because of restrictive terrain or because an enemy withdraws in a disciplined, cohesive formation and still has significant available combat power.

## B. Combination Pursuit

In the pursuit, the most decisive effects result from combining the frontal pursuit with encirclement. In the combination pursuit, the direct-pressure force initiates a frontal pursuit immediately on discovering the enemy's initiation of a retrograde operation. This slows the tempo of the enemy's withdrawal (or fixes him in his current position if possible), and may destroy his rear security force. The direct-pressure force's actions help to set the conditions necessary for the success of the encircling force's operation by maintaining constant pressure. The encircling force conducts an envelopment or a turning movement to position itself where it can block the enemy's escape and trap him between the two forces, which leads to complete annihilation.

## II. Planning & Preparation

The commander anticipates an enemy retrograde operation as either a branch or a sequel to the plan. The plan should identify possible direct-pressure, encircling, follow and support, and reserve forces and issue on-order or be-prepared missions to these forces. The commander should employ the maximum number of available combat troops in the pursuit. He bases the details of his plan on the enemy's anticipated actions, the combat formation of the attacking troops, and the amount of planning time available. The commander also considers—

- Possible routes the enemy might use to conduct his retrograde operations
- Availability of his intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to detect enemy forces and acquire targets in depth
- Scheme of maneuver
- Availability and condition of pursuit routes
- Availability of forces to keep the pressure on the enemy until his destruction is complete
- Critical terrain features
- Use of reconnaissance and security forces
- Allocation of precision-guided munitions and aviation support
- Availability of CS and CSS resources


Pursuit planning must address the possibility of defending temporarily during operational pauses while making preparations to continue the pursuit or to consolidate gains. However, the use of an operational pause generally results in the abandonment of the pursuit because the enemy is able to use that time to organize a coherent defense.

The commander must specifically address how to detect the enemy retrograde operations; otherwise, the enemy may succeed in breaking contact. The commander relies on active reconnaissance, an understanding of enemy tactics, and knowledge of the current tactical situation. He must watch for signs that indicate the enemy is preparing to conduct a retrograde, such as when the enemy—

- Lacks the capability to maintain his position or cohesion
- Conducts limited local counterattacks
- Intensifies his reconnaissance and intelligence efforts
- Increases the amount of rearward movements and changes the type of elements conducting them, especially by fire support and reserves
- Prepares his facilities, installations, equipment, and supply stock-piles for demolition and destruction
- Decreases fire in intensity and effectiveness through the AO
- Increases his fires in one or more individual sectors of the front, which does not appear to be in accordance with the developing situation, and at a time when the amount of defensive fires seems to be decreasing

### III. Conducting the Pursuit - A Small Unit Perspective

Pursuits are normally conducted at the brigade or higher level. A pursuit typically follows a successful exploitation. Ideally, it prevents a fleeing enemy from escaping and then destroys him. Companies and platoons will participate in a larger unit's exploitation and may conduct attacks as part of the higher unit's operation.



*The pursuit deploys teams forward to envelop and fix the enemy in their escape route. The suppressed enemy cannot coordinate a defense, and the main force defeats them in detail. (Ref: FM 3-90, chap 7, fig. 7-2).*



The pursuit is planned as a branch or a sequel to another combat operation. It is virtually impossible to detail the execution because much depends on the status of the enemy forces after the primary operation concludes. However, pursuit has the intended goal of destroying or capturing the enemy force.

Once the commander initiates a pursuit, he continues pursuing the enemy until a higher commander terminates the pursuit. Conditions under which a higher commander may terminate a pursuit include the following—

- The pursuing force annihilates or captures the enemy and resistance ceases
- The pursuing force fixes the enemy for follow-on forces
- The high commander makes an assessment that the pursuing force is about to reach a culminating point



*The main body maneuvers aggressively while the enveloping force still has the enemy fixed. The main body attacks and defeats in detail each pocket of enemy. This process continues until culmination. (Photo by Jeong, Hae-jung).*





1. The commander and subordinate leaders must know approximately where the enemy escape routes are located. A fixing force (typically the reserve of any combat operation) must move deep into enemy territory to identify the enemy's route of escape and relay this information back to the main force. The fixing force will suppress the enemy in individual pockets within the escape routes to prevent the enemy from coordinating an effective response with adjacent enemy units. The main force will aggressively maneuver up to and destroy the trapped, isolated enemy. Then the process repeats in order to trap and destroy as many enemy troops as possible.
2. The pursuit is focused on the destruction of the enemy force. As such, the pursuit force bypasses any terrain or facilities that do not present a threat to their rear or flanks. Do not leave an enemy force behind that would be capable of delaying the fixing force or the main force of the pursuit.
3. The commander must look for signs of culmination. As the enemy is pursued, they often are falling back on their own resources. For example, they could be falling back to designated rally points—which theoretically offer them defensive positions.

# V. Small Unit Offensive Tactical Tasks

Ref: FM 3-21.8 (FM 7-8) *The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad*, pp. 7-31 to 7-36.

Tactical tasks are specific activities performed by units as they conduct tactical operations or maneuver. At the platoon level, these tasks are the warfighting actions the platoon may be called on to perform in battle. This section provides discussion and examples of some common actions and tasks the platoon may perform during a movement to contact, a hasty attack, or a deliberate attack. It is extremely important to fully understand the purpose behind a task (what) because the purpose (why) defines what the platoon must achieve as a result of executing its mission. A task can be fully accomplished, but if battlefield conditions change and the platoon is unable to achieve the purpose, the mission is a failure.

*Note: The situations used in this section to describe the platoon leader's role in the conduct of tactical tasks are examples only. They are not applicable in every tactical operation, nor are they intended to prescribe any specific method or technique the platoon must use in achieving the purpose of the operation. Ultimately, it is up to the commander or leader on the ground to apply both the principles discussed here, and his knowledge of the situation. An understanding of his unit's capabilities, the enemy he is fighting, and the ground on which the battle is taking place are critical when developing a successful tactical solution.*

Seize		<i>Seize</i> is a tactical mission task that involves taking possession of a designated area by using overwhelming force. An enemy force can no longer place direct fire on an objective that has been seized.
Suppress	No graphic provided in FM 3-90.	<i>Suppress</i> is a tactical mission task that results in the temporary degradation of the performance of a force or weapon system below the level needed to accomplish its mission.
Support by Fire		<i>Support-by-fire</i> is a tactical mission task in which a maneuver force moves to a position where it can engage the enemy by direct fire in support of another maneuvering force. The primary objective of the support force is normally to fix and suppress the enemy so he cannot effectively fire on the maneuvering force.
Clear		<i>Clear</i> is a tactical mission task that requires the commander to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance within an assigned area.
Attack by Fire		<i>Attack-by-fire</i> is a tactical mission task in which a commander uses direct fires, supported by indirect fires, to engage an enemy without closing with him to destroy, suppress, fix, or deceive him.

*Tactical mission tasks describe the results or effects the commander wants to achieve - the what and why of a mission statement. For a more complete listing of tactical mission tasks, see pp. 1-11 to 1-14.*



## I. Seize

Seizing involves gaining possession of a designated objective by overwhelming force. Seizing an objective is complex. It involves closure with the enemy, under fire of the enemy's weapons to the point that the friendly assaulting element gains positional advantage over, destroys, or forces the withdrawal of the enemy.

A platoon may seize prepared or unprepared enemy positions from either an offensive or defensive posture. Examples include the following:

- A platoon seizes the far side of an obstacle as part of a company breach or seizes a building to establish a foothold in an urban environment
- A platoon seizes a portion of an enemy defense as part of a company deliberate attack
- A platoon seizes key terrain to prevent its use by the enemy

There are many inherent dangers in seizing an objective. They include the requirement to execute an assault, prepared enemy fires, a rapidly changing tactical environment, and the possibility of fratricide when friendly elements converge. These factors require the platoon leader and subordinate leaders to understand the following planning considerations.

Developing a clear and current picture of the enemy situation is very important. The platoon may seize an objective in a variety of situations, and the platoon leader will often face unique challenges in collecting and disseminating information on the situation. For example, if the platoon is the seizing element during a company deliberate attack, the platoon leader should be able to develop an accurate picture of the enemy situation during the planning and preparation for the operation. He must be prepared to issue modifications to the platoon as new intelligence comes in or as problems are identified in rehearsals.

In another scenario, the platoon leader may have to develop his picture of the enemy situation during execution. He must rely more heavily on reports from units in contact with the enemy and on his own development of the situation. In this type of situation, such as when the platoon is seizing an enemy combat security outpost during a movement to contact, the platoon leader must plan on relaying information as it develops. He uses clear, concise FRAGOs to explain the enemy situation, and gives clear directives to subordinates.

## II. Suppress

The platoon maneuvers to a position on the battlefield where it can observe the enemy and engage him with direct and indirect fires. The purpose of suppressing is to prevent the enemy from effectively engaging friendly elements with direct or indirect fires. To accomplish this, the platoon must maintain orientation both on the enemy force and on the friendly maneuver element it is supporting. During planning and preparation, the platoon leader should consider—

- Conducting a line-of-sight analysis during his terrain analysis to identify the most advantageous positions from which to suppress the enemy
- Planning and integrating direct and indirect fires
- Determining control measures (triggers) for lifting, shifting, or ceasing direct fires
- Determining control measures for shifting or ceasing indirect fires
- Planning and rehearsing actions on contact
- Planning for large Class V expenditures. (The company commander and the platoon leader must consider a number of factors in assessing Class V require-

# The Defense

*Ref: ADRP 3-90, Offense and Defense (Aug '12), chap. 4.*

While the offensive element of combat operations is more decisive, the defense is the stronger element. However, the conduct of defensive tasks alone normally cannot achieve a decision. Their purpose is to create conditions for a counteroffensive that allows Army forces to regain the initiative. Other reasons for conducting defensive actions include—

- Retaining decisive terrain or denying a vital area to the enemy
- Attriting or fixing the enemy as a prelude to offensive actions
- Surprise action by the enemy
- Increasing the enemy's vulnerability by forcing the enemy commander to concentrate subordinate forces



*While the offense is the most decisive type of combat operation, the defense is the stronger type. The inherent strengths of the defense include the defender's ability to occupy his positions before the attack and use the available time to prepare his defenses. (Photo by Jeong, Hae-jung).*

A defensive task is a task conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability tasks (ADRP 3-0). While the offensive element of combat operations is more decisive, the defense is the stronger element. The inherent strengths of the defense include the defender's ability to occupy positions before the attack and use the available time to prepare the defenses. The defending force ends its defensive preparations only when it retrogrades or begins to engage the enemy. Even during combat, the defending force takes the opportunities afforded by lulls in the action to improve its positions and repair combat damage. The defender maneuvers to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage and attacks the enemy at every opportunity, using fires, electronic warfare, and joint assets, such as close air support.

The static and mobile elements of the defense combine to deprive the enemy of the initiative. The defender contains the enemy while seeking every opportunity to transition to the offense.

## I. Purposes of Defense Operations

Commanders choose to defend to create conditions for a counteroffensive that allows Army forces to regain the initiative. Other reasons for conducting a defense include to retain decisive terrain or deny a vital area to the enemy, to attrit or fix the enemy as a prelude to the offense, in response to surprise action by the enemy, or to increase the enemy's vulnerability by forcing the enemy to concentrate forces.

## II. Defensive Tasks

There are three basic defensive tasks—area defense, mobile defense, and retrograde. These apply to both the tactical and operational levels of war, although the mobile defense is more often associated with the operational level. These three tasks have significantly different concepts and pose significantly different problems. Therefore, each defensive task must be dealt with differently when planning and executing the defense. Although the names of these defensive tasks convey the overall aim of a selected defense, each typically contains elements of the other and combines static and mobile elements.

Although on the defense, the commander remains alert for opportunities to attack the enemy whenever resources permit. Within a defensive posture, the defending commander may conduct a spoiling attack or a counterattack, if permitted to do so by the mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC).

### A. Area Defense

The area defense is a defensive task that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated terrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright. The focus of the area defense is on retaining terrain where the bulk of the defending force positions itself in mutually supporting, prepared positions. Units maintain their positions and control the terrain between these positions. The decisive operation focuses on fires into engagement areas, possibly supplemented by a counterattack.

*Note: See pp. 3-11 to 3-18.*

### B. Mobile Defense

The mobile defense is a defensive task that concentrates on the destruction or defeat of the enemy through a decisive attack by a striking force. The mobile defense focuses on defeating or destroying the enemy by allowing enemy forces to advance to a point where they are exposed to a decisive counterattack by the striking force.

*Note: See pp. 3-5 to 3-10.*

### C. Retrograde

The retrograde is a defensive task that involves organized movement away from the enemy. The enemy may force these operations, or a commander may execute them voluntarily. The higher commander of the force executing the retrograde must approve the retrograde operation before its initiation in either case. The retrograde is a transitional operation; it is not conducted in isolation. It is part of a larger scheme of maneuver designed to regain the initiative and defeat the enemy.

*Note: See pp. 3-19 to 3-22.*

### III. Characteristics of the Defense



*A feature of the defense is a striving to regain the initiative from the attacking enemy. The defending commander uses the characteristics of the defense to help accomplish that task. (Photo by Jeong, Hae-jung).*

#### A. Disruption

Defenders disrupt the attackers' tempo and synchronization with actions designed to prevent them from massing combat power. Commanders employ disruptive actions to unhinge the enemy's preparations and attacks. Disruption methods include misdirecting or destroying enemy reconnaissance forces, breaking up formations, isolating units, and attacking or disrupting systems.

#### B. Flexibility

The conduct of the defense requires flexible plans. Commanders focus planning on preparations in depth, use of reserves, and the ability to shift the main effort. Commanders add flexibility by designating supplementary positions, designing counterattack plans, and preparing to counterattack.

#### C. Maneuver

Maneuver allows the defender to take full advantage of the area of operations and to mass and concentrate when desirable. Maneuver, through movement in combination with fire, allows the defender to achieve a position of advantage over the enemy to accomplish the mission.

#### D. Mass and Concentration

Defenders seek to mass the effects of overwhelming combat power where they choose and shift it to support the decisive operation. Commanders retain and, when

necessary, reconstitute a reserve and maneuver to gain local superiority at the point of decision.

#### E. Operations in Depth

Simultaneous application of combat power throughout the area of operations improves the chances for success while minimizing friendly casualties. Quick, violent, and simultaneous action throughout the depth of the defender's area of operations can hurt, confuse, and even paralyze an enemy force just as that enemy force is most exposed and vulnerable. Synchronization of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations facilitates mission success.

#### F. Preparation

The defense has inherent strengths. The defender arrives in the area of operations before the attacker and uses the available time to prepare. Defenders study the ground and select positions that allow the massing of fires on likely approaches. They combine natural and manmade obstacles to canalize attacking forces into engagement areas. Defending forces coordinate and rehearse actions on the ground, gaining intimate familiarity with the terrain. They place security, intelligence, and reconnaissance forces throughout the area of operations. These preparations multiply the effectiveness of the defense. Commanders continue defensive preparations in depth, even as the close engagement begins.

#### G. Security

Commanders secure their forces principally through protection, military deception, inform and influence activities, and cyber electromagnetic activities. Security operations prevent enemy intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets from determining friendly locations, strengths, and weaknesses. Protection efforts preserve combat power. Military deception and cyber electromagnetic activities inaccurately portray friendly forces, mislead enemy commanders, and deny those same enemy commanders the ability to use cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum.

# I. Mobile Defense

*Ref: FM 3-90 Tactics, chap 10; and FM 3-21.10 (FM 7-10) The Infantry Rifle Company, chap 5.*

The mobile defense is a type of defensive operation that concentrates on the destruction or defeat of the enemy through a decisive attack by a striking force. It focuses on destroying the attacking force by permitting the enemy to advance into a position that exposes him to counterattack and envelopment. The commander holds the majority of his available combat power in a striking force for his decisive operation, a major counterattack. He commits the minimum possible combat power to his fixing force that conducts shaping operations to control the depth and breadth of the enemy's advance. The fixing force also retains the terrain required to conduct the striking force's decisive counterattack. The area defense, on the other hand, focuses on retaining terrain by absorbing the enemy into an interlocked series of positions, where he can be destroyed largely by fires.



*The mobile defense focuses on defeating or destroying the enemy by allowing him to advance to a point where he is exposed to a decisive counterattack by the striking force. The decisive operation is a counterattack conducted by the striking force. (Photo by Jeong, Hae-jung).*

Small units do not normally conduct a mobile defense because of their inability to fight multiple engagements throughout the width, depth, and height of the AO, while simultaneously resourcing striking, fixing, and reserve forces. Typically, the striking force in a mobile defense may consist of one-half to two-thirds of the defender's combat power. Smaller units generally conduct an area defense or a delay as part of the fixing force as the commander shapes the enemy's penetration or they attack as part of the striking force. Alternatively, they can constitute a portion of the reserve.



the striking force by isolating the object of the striking force and destroying the enemy's key C2 nodes, logistics resupply units, and reserves. Whenever possible the commander sequences these shaping operations, to include offensive information operations, so that

the impact of their effects coincides with the commitment of the striking force. To generate a tempo that temporarily paralyzes enemy C2, the intensity of these shaping operations may increase dramatically on the commitment of the striking force. The commander continues to conduct shaping operations once the striking force commits to prevent enemy forces from outside the objective area from interfering with executing the decisive counterattack.

### 3. Fix the Enemy

Fixing the enemy is the second half of shaping operations and results in establishing the conditions necessary for decisive operations by the striking force. Typically, the commander of the defending force allows the enemy force to penetrate into the defensive AO before the striking force attacks. The fixing force may employ a combination of area defense, delay, and strong point defensive techniques to shape the enemy penetration. The intent of the fixing force is not necessarily to defeat the enemy but to shape the penetration to facilitate a decisive counterattack by the striking force. The commander ensures that the missions and task organization of subordinate units within the fixing force are consistent with his concept for shaping the enemy penetration. Defensive positions within the fixing force may not be contiguous since the fixing force contains only the minimum-essential combat power to accomplish its mission.

### 4. Maneuver

The commander's situational understanding is critical in establishing the conditions that initiate the striking force's movement and in determining the general area that serves as a focus for the counterattack. Situational understanding includes identifying those points in time and space where the counterattack proves decisive. A force-oriented objective or an EA usually indicates the decisive point. The staff synchronizes the unit's activities in time and space to sufficiently mass the effects of the striking force at the right time and place.

The actions of the striking force are the echelon's decisive operation on its commitment. The commander's ISR systems focus entirely on tracking the enemy's advance. The striking force commander continuously receives intelligence and combat information updates that allow him to adjust his counterattack as necessary to defeat the targeted enemy. Once the enemy starts his attack, any forward-deployed elements of the striking force withdraw to AAs or attack positions and prepare for their commitment in counterattack.

The enemy attempts to discover the strength, composition, and location of the units that constitute the fixing force and the striking force. The commander uses security forces and information operations to deny the enemy this information and degrade the collection capabilities of enemy ISR assets. The commander routinely repositions to mislead the enemy and to protect his force. In addition, his plans and preparations incorporate defensive information operations. The commander normally tries to portray an area defense while hiding the existence and location of the striking force.

### 5. Follow Through

All defensive operations intend to create the opportunity to transition to the offense. In a mobile defense, that transitional opportunity generally results from the success of the striking force's attack. The commander exploits his success and attempts to establish conditions for a pursuit if his assessment of the striking force's attack is that there are opportunities for future offensive operations.

## II. Area Defense

*Ref: FM 3-90 Tactics, chap 8 and 9; FM 3-21.10 (FM 7-10) The Infantry Rifle Company, chap 5; and FM 3-21.8 (FM 7-8) Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, chap 8.*

The area defense is a type of defensive operation that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated terrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright. An area defense capitalizes on the strength inherent in closely integrated defensive organization on the ground.

A commander should conduct an area defense when the following conditions occur:

- When directed to defend or retain specified terrain
- When he cannot resource a striking force
- The forces available have less mobility than the enemy
- The terrain affords natural lines of resistance and limits the enemy to a few well-defined avenues of approach, thereby restricting the enemy's maneuver
- There is enough time to organize the position
- Terrain constraints and lack of friendly air superiority limit the striking force's options in a mobile defense to a few probable employment options

The area defense retains dominance over a given geographical location. It does this by employing a fortified defensive line, a screening force, and a reserve force. Particular care is taken in coordinating and synchronizing fire control measures in order to repel any enemy attack.



*The reserve force is perhaps the single most decisive element of the defense. The reserve may reinforce a failing line, occupy a secondary defensive position, or counterattack. (Photo by Jeong, Hae-jung).*

# I. Area Defense - Organization

The platoon will normally defend in accordance with command orders using one of these basic techniques (see pp. 3-23 to 3-28):

- Defend an area
- Defend a battle position
- Defend a strongpoint
- Defend a perimeter
- Defend a reverse slope

The commander conducting an area defense combines static and mobile actions to accomplish his assigned mission. Static actions usually consist of fires from prepared positions. Mobile actions include using the fires provided by units in prepared positions as a base for counterattacks and repositioning units between defensive positions. The commander can use his reserve and uncommitted forces to conduct counterattacks and spoiling attacks to desynchronize the enemy or prevent him from massing.

A well-conducted area defense is anything but static. It's actually quite active in that it continues to advance its own fighting position while it patrols forward to gather intelligence on the enemy. The area defense has great depth and will track and channel the enemy from considerable distances beyond the defense.

## Primary Positions

In addition to establishing the platoon's primary positions, the platoon leader and subordinate leaders normally plan for preparation and occupation of alternate, supplementary, and subsequent positions. This is done IAW the company order. The platoon and/or company reserve need to know the location of these positions. The following are tactical considerations for these positions.

## Alternate Positions

The following characteristics and considerations apply to an alternate position:

- Covers the same avenue of approach or sector of fire as the primary position
- Located slightly to the front, flank, or rear of the primary position
- Positioned forward of the primary defensive positions during limited visibility operations
- Normally employed to supplement or support positions with weapons of limited range, such as Infantry squad positions. They are also used as an alternate position to fall back to if the original position is rendered ineffective or as a position for Soldiers to rest or perform maintenance

## Supplementary Positions

The following characteristics and considerations apply to a supplementary position:

- Covers an avenue of approach or sector of fire different from those covered by the primary position
- Occupied based on specific enemy actions

## Subsequent Positions

The following characteristics and considerations apply to a subsequent position:

- Covers the same avenue of approach and or sector of fire as the primary position
- Located in depth through the defensive area
- Occupied based on specific enemy actions or conducted as part of the higher headquarters' scheme of maneuver



As part of a larger element, the platoon conducts defensive operations in a sequence of integrated and overlapping phases:

- Reconnaissance, security operations, and enemy preparatory fires
- Occupation
- Approach of the enemy main attack
- Enemy assault
- Counterattack
- Consolidation and reorganization



*The defense makes use of obstacles to expose and/or slow the enemy advance in our prepared engagement areas. Troops use of wire obstacles and mines in defilades that cannot be covered by fire. (Photo by Jeong, Hae-jung).*

At the small unit level, the area defense typically employs three teams and rotates those teams through the three tasked responsibilities—manning the line, manning the reserve, and patrolling forward. Each team takes its turn in conducting the three tasked responsibilities.

The line includes 2-man fighting positions and crew served weapon positions. It also includes the observation post/listening post (OP/LP) that is positioned just forward of our defensive line. Finally, while the command post (CP) is located behind our line near the reserve force, it is also part of the line force. The command team, however, does not rotate to the other assigned tasks, but rotates a rest plan amongst the command team.

This organization permits:

- About 50 percent of the force on the defensive line at all times
- A reserve force of 25 percent to add depth to our position
- A patrolling force of 25 percent forward to monitor enemy activity

The reserve and screening forces make up half of the total force for the area defense. The line force utilizes the other half of our troops. The troops are typically rotated in 2-hour intervals. That's two hours on the line, two hours patrolling, two hours on the line again, and two hours in reserve (where troops can implement a sleep plan).

### III. Conducting the Area Defense - A Small Unit Perspective

The area defense forms the forward line of troops (FLOT). Typically, the FLOT defends against one direction in approximately a 120° frontal-fan that overlooks the designated engagement areas within the forward edge of battle area (FEBA). The defensive line interlocks with friendly units or impassable terrain to the left and right of the position.

1. Prior to moving up to the FEBA, the patrol leader (PL) moves the patrol into security halt at an appropriate distance. The PL conducts a leader's recon of the FEBA and selects the best location to establish a defensive line. The PL issues a five-point contingency plan with the assistant patrol leader (APL) before leaving on the recon.
2. The PL moves up to the FEBA with at least a security team. The security team is placed in over-watch at the designated release point. This allows the PL to move more freely about the terrain and determine how best to place the defensive line. The leader's recon may require moving the entire recon team across the FEBA to consider possible avenues for an enemy attack.
3. Once the PL confirms or adjusts the plan, the security team is given a five-point contingency plan and left at the release point to monitor the FEBA. The PL returns to the patrol to disseminate any changes to the original plan.
4. Upon returning, the rest of the patrol forms into the line team, the reserve force, and the screening force. The order of march depends on the OPORD, but typically the screening force is first in formation so that it may move forward for security as the line team establishes the FLOT. The PL leads the patrol and links up with the security team at the release point.



*Mortars serve as combat force multipliers. They add significant punch against targets within the engagement area and break up the enemy's attack formations. Their placement and fires are carefully considered. (Dept. of Army photo by Gary L. Kieffer).*

5. After linking up with the security team, the PL designates the location of fighting positions for crew-served weapons and indicates their primary direction of fire. The PL then designates a CP at an appropriate distance behind the line, typically towards the center of the entire line. The PL designates an OP/LP location just forward of any wire obstacles. The PL designates a 'fall back' position—an alternate position that can still cover the same engagement area within the FEBA.

6. The PL coordinates with units to his left and right to be certain he has adequately linked in with friendly defenses. Meanwhile the team leaders disseminate to every member of the patrol the location of the CP, the OP/LP, and the alternate position.

7. At this point, the line team leader assigns each member a fighting position and a sector of fire to fill in the lazy "W". He ensures that all positions interlock with at least the position to their left and right. Fighting positions are 2-man positions and are placed only close enough that they mutually support each other's immediate front. This distance varies according to different types of terrain. But at a minimum, the positions must be able to cover forward obstacles with fire. Landmine and concertina wire obstacles are placed out of hand grenade range (40 meters or more) and are in full view of friendly troops.

8. The reserve force locates behind the CP, out of sight from the line and out of the way of assigned indirect fire crews. The reserve force familiarizes with the defensive line and the alternative position.



*Communication devices are established at key locations—the CP, flanks, and OP/LP. Field telephones are faster than runners, and more secure than radios. (Photo by Jeong, Hae-jung).*

9. Communication is established between key positions. This typically involves the use of field phones and landlines wire. Field phones are more secure than radios and are not concerned with high traffic and frequency availability. Most field phones transmit a distance of several kilometers—ample distance for a defensive position.

10. At this point in the defense, the PL assumes the role of the forward unit commander. He collects the sector sketches from the team leaders to create his own master sketch and reports progress to higher command.

# IV. Small Unit Defensive Techniques

Ref: FM 3-21.8 (FM 7-8) *The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad*, pp. 8-23 to 8-33.

Though the outcome of decisive combat derives from offensive actions, leaders often find it is necessary, even advisable, to defend. The general task and purpose of all defensive operations is to defeat an enemy attack and gain the initiative for offensive operations. It is important to set conditions of the defense so friendly forces can destroy or fix the enemy while preparing to seize the initiative and return to the offense. The platoon may conduct the defense to gain time, retain key terrain, facilitate other operations, preoccupy the enemy in one area while friendly forces attack him in another, or erode enemy forces. A well coordinated defense can also set the conditions for follow-on forces and follow-on operations.

## Platoon Defensive Techniques

**A platoon will normally defend IAW using one of these basic techniques:**



**Defend an Area**



**Defend a Battle Position**



**Defend a Strongpoint**



**Defend a Perimeter**



**Defend a Reverse Slope**

Ref: FM 3-21.8 (FM 7-10), p. 8-23.

## I. Defend An Area

Defending an area sector allows a unit to maintain flank contact and security while ensuring unity of effort in the scheme of maneuver. Areas afford depth in the platoon defense. They allow the platoon to achieve the platoon leader's desired end state while facilitating clearance of fires at the appropriate level of responsibility. The company commander normally orders a platoon to defend an area when flexibility is desired, when retention of specific terrain features is not necessary, or when the unit cannot concentrate fires because of any of the following factors:

- Extended frontages
- Intervening, or cross-compartmented, terrain features
- Multiple avenues of approach

The platoon is assigned an area defense mission to prevent a specific amount of enemy forces from penetrating the area of operations. To maintain the integrity of the area defense, the platoon must remain tied to adjacent units on the flanks. The platoon may be directed to conduct the defense in one of two ways.

He may specify a series of subsequent defensive positions within the area from where the platoon will defend to ensure that the fires of two platoons can be massed.

He may assign an area to the platoon. The platoon leader assumes responsibility for most tactical decisions and controlling maneuvers of his subordinate squads by assigning them a series of subsequent defensive positions. This is done IAW guidance from the company commander in the form of intent, specified tasks, and the concept of the operation. The company commander normally assigns an area to a platoon only when it is fighting in isolation.

## II. Defend a Battle Position

The company commander assigns the defensive technique of defending a battle position to his platoons when he wants to mass the fires of two or more platoons in a company engagement area, or to position a platoon to execute a counterattack. A unit defends from a battle position to—

- Destroy an enemy force in the engagement area
- Block an enemy avenue of approach
- Control key or decisive terrain
- Fix the enemy force to allow another friendly unit to maneuver

The company commander designates engagement areas to allow each platoon to concentrate its fires or to place it in an advantageous position for the counterattack. Battle positions are developed in such a manner to provide the platoon the ability to place direct fire throughout the engagement area. The size of the platoon battle position can vary, but it should provide enough depth and maneuver space for subordinate squads to maneuver into alternate or supplementary positions and to counterattack. The battle position is a general position on the ground. The platoon leader places his squads on the most favorable terrain in the battle position based on the higher unit mission and commander's intent. The platoon then fights to retain the position unless ordered by the company commander to counterattack or displace. The following are basic methods of employing a platoon in a battle position:

### 1. Same battle position, same avenue of approach

Rifle squads are on the same battle position covering the same avenue of approach. The platoon can defend against mounted and dismounted attacks and move rapidly to another position.

All squads are in the same battle position when the terrain provides good observation, fields of fire, and cover and concealment.

Employing all the squads of the platoon on the same battle position covering the same avenue of approach is the most conservative use of the platoon. Its primary advantages are that it facilitates command and control functions because of the proximity of squad elements on the same approach and it provides increased security.



# I. Stability Operations

Ref: ADP 3-07, *Stability* (Aug '12).

Stability operations encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (JP 3-0). Stability operations can be conducted in support of a host-nation or interim government or as part of an occupation when no government exists.



*Stability operations involve both coercive and constructive military actions. They help to establish a safe and secure environment and facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries. Stability operations can also help establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions and support the transition to legitimate local governance. It is essential that stability operations maintain the initiative by pursuing objectives that resolve the causes of instability. Stability operations cannot succeed if they only react to enemy initiatives. (Dept. of Army photo by Sgt. Robert Yde).*

Coordination, integration, and synchronization between host-nation elements, other government agencies, and Army forces are enhanced by transparency and credibility. The degree to which the host nation cooperates is fundamental. Commanders publicize their mandate and intentions. Within the limits of operations security, they make the populace aware of the techniques used to provide security and control. Actions on the ground reinforced by a clear and consistent message produce transparency. This transparency reinforces credibility. Credibility reflects the populace's assessment of whether the force can accomplish the mission. Army forces require the structure, resources, and rules of engagement appropriate to accomplishing the mission and discharging their duties swiftly and firmly. They must leave no doubt as to their capability and intentions.

# I. Stability Operations (Decisive Operations)

*Ref: ADP 3-07, Stability (Aug '12).*

Stability ultimately aims to create a condition so the local populace regards the situation as legitimate, acceptable, and predictable. These conditions consist of the level of violence; the functioning of governmental, economic, and societal institutions; and the general adherence to local laws, rules, and norms of behavior.

Sources of instability manifest themselves locally. First, instability stems from decreased support for the government based on what locals actually expect of their government. Second, instability grows from increased support for anti-government elements, which usually occurs when locals see spoilers as helping to solve the priority grievance. Lastly, instability stems from the undermining of the normal functioning of society where the emphasis must be on a return to the established norms.

Stabilization is a process in which personnel identify and mitigate underlying sources of instability to establish the conditions for long-term stability. While long-term development requires stability, stability does not require long-term development. Therefore, stability tasks focus on identifying and targeting the root causes of instability and by building the capacity of local institutions.

## II. Primary Army Stability Tasks

Army units conduct five primary stability tasks. These tasks support efforts that encompass both military and nonmilitary efforts generally required to achieve stability. These tasks are similar to and nested with the joint functions and DOS stability sectors. Taken together, they provide a base for linking the execution of activities among the instruments of national and international power as part of unified action.

**1. Establish Civil Security.** Establishing civil security involves providing for the safety of the host nation and its population, including protection from internal and external threats. Establishing civil security provides needed space for host-nation and civil agencies and organizations to work toward sustained peace.

**2. Establish Civil Control.** Establishing civil control supports efforts to institute rule of law and stable, effective governance. Civil control relates to public order—the domain of the police and other law enforcement agencies, courts, prosecution services, and prisons (known as the Rule of Law sector).


**3. Restore Essential Services.** The restoration of essential services in a fragile environment is essential toward achieving stability. The basic functions of local governance stop during conflict and other disasters. Initially, military forces lead efforts to establish or restore the most basic civil services: the essential food, water, shelter, and medical support necessary to sustain the population until forces restore local civil services. Military forces follow the lead of other USG agencies, particularly United States Agency for International Development, in the long restoration of essential services.

**4. Support to Governance.** When a legitimate and functional host-nation government exists, military forces operating to support the state have a limited role. However, if the host-nation government cannot adequately perform its basic civil functions—whatever the reason—some degree of military support to governance may be necessary. Military efforts to support governance focus on restoring public administration and resuming public services.

**5. Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development.** Military efforts to support the economic sector are critical to sustainable economic development. The economic viability of a host nation often exhibits stress and ultimately fractures as conflict, disaster, and internal strife overwhelms the government. Signs of economic stress include rapid increases in inflation, uncontrolled escalation of public debt, and a general decline in the host nation's ability to provide for the well-being of its people. Economic problems inextricably connect to governance and security concerns. As one institution begins to fail, others likely follow.



# Stability Underlying Logic



Ref: ADP 3-07, *Stability*, fig. 1, p. iii.



Refer to *The Stability, Peace and Counterinsurgency SMARTbook (Nontraditional approaches in a Dynamic Security Environment)* for discussion of stability operations. Related topics include peace and counterinsurgency operations; civil-military operations; engagement, security cooperation, and security force assistance, multinational operations and IGO/NGO coordination.

## II. Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations

Ref: FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, chap. 1 and chap. 5.

Insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) are complex subsets of warfare. Globalization, technological advancement, urbanization, and extremists who conduct suicide attacks for their cause have certainly influenced contemporary conflict; however, warfare in the 21st century retains many of the characteristics it has exhibited since ancient times. Warfare remains a violent clash of interests between organized groups characterized by the use of force. Achieving victory still depends on a group's ability to mobilize support for its political interests (often religiously or ethnically based) and to generate enough violence to achieve political consequences. Means to achieve these goals are not limited to conventional forces employed by nation-states.



*Offensive and defensive operations are integral to COIN. COIN differs from peacekeeping operations in this regard. In peacekeeping operations, combat is not expected and the goal is an absence of violence. In COIN, such an absence may actually mask insurgent preparations for combat. (Dept. of Army photo by Staff Sgt. Jason T. Bailey).*


Insurgency and its tactics are as old as warfare itself. Joint doctrine defines an insurgency as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict (JP 1-02). Stated another way, an insurgency is an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control. Counterinsurgency is military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency (JP 1-02). These definitions are a good starting

point, but they do not properly highlight a key paradox: though insurgency and COIN are two sides of a phenomenon that has been called revolutionary war or internal war, they are distinctly different types of operations. In addition, insurgency and COIN are included within a broad category of conflict known as irregular warfare.

# I. Aspects of Counterinsurgency

The purpose of America's ground forces is to fight and win the Nation's wars. Throughout history, however, the Army and Marine Corps have been called on to perform many tasks beyond pure combat; this has been particularly true during the conduct of COIN operations. COIN requires Soldiers and Marines to be ready both to fight and to build—depending on the security situation and a variety of other factors. The full spectrum operations doctrine (described in FM 3-0) captures this reality.

All full spectrum operations executed overseas—including COIN operations—include offensive, defensive, and stability operations that commanders combine to achieve the desired end state. The exact mix varies depending on the situation and the mission. Commanders weight each operation based on their assessment of the campaign's phase and the situation in their AO. They shift the weight among these operations as necessary to address situations in different parts of the AO while continuing to pursue their overall objectives.



Ref: FM 3-24, fig. 1-1, p. 1-19.

In almost every case, counterinsurgents face a populace containing an active minority supporting the government and an equally small militant faction opposing it. Success requires the government to be accepted as legitimate by most of that uncommitted middle, which also includes passive supporters of both sides. Because of the ease of sowing disorder, it is usually not enough for counterinsurgents to get 51 percent of popular support; a solid majority is often essential. However, a passive populace may be all that is necessary for a well-supported insurgency to seize political power.

# I. Security Operations

*Ref: ADRP 3-90, Offense and Defense (Aug '12), chap 5, pp. 5-3 to 5-4.*

Security operations are those operations undertaken by a commander to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations, to provide the force being protected with time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow the commander to effectively use the protected force.



*Security operations must provide information regarding enemy movement and capacity while giving the commander enough time and space with which to form an effective response. (Photo by Jeong, Hae-jung).*

## I. Forms of Security Operations

There are five forms of security operations -- screen, guard, cover, area security and local security.

### A. Screen

Screen is a form of security operations that primarily provides early warning to the protected force. A unit performing a screen observes, identifies, and reports enemy actions. Generally, a screening force engages and destroys enemy reconnaissance elements within its capabilities—augmented by indirect fires—but otherwise fights only in self-defense. The screen has the minimum combat power necessary to provide the desired early warning, which allows the commander to retain the bulk of his combat power for commitment at the decisive place and time. A screen provides the least amount of protection of any security mission; it does not have the combat power to develop the situation.

A screen is appropriate to cover gaps between forces, exposed flanks, or the rear of stationary and moving forces. The commander can place a screen in front of a stationary formation when the likelihood of enemy action is small, the expected enemy force is small, or the main body needs only limited time, once it is warned, to react effectively. Designed to provide minimum security with minimum forces, a screen is usually an economy-of-force operation based on calculated risk. If a significant enemy force is expected or a significant amount of time and space is needed to provide the required degree of protection, the commander should assign and resource a guard or cover mission instead of a screen. The security element forward of a moving force must conduct a guard or cover because a screen lacks the combat power to defeat or contain the lead elements of an enemy force.

## Security Fundamentals

Principles of Security Operations	Techniques Used to Perform Security Operations	Information Required from Controlling Headquarters
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Three General Orders</li> <li>• Provide early and accurate warning</li> <li>• Provide reaction time and maneuver space</li> <li>• Orient on the force / facility being secured</li> <li>• Perform continuous reconnaissance</li> <li>• Maintain enemy contact</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Observation post</li> <li>• Combat outpost</li> <li>• Battle position</li> <li>• Patrols</li> <li>• Combat formations</li> <li>• Movement techniques</li> <li>• Infiltration</li> <li>• Movement to contact</li> <li>• Dismounted, mounted, and air insertion</li> <li>• Roadblocks</li> <li>• Checkpoints</li> <li>• Convoy and route security</li> <li>• Searches</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Trace of the security area (front, sides, and rear boundaries), and initial position within the area</li> <li>• Time security is to be established</li> <li>• Main body size and location</li> <li>• Mission, purpose and commander's intent of the controlling headquarters</li> <li>• Counter reconnaissance and engagement criteria</li> <li>• Method of movement to occupy the area (zone reconnaissance, infiltration, tactical road march, movement to contact, mounted, dismounted, or air insertion)</li> <li>• Trigger for displacement and method of control when displacing.</li> <li>• Possible follow-on missions</li> </ul>

Ref: FM 3-21.8 (FM 7-8), table H-1, p. H-2.

### Critical Tasks for a Screen

Unless the commander orders otherwise, a security force conducting a screen performs certain tasks within the limits of its capabilities. A unit can normally screen an avenue of approach two echelons larger than itself. If a security force does not have the time or other resources to complete all of these tasks, the security force commander must inform the commander assigning the mission of the shortfall and request guidance on which tasks must be completed and their priority. After starting the screen, if the security unit commander determines that he cannot complete an assigned task, such as maintain continuous surveillance on all avenues of approach into an AO, he reports and awaits further instructions. Normally, the main force commander does not place a time limit on the duration of the screen, as doing so may force the screening force to accept decisive engagement. Screen tasks are to:

- Allow no enemy ground element to pass through the screen undetected and unreported
- Maintain continuous surveillance of all avenues of approach larger than a designated size into the area under all visibility conditions
- Destroy or repel all enemy reconnaissance patrols within its capabilities.
- Locate the lead elements of each enemy advance guard and determine its direction of movement in a defensive screen
- Maintain contact with enemy forces and report any activity in the AO
- Maintain contact with the main body and any security forces operating on its flanks
- Impede and harass the enemy within its capabilities while displacing

#### 5-2 (Tactical Enabling Tasks) I. Security Operations

## II. Fundamentals of Security Ops

*Ref: Adapted from FM 3-90 Tactics, pp. 12-2 to 12-3.*

### 1. Provide Early and Accurate Warning

The security force provides early warning by detecting the enemy force quickly and reporting information accurately to the main body commander. The security force operates at varying distances from the main body based on the factors of METT-TC. As a minimum, it should operate far enough from the main body to prevent enemy ground forces from observing or engaging the main body with direct fires. The earlier the security force detects the enemy, the more time the main body has to assess the changing situation and react. The commander positions ground security and aeroscouts to provide long-range observation of expected enemy avenues of approach, and he re-inforces and integrates them with available intelligence collection systems to maximize warning time.

### 2. Provide Reaction Time and Maneuver Space

The security force provides the main body with enough reaction time and maneuver space to effectively respond to likely enemy actions by operating at a distance from the main body and by offering resistance to enemy forces. The commander determines the amount of time and space required to effectively respond from information provided by the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process and the main body commander's guidance regarding time to react to enemy courses of action (COA) based on the factors of METT-TC. The security force that operates farthest from the main body and offers more resistance provides more time and space to the main body. It attempts to hinder the enemy's advance by acting within its capabilities and mission constraints.

### 3. Orient on the Force or Facility to Be Secured

The security force focuses all its actions on protecting and providing early warning to the secured force or facility. It operates between the main body and known or suspected enemy units. The security force must move as the main body moves and orient on its movement. The security force commander must know the main body's scheme of maneuver to maneuver his force to remain between the main body and the enemy. The value of terrain occupied by the security force hinges on the protection it provides to the main body commander.

### 4. Perform Continuous Reconnaissance

The security force aggressively and continuously seeks the enemy and reconnoiters key terrain. It conducts active area or zone reconnaissance to detect enemy movement or enemy preparations for action and to learn as much as possible about the terrain. The ultimate goal is to determine the enemy's COA and assist the main body in countering it. Terrain information focuses on its possible use by the enemy or the friendly force, either for offensive or defensive operations. Stationary security forces use combinations of OPs, aviation, patrols, intelligence collection assets, and battle positions (BPs) to perform reconnaissance. Moving security forces perform zone, area, or route reconnaissance along with using OPs and BPs, to accomplish this fundamental.

### 5. Maintain Enemy Contact

Once the security force makes enemy contact, it does not break contact unless specifically directed by the main force commander. The security asset that first makes contact does not have to maintain that contact if the entire security force maintains contact with the enemy. The security force commander ensures that his subordinate security assets hand off contact with the enemy from one security asset to another in this case. The security force must continuously collect information on the enemy's activities to assist the main body in determining potential and actual enemy COAs and to prevent the enemy from surprising the main body. This requires continuous visual contact, the ability to use direct and indirect fires, freedom to maneuver, and depth in space and time.



## II. Reconnaissance

*Ref: ADRP 3-90, Offense and Defense (Aug '12), chap 5, pp. 5-1 to 5-3.; and FM 7-92 Infantry Reconnaissance Platoon and Squad (Airborne, Air Assault, Light Infantry), chap 1 and 4; FM 3-21.10 (FM 7-10) The Infantry Rifle Company, pp. 8-1 to 8-4.*

Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographical or geographical characteristics and the indigenous population of a particular area. Reconnaissance primarily relies on the human dynamic rather than technical means. Reconnaissance is performed before, during, and after other operations to provide information used in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process, as well as by the commander in order to formulate, confirm, or modify his course of action (COA).



*Reconnaissance is a process of gathering information to help the commander shape his understanding of the battlespace. Reconnaissance uses many techniques and technologies to collect this information, but it is still largely a human endeavor. (Photo by Jeong, Hae-jung).*

### Reconnaissance Objective

The commander orients his reconnaissance assets by identifying a reconnaissance objective within the area of operations (AO). The reconnaissance objective is a terrain feature, geographic area, or an enemy force about which the commander wants to obtain additional information. The reconnaissance objective clarifies the intent of the reconnaissance effort by specifying the most important result to obtain from the reconnaissance effort. The commander assigns a reconnaissance objective based on his priority information requirements (PIR) resulting from the IPB process and the reconnaissance asset's capabilities and limitations. The reconnaissance objective can be information about a specific geographical location, such as the cross-country trafficability, a specific enemy activity to be confirmed or denied, or a specific enemy unit to be located and tracked.

# A. The Route Reconnaissance

Route reconnaissance is a form of reconnaissance that focuses along a specific line of communication, such as a road, railway, or cross-country mobility corridor. It provides new or updated information on route conditions, such as obstacles and bridge classifications, and enemy and civilian activity along the route. A route reconnaissance includes not only the route itself, but also all terrain along the route from which the enemy could influence the friendly force's movement.

The commander may assign a route reconnaissance as a separate mission or as a specified task for a unit conducting a zone or area reconnaissance. A scout platoon can conduct a route reconnaissance over only one route at a time. For larger organizations, the number of scout platoons available directly influences the number of routes that can be covered at one time. Integrating ground, air, and technical assets assures a faster and more complete route reconnaissance.



*Depending on the length of route to be reconnoitered, the route recon may be conducted with great stealth, or it may be conducted with great mobility. The effort is to gather intelligence on the route and its conditions. (Dept. of Army photo by Arthur McQueen).*

## Route Reconnaissance Tasks

- Find, report, and clear within capabilities all enemy forces that can influence movement along the route
- Determine the trafficability of the route; can it support the friendly force?
- Reconnoiter all terrain that the enemy can use to dominate movement along the route, such as choke points, ambush sites, and pickup zones, landing zones, and drop zones
- Reconnoiter all built-up areas, contaminated areas, and lateral routes along the route
- Evaluate and classify all bridges, defiles, overpasses and underpasses, and culverts along the route

- Locate any fords, crossing sites, or bypasses for existing and reinforcing obstacles (including built-up areas) along the route
- Locate all obstacles and create lanes as specified in execution orders
- Report the above route information to the headquarters initiating the route reconnaissance mission, to include providing a sketch map or a route overlay

*Note: See FM 3-34.212 and FM 3-20.95 for additional information concerning route reconnaissance.*

## Conducting the Route Reconnaissance - A Small Unit Perspective

Reconnaissance teams develop the picture of the battlefield for the commander. Reconnaissance provides information that is critical to the process of intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB). The commander employs his intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets as either a “recon push” or “recon pull”.

### Recon push

Recon push means that prior to a battle, the commander identifies one or more named area of interest (NAI) for a recon mission. In this manner, the recon team is pushed toward an objective within the area of operation (AO) and will develop the situation for the commander.

### Recon Pull

Recon pull means that during a battle, the commander identifies an enemy or geographical objective for one or more recon teams. In this manner, each recon team has significant latitude of movement throughout the AO in order to gain contact with the enemy objective, develop the situation, and pull the main force, altering the direction of advance in order to engage the enemy.


### Steps

1. In the case of route recon, the patrol typically begins from the assembly area (AA) and the start point serves in the same manner as a release point. During a route recon, a highly mobile reserve force may follow a safe distance behind the recon team. In such cases, the PL issues a contingency plan for both the recon team and the reserve force.
2. The patrol moves along a designated direction of advance or LOC. At each phase line and NAI, the recon team conducts a security halt for the entire patrol—including the reserve force. This security halt becomes an ERP. From the ERP, the recon team gathers information using the butterfly technique.
3. The distance each recon team will travel out from the route depends greatly on the visibility of the terrain and/or the size of the obstacle. The recon team gathers all information regarding road conditions, obstacles, bridges, enemy activity, civilian traffic, and natural choke points along parallel terrain where the enemy might impose a threat along the route.
4. Upon returning to the security halt, each recon team disseminates information among the patrol members. A written record is kept to log all information and the PL will report to higher command after each rendezvous back at the ERP.
5. The recon patrol continues on route to the next phase line or NAI and the entire process repeats itself until the patrol has adequately navigated the entire route. At that time, the PL may be required to move the recon patrol back to the FLOT or the patrol may be tasked to another mission. In either case, the PL must make a full report to higher command.

# IV. Passage of Lines

*Ref: ADRP 3-90, Offense and Defense (Aug '12), pp. 5-5 to 5-6; FM 7-85 Ranger Unit Operations, chap 6; and FM 3-21.10, The Infantry Rifle Company, pp. 8-13 to 8-17.*

Passage of lines is an operation in which a force moves forward or rearward through another force's combat positions with the intention of moving into or out of contact with the enemy. A passage may be designated as a forward or rearward passage of lines (JP 1-02). A commander conducts a passage of lines to continue an attack or conduct a counterattack, retrograde security or main battle forces, and anytime one unit cannot bypass another unit's position. It involves transferring the responsibility for an area of operations between two commanders. That transfer of authority usually occurs when roughly two-thirds of the passing force has moved through the passage point. If not directed by higher authority, the unit commanders determine—by mutual agreement—the time to pass command.



*The patrol forms into a tight 360-degree assembly area just behind the forward line of troops. The patrol leader coordinates with the forward unit commander. (Photo by Jeong, Hae-jung).*

A passage of lines occurs under two basic conditions. A forward passage of lines occurs when a unit passes through another unit's positions while moving toward the enemy. A rearward passage of lines occurs when a unit passes through another unit's positions while moving away from the enemy. Reasons for conducting a passage of line include—

- Sustain the tempo of an offensive operation
- Maintain the viability of the defense by transferring responsibility from one unit to another
- Transition from a delay or security operation by one force to a defense
- Free a unit for another mission or task

# I. Conducting a Passage of Lines - A Small Unit Perspective

Passage of lines consists of essentially two tasks, (1) coordinating the time and place of the *departure*, and (2) coordinating the time, place and signals of the *reentry* through the FLOT. This means we identify a time and a passage point for both phases. The forward unit commander identifies the passage lane, which is the precise route our patrol takes through his defensive position. Use the following for planning a passage of lines:

1. Contact and coordinate with the forward unit commander
2. Move to an assembly area (AA) behind the passage point
3. Link up with the guide to depart the FLOT
4. Conduct a security halt past the forward edge of battle area (FEBA)
5. Complete the mission
6. Return to the passage point
7. Render the far & near recognition signal to the forward unit commander
8. Link up with the guide to reenter the FLOT
9. Move into the AA to debrief the patrol

Let's break it down into two parts, departing the FLOT and reentering the FLOT. The process is more detailed; however the list will make sense as the mission planning is conceptualized.

## Departing the Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT)

1. Communicate and coordinate with the forward unit commander. The PL coordinates the time and place of the patrol's departure and reentry with the forward unit commander. The PL chooses an appropriate time. The forward unit commander chooses the appropriate passage lane through his defense. The forward unit commander also assigns a guide to lead the patrol through the wire and mine obstacles forward of the FLOT.

2. Move to the AA behind the passage point. Here the final planning, rehearsals, and coordination with the forward unit commander takes place. For this coordination, the forward unit commander supplies the following information to the patrol:

- An orientation on terrain
- Known or suspected enemy positions
- Recent enemy activity
- The location of friendly OP/LP and obstacles—wire and minefields
- Available combat support—guides, fire support, medevac and reaction forces

The PL provides the following information to the forward unit commander:

- The patrol's unit designation
- The size of the patrol
- The departure and reentry times
- All coordinating signals—near and far recognition

3. Link up with the guide to depart the FLOT through the passage lane. Once the patrol has occupied the AA, the forward unit commander links the PL with a guide. The PL restates the patrol's departure and reentry times, and near and far recognition signals for the guide. The guide is then introduced to the patrol's pointman and dragman. This allows the guide to recognize the beginning and ending of the patrol as he counts each member through the passage lane.

## II. Movement Techniques

Ref: ADP 3-90, *Offense and Defense* (Aug '12), p. 5-5.

The commander uses the combat formations described in FM 3-90 in conjunction with three movement techniques: traveling, traveling overwatch, and bounding overwatch. The following figure illustrates when a unit is most likely to use each technique.

### Movement Techniques

<b>If enemy contact is:</b>		<b>Move by:</b>
Not likely	↔	Traveling
Possible	↔	Traveling overwatch
Expected	↔	Bounding overwatch

Ref: ADRP 3-90, *Offense and Defense*, fig. 5-1, p. 5-5.

See also pp. 8-7 to 8-10 for discussion of the traveling techniques as applied in patrols and patrolling (dismounted).



# Special Purpose Attacks







Ref: FM 3-90 Tactics, pp. 5-29 to 5-40.

An attack is an offensive operation that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both. Movement, supported by fires, characterizes the conduct of an attack. However, based on his analysis of the factors of METT-TC, the commander may decide to conduct an attack using only fires. An attack differs from a MTC because enemy main body dispositions are at least partially known, which allows the commander to achieve greater synchronization. This enables him to mass the effects of the attacking force's combat power more effectively in an attack than in a MTC.

Special purpose attacks are ambush, spoiling attack, counterattack, raid, feint, and demonstration. The commander's intent and the factors of METT-TC determine which of these forms of attack are employed. He can conduct each of these forms of attack, except for a raid, as either a hasty or a deliberate operation.

*This chapter specifically discusses "special purpose attacks." Chap. 2 discusses the attack (pp. 2-13 to 2-18) and other forms of the offense.*

## Special Purpose Attacks

-  **Ambush**
-  **Raid**
-  **Spoiling Attack**
-  **Counterattack**
-  **Demonstration**
-  **Feint**

Ref: FM 3-90 Tactics, pp. 5-29 to 5-40.

### I. Ambush

An ambush is a form of attack by fire or other destructive means from concealed positions on a moving or temporarily halted enemy. It may include an assault to close with and destroy the engaged enemy force. In an ambush, ground objectives do not have to be seized and held.

*Note: See pp. 6-3 to 6-16 for further discussion on the ambush.*

## II. Raid

A raid is a form of attack, usually small scale, involving a swift entry into hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or destroy installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal from the objective area on mission completion. A raid can also be used to support operations designed to rescue and recover individuals and equipment in danger of capture.

*Note: See pp. 6-17 to 6-22 for further discussion on the raid.*

## III. Spoiling Attack

A spoiling attack is a form of attack that preempts or seriously impairs an enemy attack while the enemy is in the process of planning or preparing to attack. The objective of a spoiling attack is to disrupt the enemy's offensive capabilities and timelines while destroying his personnel and equipment, not to secure terrain and other physical objectives. A commander conducts a spoiling attack whenever possible during friendly defensive operations to strike the enemy while he is in assembly areas or attack positions preparing for his own offensive operation or is temporarily stopped. It usually employs heavy, attack helicopter, or fire support elements to attack enemy assembly positions in front of the friendly commander's main line of resistance or battle positions.

## IV. Counterattack

A counterattack is a form of attack by part or all of a defending force against an enemy attacking force, with the general objective of denying the enemy his goal in attacking. The commander directs a counterattack—normally conducted from a defensive posture—to defeat or destroy enemy forces, exploit an enemy weakness, such as an exposed flank, or to regain control of terrain and facilities after an enemy success. A unit conducts a counterattack to seize the initiative from the enemy through offensive action. A counterattacking force maneuvers to isolate and destroy a designated enemy force. It can attack by fire into an engagement area to defeat or destroy an enemy force, restore the original position, or block an enemy penetration. Once launched, the counterattack normally becomes a decisive operation for the commander conducting the counterattack.

## V. Demonstration

A demonstration is a form of attack designed to deceive the enemy as to the location or time of the decisive operation by a display of force. Forces conducting a demonstration do not seek contact with the enemy.


## VI. Feint

A feint is a form of attack used to deceive the enemy as to the location or time of the actual decisive operation. Forces conducting a feint seek direct fire contact with the enemy but avoid decisive engagement. A commander uses them in conjunction with other military deception activities. They generally attempt to deceive the enemy and induce him to move reserves and shift his fire support to locations where they cannot immediately impact the friendly decisive operation or take other actions not conducive to the enemy's best interests during the defense.

The principal difference between these forms of attack is that in a feint the commander assigns the force an objective limited in size, scope, or some other measure. Forces conducting a feint make direct fire contact with the enemy but avoid decisive engagement. Forces conducting a demonstration do not seek contact with the enemy. The planning, preparing, and executing considerations for demonstrations and feints are the same as for the other forms of attack.

## B. Organization - The Far Ambush

The far ambush breaks into only two teams—the security team and the support team. However, these teams may be spread out over large distances and assume very specific responsibilities in regards to a particular target.



*The far ambush keeps considerable distance between the ambush patrol and the enemy in the kill zone. Note that the creek offers protection from counterattack. The 'L' method is common for the far ambush. (Ref: FM 7-85, chap 6, fig. 6-2).*


### 1. The Security Team

The **security team**, in a very similar manner to the near ambush, assumes responsibility for the far left and right sides of the far ambush formation. There is also a greater likelihood for the need of a rear security team on the far ambush to protect the multiple teams as they maneuver into their escape routes.

Also, the security team is responsible for security details as the ambush patrol moves to and from the ambush site. Again, the security team responsibilities are almost identical, regardless of whether we employ a near or far ambush. The major difference for the security team is that the far ambush requires the security teams to be very far apart from each other—often operating without visibility of each other. This takes considerable coordination in that the security teams must protect the ambush force, and ensure no friendly fire incidents occur.

### 2. The Support Team

The **support team** is, again, responsible for delivering effective fires against the enemy. However, in the far ambush, the support team is often broken into separate teams in order to deliver accurate fire to the entire kill zone. The support team is typically comprised of machine gunners, grenadiers, and marksmen. Depending on the type of target, the support team for a far ambush may also include missile launchers, combat engineers, and even mortar crews.



*The 'T' method is a variation of the 'Z' method, but places the support teams at the same end of the ambush line. It is used for near ambushes along a spur when we are uncertain which side of the spur the enemy is traveling. (Ref: FM 7-85, chap 6, fig. 6-3).*

### III. Planning & Preparation

Surprise, coordinated fires, and control are the keys to a successful ambush. Surprise allows the ambush force to seize control of the situation. If total surprise is not possible, it must be so nearly complete that the target does not expect the ambush until it is too late to react effectively. Thorough planning, preparation, and execution help achieve surprise.

The commander conducts a leader's reconnaissance with key personnel to confirm or modify his plan. This reconnaissance should be undetected by the enemy to preclude alerting him. If necessary, the commander modifies the ambush plan and immediately disseminates those changes to subordinate leaders and other affected organizations. The leader's key planning considerations for any ambush include:

- Cover the entire kill zone (engagement area) by fire
- Use existing terrain features (rocks or fallen trees, for example) or reinforcing obstacles (Claymores or other mines) orienting into the kill zone to keep the enemy in the kill zone
- Determine how to emplace reinforcing obstacles on the far side of the kill zone
- Protect the assault and support elements with mines, Claymores, or explosives
- Use the security element to isolate the kill zone
- Establish rear security behind the assault element
- Assault into the kill zone to search dead and wounded, to assemble prisoners, and to collect equipment. The assault element must be able to move quickly on its own through the ambush site protective obstacles.
- Time the actions of all elements of the platoon to prevent the loss of surprise

### III. Conducting the Raid - A Small Unit Perspective

Surprise, firepower, and a tenacious attack stun and disorient the enemy. The psychological effect of violence should not be underestimated. If the enemy on the objective believe that the raid patrol is actually much larger due to the use of massed firepower and violence, the enemy is less likely to stand and defend against the assaulting team. Furthermore, after the patrol has withdrawn from the objective, the enemy will pursue the raid patrol much less aggressively if they believe the patrol is very large.



*The ORP must be secured. The patrol leader leaves the assistant patrol leader in the ORP with a security force. The rest of the patrol will drop any unnecessary gear at the ORP and return to the ORP after the raid is complete. (Photo by Jeong, Hae-jung).*

#### A. Infiltrate to the Objective

1. After infiltrating into enemy territory and the objective rally point (ORP) has been properly occupied and secured, the patrol leader (PL) conducts a leader's recon of the objective. At a minimum, the PL takes a two-man security team, and the leader of the support or assault team—whichever one the PL will *not* be positioned with during the raid. It generally is considered a good idea to bring all three element leaders, if possible.


2. The PL leaves a contingency plan with the assistant patrol leader (APL) in the ORP before departing. The leader's recon conducts a physical inspection of the objective, making certain that everything is as planned. If not, the PL improvises

any change to the plan...and since there will be no time or space for rehearsals, the option to change the plan should only be used in extreme circumstances.

3. The PL leaves a two-man security team with communication and a contingency plan. The security team is positioned in such a manner that they maintain constant observation of the objective (this spot will later become the release point) to ensure that enemy reinforcements do not arrive and that the target doesn't leave. The PL and element leader(s) move back to the ORP.

4. The PL issues any changes to the plan in the ORP and finalizes all preparations. Picking up the rest of the patrol, the PL leads them out of the ORP and towards the release point in the following order:

- PL leads at point
- Security team
- Support team
- Assault team pulls up the drag



*The patrol leader moves the patrol forward to link up with the release point. From the release point the patrol waits while the security teams carefully and quietly move to their assigned locations. (Photo by Jeong, Hae-jung).*

5. Upon reaching the release point, the PL checks with the on-site security team to make certain everything is okay. The PL then links the entire security team up with the leader and gives them time to move into their designated position. Unlike the ambush, the PL does NOT have the option of positioning each element. On a raid, the elements have all rehearsed exhaustively on where to go. Time must be allowed for each team to stealthily position themselves.

6. The PL releases the support team next and may travel with that element if he has not assigned himself to the assault team. The assault team takes position last and due to the close proximity of their position to the objective, they must be given ample time to move.

7. All elements wait for the signal to commence fire. This may be designated by:

- A fixed time, OR
- A designated signal, OR
- The PL may issue the "No Fire" signal (in which case the patrol withdraws)

## B. Actions on the Objective

Just as with the ambush, the initiating volley of fire must physically and psychologically overwhelm the enemy force. Upon the initiating shot, every member of the patrol immediately opens fire on the objective. Failure to immediately suppress the enemy means failure for the raid patrol. If the enemy gains the initiative, the patrol will likely be destroyed.



*The support team takes position after the security team sets into place. Because the support team carries crew-served weapons that are heavy, more time must be allotted for their movement. (Photo by Jeong, Hae-jung).*

1. After effectively devastating the objective with a heavy volume of fire, the PL gives a designated signal to lift or shift fires. Now, a common misconception is that the term "lift or shift" fires actually means "cease-fire."

**Shifting** fires means that the support team's direction of fire will shift either left or right in order to suppress fleeing or reinforcing enemy. If shifting of fires cannot be done safely, then **lifting** fires means the support team will continue to fire harmlessly over everyone's heads.

2. The assault team begins their choreographed attack across the objective. The assault team crosses the objective in pre-arranged buddy teams and...

- Double-taps all enemy combatants
- Secures the far side of the objective, AND
- Conducts the sub-tasks of the specialty teams

3. Once the specialty teams are finished with the assigned tasks, the assault team leader gives the PL the signal that they have accomplished the task and are ready to move.

4. The PL then gives three designated signals. The first notifies the assault team to fall back through the release point to the ORP. The second notifies the support team to do the same. The third signal notifies the security team to fall back via their designated route to the ORP.

5. In the ORP, subordinate leaders reconsolidate and reorganize the patrol. The APL accounts for all members and equipment. All crew served weapons and priority equipment is reassigned if there have been casualties. Friendly casualties are cared for in accordance with the operations order (OPORD). Water and ammunition is redistributed.

6. The patrol then falls back to a pre-designated position, usually one terrain feature back from the ORP. The patrol stops to disseminate all information and PIR regarding the raid amongst every patrol member. This is done prior to returning to the FEBA.



# Understanding the Urban Environment


Ref: ATTP 3-06.11, *Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain* (Jun '11), pp. xii to xviii.

Urban operations are among the most difficult and challenging missions a BCT can undertake. Most UO are planned and controlled at division or corps level but executed by BCTs. The unified action environment of UO enables and enhances the capabilities of the BCT to plan, prepare, and execute offensive, defensive, and stability operations. Urban operations are Infantry-centric combined arms operations that capitalize on the adaptive and innovative leaders at the squad, platoon, and company level.

The special considerations in any UO go well beyond the uniqueness of the urban terrain. JP 3-06 identifies three distinguishing characteristics of the urban environment—physical terrain, population, and infrastructure. FM 3-06 identifies three key overlapping and interdependent components of the urban environment: terrain (natural and man-made), society, and the supporting infrastructure.

## Terrain

Urban terrain, both natural and man-made, is the foundation upon which the population and infrastructure of the urban area are superimposed. The physical environment includes the geography and man-made structures in the area of operations (AO). A city may consist of a core surrounded by various commercial ribbons, industrial areas, outlying high-rise areas, residential areas, shantytowns, military areas, extensive parklands or other open areas, waterways, and transportation infrastructure. City patterns may consist of a central hub surrounded by satellite areas, or they may be linear, networked, or segmented. They may contain street patterns that are rectangular, radial, concentric, irregular, or a combination of patterns. They may be closely packed where land space is at a premium or dispersed over several square miles. The infinite ways in which these features may be combined make it necessary to approach each urban area as a unique problem.



Understanding the physical characteristics of urban terrain requires a multidimensional approach. Commanders operating in unrestricted terrain normally address their AO in terms of air and ground. However, operations within the urban environment provide numerous man-made structures and variables not found in unrestricted terrain. Commanders conducting UO must broaden the scope of their thinking. The total size of the surfaces and spaces of an urban area is usually many times that of a similarly size piece of natural terrain because of the complex blend of horizontal, vertical, interior, exterior, and subterranean forms superimposed on the natural landscape.

## Society

Urban operations often require forces to operate in close proximity to a high density of civilians. Even evacuated areas can have a large stay-behind population. The population's presence, attitudes, actions, communications with the media, and needs may affect the conduct of the operation. To effectively operate among an urban population and maintain its goodwill, it is important to develop a thorough understanding of the population and its culture, to include values, needs, history, religion, customs, and social structure.

The demographics of the HN can complicate urban operations. The Army is likely to conduct UO in countries with existing or emerging cultural, ethnic, or religious conflicts. When these conditions exist, the local population may be sympathetic to enemy causes. Refugees and displaced persons are likely to be present. For these and other reasons, cultural awareness is imperative to mission success.

Accommodating the social norms of a population is potentially the most influential factor in conducting UO. Soldiers function well by acting in accordance with American values but may encounter difficulties when applying American culture, values, and thought processes to the populace or individuals the unit and leadership is trying to understand. Defining the structure of the social hierarchy is often critical to understanding the population.

Other considerations include:

- Many governments of developing countries are characterized by nepotism, favor trading, sectarianism, and indifference
- Regardless of causes or political affiliations, civilian casualties are often the focal point of press coverage to the point of ignoring or demeaning any previous accomplishments.
- Religious beliefs and practices are among the most important yet least understood aspects of the cultures of other peoples. In many parts of the world, religious norms are a matter of life and death.
- Another significant problem is the presence of displaced persons within an urban area. Noncombatants without hostile intent can inadvertently complicate UO.

## Infrastructure

A city's infrastructure is its foundation. Restoration or repair of urban infrastructure is often decisive to mission accomplishment. During full spectrum operations, destroying, controlling, or protecting vital parts of the urban infrastructure may be a necessary shaping operation to isolate an enemy from potential sources of support. An enemy force may rely on the area's water, electricity, and sources of bulk fuel to support his forces. To transport supplies, the enemy may rely on roads, airfields, sea or river lanes, and rail lines.

Controlling these critical infrastructure systems may prevent the enemy from resupplying his forces. The infrastructure of an urban environment consists of the basic resources, support systems, communications, and industries upon which the population depends. The key elements that allow an urban area to function are significant to full spectrum operations. The force that can control and secure the water, telecommunications, energy production and distribution, food production and distribution, and medical city's boundaries.

All systems fit into six broad categories. Commanders should analyze key facilities in each category and determine their role and importance throughout all phases of UO. (Refer to FM 3-06 for details.) The six categories of infrastructure are—

- Communications and Information.
- Transportation and Distribution
- Energy
- Economics and Commerce
- Administration and Human Services
- Cultural

# II. Fortified Areas

*Ref: FM 3-21.8 (FM 7-8) The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, pp. 7-48 to 7-53.*

Fortifications are works emplaced to defend and reinforce a position. Time permitting, enemy defenders build bunkers and trenches, emplace protective obstacles, and position mutually supporting fortifications when fortifying their positions. Soldiers who attack prepared positions should expect to encounter a range of planned enemy fires to include small arms fire, mortars, artillery, antitank missiles, antitank guns, tanks, attack aviation, and close air support. Attacking forces should also expect a range of offensive type maneuver options to include spoiling attacks, internal repositioning, counterattacks, and withdrawing to subsequent defensive positions. Spoiling attacks will attempt to disrupt the attacker's momentum and possibly seize key terrain. If driven out of their prepared positions, enemy troops may try to win them back by hasty local counterattacks or through deliberate, planned combined arms counterattacks. If forced to withdraw, the enemy forces may use obstacles, ambushes, and other delaying tactics to slow down pursuing attackers.

The attack of a fortified position follows the basic principles of tactical maneuver. However, greater emphasis is placed upon detailed planning, special training and rehearsals, increased fire support, and the use of special equipment.

The deliberate nature of defenses requires a deliberate approach to the attack. These types of operations are time consuming. Leaders must develop schemes of maneuver that systematically reduce the area. Initially, these attacks should be limited in scope, focusing on individual positions and intermediate terrain objectives. Leaders must establish clear bypass criteria and position destruction criteria and allocate forces to secure cleared enemy positions. Failure in this will likely result in enemy reoccupying the positions, isolating lead elements, and ambushes.

## Characteristics

The intense, close combat prevalent in trench clearing is remarkably similar to fighting in built up areas. Comparable characteristics include:

- **Restricted Observation and Fields of Fire.** Once the trench is entered, visibilities may be limited to a few meters in either direction. This compartmentalization necessarily decentralizes the engagement to the lowest level.
- **Cover and Concealment.** The nature of a trench system allows covered movement of both friendly and enemy forces. To prevent being flanked or counterattacked, junctions, possible entry points, and corners should be secured.
- **Difficulty in Locating the Enemy.** The assault element may come under fire from multiple mutually supporting positions in the trench or a nearby position. The exact location of the fire may be difficult to determine. Supporting elements should be capable of locating, suppressing, or destroying such threats.
- **Close Quarters Fighting.** Because of the close nature of the trench system, Soldiers should be prepared to use close quarters marksmanship, bayonet, and hand-to-hand fight techniques.
- **Restricted Movement.** Trench width and height will severely restrict movement inside the system. This will ordinarily require the assault element to move at a low crouch or even a crawl. Sustainment including ammunition resupply, EPW evacuation, casualty evacuation, and reinforcement will also be hampered.
- **Sustainment.** The intensity of close combat in the trench undoubtedly results in increased resource requirements.

## I. Find

Finding the enemy's fortified positions relates back to the position's purpose. There are two general reasons to create fortified positions. The first includes defending key terrain and using the position as a base camp, shelter, or sanctuary for critical personnel or activities. This type of position is typically camouflaged and difficult to locate. When U.S. forces have air superiority and robust reconnaissance abilities, enemy forces will go to great lengths to conceal these positions. Sometimes the only way to find these enemy positions is by movement to contact. When Infantry platoons or squads encounter a previously unidentified prepared enemy position, they should not, as a general rule, conduct a hasty attack until they have set conditions for success.

The second general purpose for fortified positions is to create a situation in which the attacker is required to mass and present a profitable target. This type of position normally occurs in more conventional battles. These positions can be relatively easy to find because they occupy key terrain, establish identifiable patterns, and generally lack mobility.

Attacking fortified positions requires thorough planning and preparation based on extensive reconnaissance.

## II. Fix

An enemy in fortified defenses has already partially fixed himself. This does not mean he will not be able to maneuver or that the fight will be easy. It does mean that the objective is probably more defined than with an enemy with complete freedom of movement. Fixing the enemy will still require measures to prevent repositioning to alternate, supplementary, and subsequent positions on the objective and measures to block enemy counterattack elements.

## III. Finish (Fighting Enemies in Fortifications)

Finishing an enemy in prepared positions requires the attacker to follow the fundamentals of the offense-surprise, concentration, tempo, and audacity to be successful.

The actual fighting of enemy fortifications is clearly an Infantry platoon unit function because squads and platoons, particularly when augmented with engineers, are the best organized and equipped units in the Army for breaching protective obstacles. They are also best prepared to assault prepared positions such as bunkers and trench lines. Infantry platoons are capable of conducting these skills with organic, supplementary, and supporting weapons in any environment.

Leaders develop detailed plans for each fortification, using the SOSRA technique to integrate and synchronize fire support and maneuver assets. Although there are specific drills associated with the types of fortifications, the assault of a fortified area is an operation, not a drill. During planning, the leader's level of detail should identify each aperture (opening or firing port) of his assigned fortification(s) and consider assigning these as a specific target when planning fires. Contingency plans are made for the possibility of encountering previously undetected fortifications along the route to the objective, and for neutralizing underground defenses when encountered.

## A. Securing the Near and Far Side—Breaching Protective Obstacles

To fight the enemy almost always requires penetrating extensive protective obstacles, both antipersonnel and antivehicle. Of particular concern to the Infantrymen are antipersonnel obstacles. Antipersonnel obstacles (both explosive and nonexplosive) include, wire entanglements; trip flares; antipersonnel mines; field expedient devices

(booby traps, nonexplosive traps, punji sticks); flame devices; rubble; warning devices; CBRN; and any other type of obstacle created to prevent troops from entering a position. Antipersonnel obstacles are usually integrated with enemy fires close enough to the fortification for adequate enemy surveillance by day or night, but beyond effective hand grenade range. Obstacles are also used within the enemy position to compartmentalize the area in the event outer protective barriers are breached. See Appendix F for more information on obstacles.

The following steps are an example platoon breach:

- The squad leader and the breaching fire team move to the last covered and concealed position near the breach point (point of penetration)
- The squad leader confirms the breach point
- The platoon leader or squad leader shifts the suppressing element away from the entry point
- The fire element continues to suppress enemy positions as required
- Buddy team #1 (team leader and the automatic rifleman) remains in a position short of the obstacle to provide local security for buddy team #2
- The squad leader and breaching fire team leader employ smoke grenades to obscure the breach point
- Buddy team #2 (grenadier and rifleman) moves to the breach point. They move in rushes or by crawling
- The squad leader positions himself where he can best control his teams.
- Buddy team #2 positions themselves to the right and left of the breach point near the protective obstacle
- Buddy team #2 probes for mines and creates a breach, marking their path as they proceed
- Once breached, buddy team #1 and buddy team #2 move to the far side of the obstacle and take up covered and concealed positions to block any enemy movement toward the breach point. They engage all identified or likely enemy positions.
- The squad leader remains at the entry point and marks it. He calls forward the next fire team with, "Next team in."
- Once the squad has secured a foothold, the squad leader reports to the platoon leader, "Foothold secure." The platoon follows the success of the seizure of the foothold with the remainder of the platoon.

## **B. Knocking Out Bunkers**

The term bunker in this discussion covers all emplacements having overhead cover and containing apertures (embrasures) through which weapons are fired. The two primary types are reinforced concrete pillboxes, and log bunkers. There are two notable exploitable weaknesses of bunkers.

First, bunkers are permanent, their location and orientation fixed. Bunkers cannot be relocated or adjusted to meet a changing situation. They are optimized for a particular direction and function. The worst thing an Infantry platoon or squad can do is to approach the position in the manner it was designed to fight.

Second, bunkers must have openings (doors, windows, apertures, or air vents). There are two disadvantages to be exploited here. First, structurally, the opening is the weakest part of the position and will be the first part of the structure to collapse if engaged. Second, a single opening can only cover a finite sector, creating blind spots.

# C. Assaulting Trench Systems

Ref: FM 3-21.8 (FM 7-8) *The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad*, pp. 7-51 to 7-53.

Trenches are dug to connect fighting positions. They are typically dug in a zigzagged fashion to prevent the attacker from firing down a long section if he gets into the trench, and to reduce the effectiveness of high explosive munitions. Trenches may also have shallow turns, intersections with other trenches, firing ports, overhead cover, and bunkers. Bunkers will usually be oriented outside the trench, but may also have the ability to provide protective fire into the trench.

The trench provides defenders with a route that has frontal cover, enabling them to reposition without the threat of low trajectory fires. However, unless overhead cover is built, trenches are subject to the effects of high trajectory munitions like the grenade, grenade launcher, plunging machine gun fire, mortars, and artillery. These types of weapon systems should be used to gain and maintain fire superiority on defenders in the trench.

The trench is the enemy's home, so there is no easy way to clear it. Their confined nature, extensive enemy preparations, and the limited ability to integrate combined arms fires makes trench clearing hazardous for even the best trained Infantry. If possible, a bulldozer or plow tank can be used to fill in the trench and bury the defenders. However, since this is not always feasible, Infantry units must move in and clear trenches.

## 1. Entering the Trenchline

To enter the enemy trench the platoon takes the following steps:

- The squad leader and the assault fire team move to the last covered and concealed position near the entry point
- The squad leader confirms the entry point
- The platoon leader or squad leader shifts the base of fire away from the entry point
- The base of fire continues to suppress trench and adjacent enemy positions as required
- Buddy team #1 (team leader and automatic rifleman) remains in a position

short of the trench to add suppressive fires for the initial entry

- Buddy team #2 (grenadier and rifleman) and squad leader move to the entry point. They move in rushes or by crawling (squad leader positions himself where he can best control his teams).
- Buddy team #2 positions itself parallel to the edge of the trench. Team members get on their backs
- On the squad leader command of COOK OFF GRENADES (2 seconds maximum), they shout, FRAG OUT, and throw the grenades into the trench
- Upon detonation of both grenades, the Soldiers roll into the trench, landing on their feet and back-to-back. They engage all known, likely or suspected enemy positions.
- Both Soldiers immediately move in opposite directions down the trench, continuing until they reach the first corner or intersection
- Both Soldiers halt and take up positions to block any enemy movement toward the entry point
- Simultaneously, buddy team #1 moves to and enters the trench, joining buddy team #2. The squad leader directs them to one of the secured corners or intersections to relieve the Soldier who then rejoins his buddy at the opposite end of the foothold.
- At the same time, the squad leader rolls into the trench and secures the entry point.
- The squad leader remains at the entry point and marks it. He calls forward the next fire team with, NEXT TEAM IN
- Once the squad has secured a foothold, the squad leader reports to the platoon leader, FOOTHOLD SECURE. The platoon follows the success of the seizure of the foothold with the remainder of the platoon.



The leader or a designated subordinate must move into the trench as soon as possible to control the tempo, specifically the movement of the lead assault element and the movement of follow-on forces. He must resist the temptation to move the entire unit into the trench as this will unduly concentrate the unit in a small area. Instead, he should ensure the outside of the trench remains isolated as he maintains fire superiority inside the trench. This may require a more deliberate approach. When subordinates have reached their objectives or have exhausted their resources, the leader commits follow-on forces. Once stopped, the leader consolidates and reorganizes.

The assault element is organized into a series of three-man teams. The team members are simply referred to as number 1 man, number 2 man, and number 3 man. Each team is armed with at least one M249 and one grenade launcher. All men are armed with multiple hand grenades.

The positioning within the three-man team is rotational, so the men in the team must be rehearsed in each position. The number 1 man is responsible for assaulting down the trench using well aimed effective fire and throwing grenades around pivot points in the trenchline or into weapons emplacements. The number 2 man follows the number 1 man closely enough to support him but not so closely that both would be suppressed if the enemy gained local fire superiority. The number 3 man follows the number 2 man and prepares to move forward when positions rotate.

While the initial three-man assault team rotates by event, the squad leader directs the rotation of the three-man teams within the squad as ammunition becomes low in the leading team, casualties occur, or as the situation dictates. Since this three-man drill is standardized, three-man teams may be reconstituted as needed from the remaining members of the squad. The platoon leader controls the rotation between squads using the same considerations as the squad leaders.

## 2. Clearing the Trenchline

Once the squad has secured the entry point and expanded it to accommodate the squad, the rest of the platoon enters and begins to clear the designated section of the enemy

position. The platoon may be tasked to clear in two directions if the objective is small. Otherwise, it will only clear in one direction as another platoon enters and clears in the opposite direction.

The lead three-man team of the initial assault squad moves out past the security of the support element and executes the trench clearing drill. The number 1 man, followed by number 2 man and number 3 man, maintains his advance until arriving at a pivot, junction point, or weapons emplacement in the trench. He alerts the rest of the team by yelling out, POSITION or, JUNCTION, and begins to prepare a grenade. The number 2 man immediately moves forward near the lead man and takes up the fire to cover until the grenade can be thrown around the corner of the pivot point. The number 3 man moves forward to the point previously occupied by number 2 and prepares for commitment.

If the lead man encounters a junction in the trench, the platoon leader should move forward, make a quick estimate, and indicate the direction the team should continue to clear. This will normally be toward the bulk of the fortification or toward command post emplacements. He should place a marker (normally specified in the unit TSOP) pointing toward the direction of the cleared path. After employing a grenade, the number 2 man moves out in the direction indicated by the platoon leader and assumes the duties of the number 1 man. Anytime the number 1 man runs out of ammunition, he shouts, MAGAZINE, and immediately moves against the wall of the trench to allow the number 2 man to take up the fire. Squad leaders continue to push uncommitted teams forward, securing bypassed trenches and rotating fresh teams to the front. Trenches are cleared in sequence not simultaneously.

## 3. Moving in a Trench

Once inside, the trench teams use variations of the combat formations to move. These formations are used as appropriate inside buildings as well. The terms hallway and trench are used interchangeably. The column (file) and box formations are self explanatory. The line and echelon formations are generally infeasible.

Ideally the team is able to destroy the bunker with standoff weapons and HE munitions. However, when required, the fire team can assault the bunker with small arms and grenades. A fire team (two to four men) with HE and smoke grenades move forward under cover of the suppression and obscuration fires from the squad and other elements of the base of fire. When they reach a vulnerable point of the bunker, they destroy it or personnel inside with grenades or other hand-held demolitions. All unsecured bunkers must be treated as if they contain live enemy, even if no activity has been detected from them. The clearing of bunkers must be systematic or the enemy will come up behind assault groups. To clear a bunker—

- The squad leader and the assault fire team move to the last covered and concealed position near the position's vulnerable point
- The squad leader confirms the vulnerable point
- The platoon leader/squad leader shifts the base of fire away from the vulnerable point
- The base of fire continues to suppress the position and adjacent enemy positions as required
- Buddy team #1 (team leader and the automatic rifleman) remain in a position short of the position to add suppressive fires for buddy team #2 (grenadier and rifleman)
- Buddy team #2 moves to the vulnerable point. They move in rushes or by crawling
- One Soldier takes up a covered position near the exit
- The other Soldier cooks off a grenade (2 seconds maximum), shouts, FRAG OUT, and throws it through an aperture
- After the grenade detonates, the Soldier covering the exit enters and clears the bunker
- Simultaneously, the second Soldier moves into the bunker to assist Soldier #1
- Both Soldiers halt at a point of domination and take up positions to block any enemy movement toward their position
- Buddy team #1 moves to join buddy team #2
- The team leader inspects the bunker, marks the bunker, and signals the squad leader
- The assault squad leader consolidates, reorganizes, and prepares to continue the mission

## IV. Follow Through

The factors for consolidation and reorganization of fortified positions are the same as consolidation and reorganization of other attacks. If a fortification is not destroyed sufficiently to prevent its reuse by the enemy, it must be guarded until means can be brought forward to complete the job. The number of positions the unit can assault is impacted by the—

- Length of time the bunkers must be guarded to prevent reoccupation by the enemy
- Ability of the higher headquarters to resupply the unit
- Availability of special equipment in sufficient quantities
- Ability of the unit to sustain casualties and remain effective

As part of consolidation, the leader orders a systematic search of the secured positions for booby traps and spider holes. He may also make a detailed sketch of his area and the surrounding dispositions if time allows. This information will be helpful for the higher headquarters intelligence officer or if the unit occupies the position for an extended length of time.

# III. Desert Operations

Ref: FM 90-3 (FMFM 7-27), Desert Operations (Aug '93).

## I. Desert Environments

By definition, a desert region receives less than 10 inches (25cm) of rainfall annually. There are 22 deserts covering 30 percent of the earth's landmass. The largest non-polar desert is the Sahara that covers the northern half of the African continent, an area larger than the entire contiguous 48 states of America. The word desert comes from Latin *desertum* meaning "an abandoned place." Though admittedly sparse, both large and small cities are distributed across the deserts of the world. Human population in the desert centers on fresh water sources, oil reserves, and seaports.



*Successful desert operations require adaptation to the environment and to the limitations its terrain and climate impose. Equipment and tactics must be modified and adapted to a dusty and rugged landscape where temperatures vary from extreme highs down to freezing and where visibility may change from 30 miles to 30 feet in a matter of minutes. Deserts are arid, barren regions of the earth incapable of supporting normal life due to lack of water. (Dept. of Defense photo by Chance Haworth).*

### A. Weather in the Desert

Storms in the desert are commonly refer to dust storms. Dust storms are a meteorological formation that may produce hurricane force wind delivering walls of thick dust several hundred feet (100m) high. Dust storms may last as long as several days and can produce dangerous levels of static electricity. Visibility closes to just 30 feet (10m) and travel by land-borne or airborne vehicle is extremely dangerous.

Typically, deserts also have a rainy season in which nearly all of the little precipitation falls. Rains commonly follow heavy dust storms. Flash flooding is a threat during rains because the desert floor has modest absorption properties.

# Injuries & Disease in the Desert

Ref: FM 90-3 (FMFM 7-27), *Desert Operations* (Aug '93), chap. 1.

Contaminated water supplies bring dysentery, skin infection and even malaria. This again puts great emphasis on a healthy, reliable water supply. Often water will need to be purified before use. Flies and rodents are prolific in the desert, and carry a variety of diseases. Units must take preventative measures to repel such animals. Protective screening in dining areas is a must.

## Heat Exhaustion & Heat Stroke

The most immediate and pervasive dangers are heat exhaustion and the more severe heat stroke. Heat exhaustion is a medical condition of water and/or salt depletion in the body. Signs of dehydration include dark colored urine, thirst, fatigue and headache. Signs of salt depletion include muscle cramps, dizziness and vomiting. Left unattended heat exhaustion can quickly worsen into heat stroke.

Prevention and treatment for heat exhaustion is to hydrate with drinks that include electrolytes, and to take frequent rest breaks in shaded areas. Due to excessive sweating in jungle climates, fluid consumption should equal 1 gallon (3.8 liters) per day at rest; 1.5 gallons (5.7 liters) while at moderate work; and upwards of 2 gallons (7.5 liters) of fluids per day for heavy continuous work.

Heat stroke is a potentially deadly medical condition. It usually occurs due to dehydration, plus high temperatures and/or heavy physical exertion. When the bodily core temperature reaches 105°F (40.5°C) or higher, the central nervous system begins to malfunction and the brain and other organs are damaged.

Signs and symptoms of heat stroke mimic those of heat exhaustion, but later stages include a lack of sweating, hot red skin, seizures, and unconsciousness.

First aid includes any attempt to lower the subject's core bodily temperature. This most commonly involves pouring water over the subject while loosening restrictive clothing. If the subject is still conscious, have the subject sip water or liquids. An IV should be administered at once. Medevac promptly.

## Hyponatremia

A condition exists in which electrolyte salts are flushed from the bodily fluids through excessive drinking in a short period of time. This results in human body cells expanding to accept more water from the bodily fluids. Such a state would be fine for most tissues of the body, but the human brain cannot expand in this manner and death is a potential result.

Drinking too much water risks hyponatremia. The exact amount of "too much" water is still debated, however even physically fit troops working in moderate to heavy labor may experience a dangerous loss of electrolytes at somewhere near 4 gallons (15 liters) of water intake per day.

Prevention involves drinking liquids mixed with powdered drinks. Electrolytes are salts found in the powdered drink mixed in the MRE.

## Malaria

This is one of the more serious afflictions in the desert and it can be fatal in some cases. Early signs and symptoms include headache, fever, fatigue and back pain. Later symptoms include a dry cough, shivering while sweating, vomiting and seizures.

Prevention includes insect repellants such as DEET (N,N-diethylmetatoluamide), insecticide sprays, and mosquito bar netting when sleeping.

Treatment requires medical evacuation. For uncomplicated malaria oral anti-malarial prescription drugs are used. For severe cases, the subject is brought to intensive care units to fight many of the symptoms such as high fever while using prescription-based drugs in tandem.

### III. Mission Command Considerations

Maneuver in desert operations is a large affair, most often conducted with the battalion and even entire brigade moving toward a single tactical objective. It is not uncommon for battalion commanders to monitor and control the entire mission as it develops. Command is centered at battalion and brigade level, and reports to higher organizational command at division, corps, or joint task force.

There are few restrictions on command and control in desert environments, with the notable exceptions of mountain and arctic regions covered elsewhere in this manual. However control measures, communications, and weapons all have unique considerations in the desert.

#### A. Control Measures

Again the relatively flat, open, and sometimes featureless desert presents challenges for fire and maneuver coordination between various units. The boundaries for each unit on map overlays are ideally establish along prominent terrain or man-made features such as highways. Such features are rare.

This means successful coordination places enormous emphasis on proper navigation. Masterful use of map, compass, and Global Positioning Satellite (GPS), coupled with an effective communication plan are critical to mission accomplishment. This is particularly so when two or more units attempt a passage of lines in hours of darkness. Creative and perhaps unorthodox solutions may be employed as friend-or-foe identifiers to prevent fratricide.

#### B. Communications

In general, communications do well in desert conditions, in part due to a lack of vegetation and tall terrain features (mountain deserts excepted). However the constant dust and the extreme temperatures play havoc on electronic devices.

Electronic circuit boards have a maximum heat allowance by design. The use of the device increased heat output, yet the extreme heat from the hottest season in the desert can literally shut down or even damage circuit boards. Too, batteries will deplete much faster in hot temperatures. When possible electronics should be removed from direct sunlight and placed in well-ventilated containers for better performance.

Normal radio transmitting ranges may be cut in half during the day as the extreme heat causes anomalies that attenuate radio signal. Yet during nighttime operations in the desert, normal transmitting ranges can be exponentially increased. This causes communication security (COMSEC) issues when a unit is broadcasting much further than intended.

#### C. Weapons

Small arms perform reasonably well in desert environments. The dust, however, will be a constant factor. The use of thick grease or excessive oil on a weapon will result in dust build up that may cause immediate malfunction upon use. Lubricate only the surface of moving parts of the firearm in desert conditions.

Also, during periods of extreme heat small arms cool gradually. This makes extended employment of weapons in cyclical fire or rapid fire problematic. It risks overheating the weapon and causing malfunction. Short bursts are preferred in most situations in the desert.

Lastly, the long distances that can be viewed in desert environments cause target acquisition problems. An illusion referred to as "optical bending" creates a ghost image that makes the target look higher in elevation than it actually is. Overshooting enemy targets at mid to far distances is common in the desert.

Overall, small arms perform well in the dry desert environment. Routine maintenance keeps them functioning reliably.

## IV. Tactical Considerations

Ref: FM 90-3 (FMFM 7-27), *Desert Operations* (Aug '93), chap. 3.

Desert operations establish highly centralized control from commands of higher unit formations. Missions take place in vast geographic areas, yet the command team in the Tactical Operation Center (TOC) commonly monitors and influences the battle as it progresses through a network of ISRC4 capital.

This means tasks to subordinate tactical units at the fireteam, squad, platoon, company, and even the battalion level are often little more than a series of well-executed battle drills. Subordinate units are given an identified objective, a distance, direction and time hack. Each unit will accomplish the mission by employing unit SOP.

### A. Offense Operations

In the desert the offense is swift, powerful and violent. It combines mechanized forces with highly synchronized combat engineer, artillery and Close Air Support (CAS) assets. Engagements frequently begin at the maximum effective ranges of the weapon systems employed, well beyond the range of visual recognition.



*In desert operations small tactical units perform battle drill often as a single large formation. Here US Soldiers practice vehicle dismount and attack drills. (Dept. of Army).*

**Deliberate Attack** is the preferred method of the initial engagement. The deliberate attack requires excellent information regarding the enemy location, size, capabilities, and disposition. The lack of vegetation and prohibitive terrain in the desert allow excellent collection of such information ahead of the attack. Heavy aerial and artillery bombardment precede deliberate attacks. Under conditions of limited visibility, combat engineers pave the channels through enemy obstacles such as minefields, wire entanglements, and buttresses. Mechanized armor and infantry formations break through the breach to capitalize on the momentum of violence and destroy targeted enemy nodes of command and control.



**Movement to Contact (MTC)**, in desert operations, almost invariably follows the breach caused by a deliberate attack. In this way, local tactical gains appreciate larger operational and strategic success.

The MTC is conducted either by a larger main body behind the attacking force, or by a reserve force held in store during the deliberate attack. MTC continues to push the retreating enemy force back, and seeks to seize key terrain or defeat the enemy in detail.

Exploitation is the means by which an offensive force gains key terrain after a successful deliberate attack. This may be achieved by the MTC that pushes through and beyond the breach, or it may be achieved through the shaping operations of an enveloping force.

Pursuit is the means by which an offensive force destroys the enemy force after a successful deliberate attack. Pursuits are conducted as single, double, or vertical envelopments by forces conducting shaping operations in conjunction with the decisive operation of the deliberate attack and MTC. The pursuit sometimes tasks the enveloping force to initially conduct an exploitation to seize key terrain along the enemy's route of egress, and then fix the enemy in battle. With the enemy disrupted and committed to battle in small pockets of resistance along their line of egress, the MTC is then able to effectively defeat the enemy in detail using classic hammer and anvil maneuver.

Raids are commonly used in desert operations as a means of shaping operations. While raids seek very limited tactical goals such as destroying enemy ISRC4 resources or enemy Air Defense Artillery (ADA) assets, these missions are critical.

Ambushes are somewhat rare in offensive desert operations. However the ambush remains a viable component of the defense, even in desert operations.

## **B. Defense Operations**

The defense, too, is a large affair in desert operations. On rare occasions an outpost can be established as a strongpoint defense of key terrain. Otherwise, an area defense may extend continuously in breadth over hundreds of miles or kilometers. Alternatively, a mobile defense or retrograde may extend an equal number of miles in depth. For the largest task forces in desert operations, both an area defense and a retrograde are developed simultaneously.

The desert presents few flanking obstacles with which a defense may tie into. If impassable terrain features – the sea, plateau, mountain canyon, sand dunes, or the deep silt of a dried salt lake – cannot be established on the flanks then flanks may be secured with massive minefields to deny the enemy maneuver.

Tactical units in the defense spend an inordinate amount of time conducting surveillance and screening operations forward of the engagement area. During nighttime hours or periods of limited visibility, a network of ambushes may be employed to disrupt enemy reconnaissance.

## **C. Enabling Operations**

The defense requires coordinated planning and sustainment. Combat support and service support units shape the success of any operation. Tactical units must be prepared to provide security for supporting units.

Reconnaissance in Force (RIF) is the primary form of ground reconnaissance in the desert. RIF swaps stealth for speed, and values timely information over catching the enemy unaware. Thus, RIF is typically conducted by mechanized or motorized mounted patrols. And unlike other operational environments that might dispatch a squad or fireteam to conduct reconnaissance, RIF typically involves platoons or entire companies for each reconnaissance mission.

Screening patrols and local area security patrols are conducted as a means of counter-reconnaissance to disrupt enemy activity. This is particularly effective when supporting sustainment operations or a relief-in-place.

Lastly, tactical commanders must become competent at effectively conducting passage of lines in a wide variety of weather and light conditions. This is a critical enabling task for extended offensive operations common to desert warfare.

# V. Mountain Operations

Ref: FM 3-97.6 (90-6), *Mountain Operations* (Nov '00).

## I. Mountain Environments

Mountain weather can vary sharply and has enormous implications for tactical missions. Erratic weather conditions from extreme cold to hot temperatures, extremely arid to periods of considerable precipitation, and from calm to violent winds dictate a wider variety of combat troop equipment and uniforms, placing greater demand on unit logistical requirements.



*Talus boulders present challenges and opportunities in mountain warfare. Ascent is relatively easy but descent requires greater care. (Dept. of Army photo).*

## A. Temperatures

Generally, mountain temperatures decrease approximately 5 degrees for every one thousand feet (300 meters) increased in altitude. This varies of course depending on air humidity. Furthermore, during periods of cloud overcast the temperatures may counter-intuitively become warmer than during periods of clear sky. This phenomenon is referred to as inversion.

Normal daytime to nighttime temperatures will vary 40 degrees in the mountains. Where there are no forest canopies, the temperature variation in the mountains can vary at even greater extremes.

Extreme temperatures have marginal effect on weapon ballistics, but create a greater demand on weapon maintenance as the moving parts can become frozen with ice and snow. In rare but specific weather and humidity conditions, small arms fire will leave frozen vapor trails behind the bullet, disclosing the firing position of both friendly and enemy troops.

# B. Terrain & Vegetation Characteristics

Ref: FM 90-5, *Jungle Operations* (Aug '93), chap. 1.

Tactical considerations of OCOKA present unique challenges in the dense jungle canopy and tropical grasslands. Visibility in the jungle is greatly diminished making concealment all but guaranteed for both friend and foe alike.



*Dismounted patrolling remains the only viable option for imposing force in jungle operations. US Marines patrol the jungles of Columbia. (Dept. of Defense photo by Brian J. Slaght).*

## Terrain Formations

Farmable plains in jungle regions are regarded at a premium, especially when low altitude mountains are present. As such flat land is commonly cultivated into expansive open fields of rice paddies, cane fields, and fruit tree plantations or other similar produce. And because jungle regions are highly populated, villages, townships and cities also vie for lowland plains.

Swamps are the exception to habitual use of lowland terrain for farms and cities. Swamps restrict movement for vehicles and often even for dismounted patrols. In such cases travel through swamps may require small, flat-bottom boats.

Swamps fall into two general categories:

- **Mangrove swamps** – coastal region swamps often with brackish water and dense shrub trees that grow only 3-15 feet (1-5m) high, as are common in the Everglades of Florida.
- **Palm swamps** – freshwater inland swamps set in mature forests trees that grow 65 feet (20m) or taller with dense upper canopies, as is common in the Bayous of Louisiana.

Hilly and mountainous terrain is commonly void of human development in jungle regions, leaving pristine jungle forests covering the high ground.

## Vegetation

The jungle climate is covered with dense vegetation. This includes rainforests and deciduous forest, but also includes grasslands called savannahs.

- **Rainforests** – mature forests with trees growing as tall 200 feet (60m) and multiple canopy layers that leave a dark rotten floor with no undergrowth. The canopy ceiling can be 25 feet (8m) above the ground.
- **Deciduous Forests** – new growth or mature forests with trees commonly reaching 65 feet (20m) high. These forests typically have just one upper canopy that allows sunlight to the forest floor that may in spots produce a thick underbrush canopy.
- **Savannahs** – treeless grassland with broadleaf grasses that grow 3-15 feet (1-5m) high. These grasslands can appear as small meadows in the jungle, or grow as vast open prairies across flats and mountain foothills.

The more canopies present in the jungle, the less sunlight can break through to the forest floor. Yet the lack of undergrowth in dark jungle forests makes for easier movement when conducting dismounted patrols.

# Patrols & Patrolling

*Ref: FM 3-21.8 (FM 7-8) The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, pp. 9-2 to 9-9 and The Ranger Handbook, chap. 5.*

The two categories of patrols are combat and reconnaissance. Regardless of the type of patrol being sent out, the commander must provide a clear task and purpose to the patrol leader. Any time a patrol leaves the main body of the unit there is a possibility that it may become engaged in close combat.



*Patrol missions can range from security patrols in the close vicinity of the main body, to raids deep into enemy territory. Successful patrolling requires detailed contingency planning and well-rehearsed small unit tactics. The planned action determines the type of patrol. (Dept. of Army photo by Sgt. Ben Brody).*

## Combat Patrols

Patrols that depart the main body with the clear intent to make direct contact with the enemy are called combat patrols. The three types of combat patrols are raid patrols, ambush patrols (both of which are sent out to conduct special purpose attacks), and security patrols.

## Reconnaissance Patrols


Patrols that depart the main body with the intention of avoiding direct combat with the enemy while seeing out information or confirming the accuracy of previously-gathered information are called reconnaissance patrols. The most common types reconnaissance patrols are area, route, zone, and point. Leaders also dispatch reconnaissance patrols to track the enemy, and to establish contact with other friendly forces. Contact patrols make physical contact with adjacent units and report their location, status, and intentions. Tracking patrols follow the trail and movements of a specific enemy unit. Presence patrols conduct a special form of reconnaissance, normally during stability or civil support operations.

*Note: See also p. 4-12 for discussion of patrols in support of stability operations.*

# I. Organization of Patrols

A patrol is organized to perform specific tasks. It must be prepared to secure itself, navigate accurately, identify and cross danger areas, and reconnoiter the patrol objective. If it is a combat patrol, it must be prepared to breach obstacles, assault the objective, and support those assaults by fire. Additionally, a patrol must be able to conduct detailed searches as well as deal with casualties and prisoners or detainees.

The leader identifies those tasks the patrol must perform and decides which elements will implement them. Where possible, he should maintain squad and fire team integrity.



*Squads and fire teams may perform more than one task during the time a patrol is away from the main body or it may be responsible for only one task. The leader must plan carefully to ensure that he has identified and assigned all required tasks in the most efficient way. (Dept. of Army photo by Sgt. Ben Brody).*

A patrol is sent out by a larger unit to conduct a specific combat, reconnaissance, or security mission. A patrol's organization is temporary and specifically matched to the immediate task. Because a patrol is an organization, not a mission, it is not correct to speak of giving a unit a mission to "Patrol."

The terms "patrolling" or "conducting a patrol" are used to refer to the semi-independent operation conducted to accomplish the patrol's mission. Patrols require a specific task and purpose.

A commander sends a patrol out from the main body to conduct a specific tactical task with an associated purpose. Upon completion of that task, the patrol leader returns to the main body, reports to the commander and describes the events that took place, the status of the patrol's members and equipment, and any observations.

If a patrol is made up of an organic unit, such as a rifle squad, the squad leader is responsible. If a patrol is made up of mixed elements from several units, an officer or NCO is designated as the patrol leader. This temporary title defines his role and responsibilities for that mission. The patrol leader may designate an assistant, normally the next senior man in the patrol, and any subordinate element leaders he requires.



A patrol can consist of a unit as small as a fire team. Squad- and platoon-size patrols are normal. Sometimes, for combat tasks such as a raid, the patrol can consist of most of the combat elements of a rifle company. Unlike operations in which the Infantry platoon or squad is integrated into a larger organization, the patrol is semi-independent and relies on itself for security.

Every patrol is assigned specific tasks. Some tasks are assigned to the entire patrol, others are assigned to subordinate teams, and finally some are assigned to each individual. An individual will have multiple tasks and subtasks to consider and carry out.

### **1. Pointman, Dragman, and Security Team**

Security is everyone's responsibility. Having noted that, every patrol has a troop walking in front. This troop is called the pointman. He is responsible for making sure the patrol does not walk into enemy ambushes, minefields, or similar. The pointman has forward security. Sometimes a patrol will send the pointman with another patrol member to walk a short distance forward of the patrol.

Also, every patrol has someone who is last in the formation. This troop is called the dragman. He is responsible for making sure that no patrol members are left behind. He also makes sure that the enemy doesn't surprise the patrol from the rear unnoticed.

The security team is responsible for specifically pulling security to the left and right of the patrol. This is a critical task when crossing danger areas, so a specific team is identified to conduct this task.

### **2. Clearing Team**

The clearing team crosses the danger area once the security team is in place. The clearing team has the specified responsibility of visually clearing and physically securing the far side of a danger area. It's important so another team is designated to conduct this task.

### **3. Compass & Pace Team**

Obviously someone needs to make sure the patrol is headed in the right direction and that we don't travel too far. This is the job of the compassman and paceman. Typically the compass and pace team is positioned

immediately behind the pointman. Additionally, a secondary compass and pace team is usually located in the back half of the patrol.

### **4. Command Team**

The PL and a radio operator (RTO) make up the command team for most patrols. Doctrinally speaking, the APL is also part of this team but the APL is normally positioned near the very rear of the formation to help the dragman and ensure no patrol member is left behind.

### **5. Aid & Litter Team**

Someone has to help pull wounded buddies out of harms way. There are usually two members of each fire team designated as aid and litter teams. These teams are spread throughout the patrol and have the responsibility of carrying and employing extra medical aid gear.

### **6. Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Search Team**

EPW teams are responsible for controlling enemy prisoners IAW the five S's and the leader's guidance. These teams may also be responsible for accounting for and controlling detainees or recovered personnel.

### **7. Tracking Team**

There are many different specialty teams that might be assigned to a patrol. Trackers are just one such resource. Explosive ordinance details (EOD) are another. Trackers are unique, however, because they are generally positioned just ahead of the pointman on the patrol.

### **8. Support Team**

The support team is outfitted with heavy, crew-served weapons on the patrol. Of course, reconnaissance patrols usually do not make use of a support team. But when a support team is required, it will be positioned to the center of the patrol.

### **9. Assault & Breach Team**

Reconnaissance rarely ever needs an assault team. The assault team may be dispersed throughout the patrol, but ideally is situated toward the rear. This is because the assault team is typically placed on the objective last.



# I. Attack Formations - The Line

The line formation places excellent firepower forward, employing virtually 100 percent of the unit's weapon systems to the front. Additionally, C2 is easily achieved along a line formation, making the line an excellent choice for frontal assaults against the enemy.

To execute the squad line, the squad leader designates one of the teams as the base team. The other team cues its movement off of the base team. This applies when the squad is in close combat as well. From this formation, the squad leader can employ any of the three movement techniques or conduct fire and movement.

The disadvantages include a lack of maneuverability, difficulty in changing direction, and an almost complete inability to protect the flank. Regardless of the interval distance between each troop in the line formation, they are literally lined up in a side-by-side fashion. This means that only the last troop on either flank can engage an enemy force to the sides of this formation.



*Troops stand abreast of each other to form the line—with key leaders situated in the middle or just behind the formation. This formation is effective when we expect to gain fire superiority to the immediate front. (Photo by Jeong, Hae-jung).*

1. All troops are formed into a rank, side-by-side. Each troop faces forward and has essentially a 90° sector of fire. Subordinate leaders maintain control over the formation, careful not to allow any portion of the line formation to get ahead of the others. This could risk fratricide or at the very least, mask the fires of friendly troops.
2. Hand and arm signals are the preferred method of communication. Communication is passed left and right along the formation. This means that every sixth step of the left foot, each troop should look left and right to see if any information is being passed along the line formation.
3. When any one member of the formation stops, every member halts. Each member takes a knee upon the formation's halt facing forward. The troop on the far left and right face out accordingly. After five minutes, each patrol member drops their rucksack and assumes a prone position until the signal to move out is given.

# I. Patch-to-the-Road Method

Using this method, a nine-man squad should be able to cross the danger area in ten seconds or less. *Speed is a form of security.* This method also allows the column formation to be maintained, which means greater control and communication for the PL.

1. The point man brings the patrol to a halt and signals that he has come upon a danger area. The PL comes forward to view the danger area, assesses the situation, and selects a method of negotiating the danger area.
2. If the patch-to-the-road method is selected, the PL communicates this to the team with the appropriate hand and arm signal. The entire patrol closes the intervals between members shoulder-to-shoulder. The patrol members must actually touch each other. This is done even during daylight hours. This will allow a very fast pace when crossing and prevent a break in contact.
3. The two-man security team moves from the rear of the formation up to the front. At the PL's signal, the first security troop steps up to the danger area only as far as he needs to look left and right. If the road is clear of enemy presence, the troop takes a position so he can view down the road to his right. In this position, his unit patch (on the upper part of his left arm sleeve) will be facing toward the middle of the road. Thus, the method is called "patch-to-the-road."



*This method uses speed as the primary form of security. A left and right security overwatch is provided locally. At the patrol leader's signal, the rest of the patrol move in file across the danger area. (Photo by Jeong, Hae-jung).*

4. As soon as the security troop on the near side of the danger area levels his weapon down the road, the second member of the security team immediately rushes across the danger area and takes up a position to view down the opposite direction of the road. At this point, both team members have their unit arm patches facing toward the middle of the road and they are pointing in the *opposite direction*.

5. As soon as the security troop is on far side if the danger area levels his weapon down the road, this signals the PL to stand the remaining patrol members and RUN across the danger area. This is done literally by holding onto the gear of the troop to the front.

6. As the last troop passes the near side security troop, he firmly says, "Last man." An acceptable alternative is to tap the security troop on the shoulder. In either case, this indicates to the security troop to stand up and run across the danger area behind the patrol.

7. The security troop will say firmly, "Last man", to the far side security troop or tap him on the shoulder. This lets that troop know to follow behind.

8. Now the entire patrol is back in its original marching order on the far side of the objective.

It is important that as the pointman initially crosses the danger area, that he makes a quick dash into the tree line to visually inspect the space the patrol will occupy. The *only reason to stop the patrol in the danger area* is if the pointman determines the far side tree line is booby-trapped. Even if the enemy has set up a near ambush, the patrol must assault through. No one stays in the danger area.

The potential danger here is that the security team troops become distracted from the mundane task of overwatching their sector. This is especially true if some snag holds up the process and the security team is forced to stand overwatch down the road for more than the allotted ten seconds.

It takes considerable discipline and lots of rehearsals to keep troops facing down a linear danger area, partially exposing themselves and generally feeling vulnerable when there is a hold-up such as another member tripping while running across the road, or getting caught on a fence wire, or dropping an unsecured piece of equipment and then doubling back to retrieve it. What generally happens at that point is that one or both of the security team members become agitated and turns to look to see what's going on in middle of the road instead of maintaining a vigilant overwatch of their sector.

## Contingency Plan

Ideally, if the enemy does show up when the patrol is crossing a danger area, the security team will fire first. Or if there is on-coming traffic, the security team will shout a warning to the other patrol to momentarily halt and hide. This signal means no one else should attempt to cross the danger area. So it is imperative that the security team realizes they are to keep a vigilant overwatch of the danger area until:

- The patrol successfully traverses the danger area
- They are directed to hide from on-coming traffic
- Or the patrol becomes engaged in a firefight

If there is a break in contact due to traffic or contact with the enemy, each patrol must establish a method of link-up. Typically, if the patrol becomes separated, the patrol will rendezvous at the last designated en-route rally point (ERP).

6. The third element waits at the 6 o'clock security team position. The PL links up with the third element and walks them in a straight line between the 6 o'clock and the 2 o'clock position, physically placing each member of the element.



**Phase Three:** The patrol leader returns to the 6 o'clock position to walk the second squad in a line between the 6 o'clock on the 10 o'clock positions. Troops must link up with the apex to their left and right. (Ref: FM 7-8, chap 3, section V, fig. 3-22).

7. The PL moves to the center of the patrol base to establish the command post (CP). The PL coordinates his subordinate leaders to be sure they are all aware of each other's location and tied into each other's left and right line.



**Phase Four:** The PL meets the last squad at the 6 o'clock position and walks them in a line between the 6 o'clock and 2 o'clock positions. Each apex is assigned a crew-served weapon, and the command post is center. (Ref: FM 7-8, chap 3, section V, fig. 3-22).

## Planning Considerations

Leaders planning for a patrol base must consider the mission and passive and active security measures. A patrol base must be located so it allows the unit to accomplish its mission.

- Observation posts and communication with observation posts
- Patrol or platoon fire plan
- Alert plan
- Withdrawal plan from the patrol base to include withdrawal routes and a rally point, rendezvous point, or alternate patrol base
- A security system to make sure that specific Soldiers are awake at all times
- Enforcement of camouflage, noise, and light discipline
- The conduct of required activities with minimum movement and noise
- Priorities of work

## Security Measures

- Select terrain the enemy would probably consider of little tactical value
- Select terrain that is off main lines of drift
- Select difficult terrain that would impede foot movement, such as an area of dense vegetation, preferably bushes and trees that spread close to the ground
- Select terrain near a source of water
- Select terrain that can be defended for a short period and that offers good cover and concealment
- Avoid known or suspected enemy positions
- Avoid built-up areas
- Avoid ridges and hilltops, except as needed for maintaining communications
- Avoid small valleys
- Avoid roads and trails

# Priorities of Work - Patrol Base

Once the PL is briefed by the R&S teams and determines the area is suitable for a patrol base, the leader establishes or modifies defensive work priorities in order to establish the defense for the patrol base. Priorities of work are not a laundry list of tasks to be completed; to be effective, priorities of work must consist of a task, a given time, and a measurable performance standard. For each priority of work, a clear standard must be issued to guide the element in the successful accomplishment of each task. It must also be designated whether the work will be controlled in a centralized or decentralized manner. Priorities of work are determined IAW METT-TC. Priorities of work may include, but are not limited to the following tasks:

- 1. Security is always the first priority.** The patrol base is maintained at a level of security appropriate to the situation. As a rule of thumb, the patrol base does not fall below 33 percent security. That means one out of three troops are diligently watching their sectors of fire.
- 2. An alternate defensive position is designated.** Typically, the PL informs the subordinate leaders that the ORP will serve as a fallback position in the event the patrol base is over-run. This information is disseminated to all of the patrol members.
- 3. An ambush team covers the trail into the patrol base.** A small force backtracks approximately 100 meters from the 6 o'clock position and then steps off of the trail. This ambush team observes the trail for a half hour or so to be certain no enemy force has followed the patrol into the patrol base. This must be done immediately after the patrol base has been secured.
- 4. Communication is established between all key positions.** Field phones or radios are positioned with the CP and each apex at the 2, 6, and 10 o'clock positions.
- 5. An R&S team conducts a recon of the immediate area.** After communication is established, the PL dispatches a recon & security (R&S) team to skirt the area just outside the visible sectors of fire for the patrol base. Everyone must be informed. Otherwise, patrol members may fire upon the R&S team.
- 6. Mines and flares are implemented.** After the R&S team confirms that the area immediately around the patrol base is secure, those positions designated to employ mines or flares carefully place them at the far end of their visible sectors of fire—no more than 35 meters out. These anti-personnel mines and early warning devices must be kept within viewable distance of the patrol base.
- 7. Hasty fighting positions are constructed.** Barricades are the preferred method as digging and cutting can be too loud and may disclose the position. Fighting positions make use of available micro-terrain. If a hasty fighting position is necessary, care is taken to camouflage the exposed earth.
- 8. Plans are finalized or altered.** The patrol's missions may be altered slightly or significantly in time. The PL makes these adjustments and every member of the patrol base is informed. If at all possible, shoulder-to-shoulder rehearsals are carried out in the center of the patrol base, prior to conducting missions.
- 9. Weapons are cleaned.** This is particularly true if the patrol made contact during a mission or if the movement to the patrol base took involved moving through a particularly filthy environment—such as fording a river or being inserted onto a sandy beach. Still, no less than 33 percent of the patrol members maintain security.
- 10. Sleep and eating plans are initiated.** If the situation dictates, the patrol base implements an eating and sleeping schedule, while maintaining security.



# The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook

# Index

5 and 20 Meter Checks, 8-18

## A

Actions by Friendly Forces, 1-13  
Actions on the Objective, 6-21  
Administrative Movement, 5-29  
After Action Review (AAR), 1-55  
Alternate Positions, 3-12  
Ambush, 6-3  
Approach March, 5-29S  
Approach-March Technique, 2-8  
Area Ambush, 6-16  
Area Defense, 3-11  
Area of Influence, 1-18  
Area of Interest, 1-18  
Area of Operations, 1-18  
Area Reconnaissance, 5-16  
Area Security, 5-6  
Arms Control, 4-5  
Army Core Competencies, 1-10  
Army Operational Concept, 1-5  
Art of Tactics, 1-1  
Assault a Building, 7-10  
Assault Element, 8-6  
Assault Position, 2-5a, 2-16  
Assault Team, 6-18  
Assault Time, 2-5a  
Assess, 1-17  
Attack, 2-13  
Attack by Fire, 1-13, 2-34  
Attack Formations, 8-11  
Attack Position, 2-5a  
Avenues of Approach, 1-33

## B

Backbrief, 1-54  
Back-to-Back Method, 8-34  
Battles, Engagements and Small-Unit Actions, 1-2  
Battle Handover Line, 2-5a  
Battle Position, 3-3a, 3-24  
Bounding Overwatch, 8-9  
Block, 1-12  
Box Method, 8-25  
Branch, 2-22  
Breach, 1-13  
Bunkers, 7-19  
Bypass, 1-13  
Bypass Method, 8-24

## C

Canalize, 1-12  
Checkpoints, 4-10  
Cigar-Shaped Method, 8-29  
Clear, 1-13, 2-32  
Clearing Rooms, 7-13  
Close Operations, 1-19  
Cold Regions, 7-31  
Cold Region Operations, 7-31  
Combat Orders, 1-37  
Combat Outposts, 5-7  
Combat Patrols, 8-1  
Combat Power, 1-22  
Combating Terrorism, 4-5  
Combination Pursuit, 2-25  
Combined Arms Maneuver, 1-5  
Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR), 1-20  
Commander's Intent, 1-20  
Contain, 1-12  
Control, 1-13  
Control Crowds, 4-12

Control Measures, *Defensive*, 3-3a  
*Offensive*, 2-5a  
Convoy, 4-12  
Cordon, 7-10  
Core Competencies, 1-5, 1-10  
Counterattack, 1-11  
Counterdrug Operations, 4-5  
Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations, 4-13  
Counterrecon, 1-13  
Course of Action Development, 1-30  
Cover, 1-11, 5-5  
Crossing a Danger Area, 8-19  
Crossing Large Open Areas, 8-25

## D

Danger Areas, 8-19  
Decisive Action, 1-6  
Decisive Operation, 1-19  
Decisive-Shaping-Sustaining, 1-19  
Deep Operations, 1-19  
Deep-Close-Security, 1-19  
Defeat, 1-12  
Defending Encircled, 5-27  
Defense Support of Civil Authority Tasks, 1-9  
Defense, 3-1  
Defensive Control Measures, 3-3a  
Defensive Tasks, 1-8, 3-2  
Delay, 1-11, 3-20  
Deliberate Operations, 1-4  
Describe, 1-16  
Desert Environments, 7-23  
Desert Operations, 7-23  
Destroy, 1-12



Diamond Attack Formation, 8-17  
 Direct, 1-17  
 Direction of Attack, 2-5a  
 Disengage, 1-13  
 Disengagement Line, 3-3b  
 Dissemination of Information, 5-17  
 Disrupt, 1-12  
 Domain Knowledge, 1-3

## E

Effects on Enemy Forces, 1-12  
 Elements of Combat Power, 1-22  
 En Route Rally Point (ERP), 8-32  
 Encirclement Operations, 5-27  
 Enemy Contact, 8-26  
 Engagement Areas, 3-16  
 Entering a Building, 7-11  
 Envelopment, 2-4  
 Escort a Convoy, 4-12  
 Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI), 1-21  
 Exfiltration, 1-13  
 Exploitation, 2-19

## F

Far Ambush, 6-4  
 File Attack Formation, 8-14  
 Final Coordination Line, 2-5b  
 Find, 7-3, 7-18  
 Finish, 7-18  
 Fire Support Coordination Measures, 3-3b  
 Fire Team Formations, 8-11  
 Fix, 1-12, 7-18  
 Fixing Force, 3-6  
 Follow and Assume, 1-13  
 Follow and Support, 1-13  
 Force Tailoring, 1-22  
 Foreign Internal Defense (FID), 4-4  
 Forms of Maneuver, 2-4  
 Fortified Areas, 7-17

Forward Edge of the Battle Area, 3-3b  
 Forward Line of Troops (FLOT), 5-24, 5-25  
 Forward Operating Base (FOB), 4-7  
 Foundations of Unified Land Operations, 1-5  
 Fragmentary Order (FRA-GO), 1-40  
 Frontal Attack, 2-5  
 Frontal Attack, 2-5  
 Frontal Pursuit, 2-24

## G

Guard, 1-11, 5-4  
 Guerrillas, 7-9

## H

Hasty Operations, 1-4  
 Heart-Shaped Method, 8-22  
 Hide Position, 8-33  
 Human Dimension, 1-3  
 Humanitarian Assistance, 4-4

## I

Individuals, Crews, and Small Units, 1-1  
 Infiltration, 2-5  
 Insurgents, 7-9  
 Interdict, 1-12  
 Isolate, 1-12  
 Isolate the Building, 7-3

## J

Jungle Environments, 7-47  
 Jungle Operations, 7-47

## K

Key Terrain, 1-33

## L

Lead, 1-17  
 Level of Force, 4-16  
 Limit of Advance, 2-5b  
 Line Attack Formation, 8-13  
 Line of Departure, 2-5b  
 Local Security, 5-7  
 Lodgment Area, 4-7

## M

Main and Supporting Efforts, 1-19  
 Main Battle Area, 3-3b  
 Meeting Engagement, 2-7  
 METT-TC (Mission Variables), 1-31  
 Military Aspects of the Terrain (OCOKA), 1-32  
 Mission Analysis, 1-30  
 Mission Command, 1-10  
 Mission Symbols, 1-11  
 Mission Variables (METT-TC), 1-31  
 Mobile Defense, 3-5  
 Monitor Compliance with an Agreement, 4-7  
 Mountain Environments, 7-39  
 Mountain Operations, 7-39  
 Movement Techniques, 5-30  
 Movement to Contact, 2-7  
 Moving in the Building, 7-14  
 Mutual Support, 1-22

## N

Near Ambush, 6-4  
 Negotiations, 4-8  
 Neutralize, 1-12  
 Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), 4-5

## O

Objective, 2-5b  
 Objective Rally Point (ORP), 8-31, 8-32  
 Observation Posts, 4-10  
 Occupy, 1-13  
 OCOKA - Military Aspects of the Terrain, 1-32  
 Offense, 2-1  
 Offensive Control Measures, 2-5a  
 Offensive Tactical Tasks, 2-29  
 Offensive Tasks, 1-8, 2-2  
 Open and Secure Routes, 4-12  
 Operational Framework, 1-18

Operations Order (OPORD), 1-39, 1-42  
 Operations Process, 1-24  
 Organizing Combat Power, 1-22

## P

Passage of Lines, 5-23  
 Patch-to-the-Road Method, 8-20  
 Patrol Base, 8-37  
 Patrol, 4-12, 8-1  
 Patrolling, 8-1  
 Peace Operations, 4-4  
 Penetrate, 1-11  
 Penetration, 2-5  
 Perimeter, 3-27  
 Planning Guidance, 1-20  
 Point Ambush, 6-16  
 Point of Departure, 2-5b  
 Pre-Combat Inspection (PCI), 1-45  
 Preparation, 1-45  
 Primary Positions, 3-12  
 Priorities of Work in the Defense, 3-18  
 Probable Line of Deployment, 2-5b  
 Pursuit, 2-23

## R

Raid, 6-17  
 Rally Point, 2-5b  
 Range Card, 3-14  
 Recon Pull, 5-13  
 Recon Push, 5-13  
 Reconnaissance, 5-9  
   *Fundamentals*, 5-10  
   *Operations*, 5-9  
   *Patrols*, 8-1  
 Reconnaissance in Force (RIF), 5-18  
 Reconnaissance Objective, 5-9  
 Reconstitution, 3-22  
 Reduce, 1-13  
 Regional Environments, 7-1  
 Rehearsals, 1-51  
 Relief in Place, 1-11, 5-19

Reserve Operations, 4-12  
 Retain, 1-13  
 Retirement, 1-11, 3-21  
 Retrograde, 3-19  
 Reverse Slope, 3-27  
 Risk Management (RM), 1-36  
 Risk Reduction, 1-4  
 Route Reconnaissance, 5-12

## S

Science of Tactics, 1-2  
 Screen, 1-11, 5-1  
 Search and Attack, 2-8  
 Search, 4-12  
 Sector Sketch, 3-14  
 Sectors of Fire, 3-15  
 Secure, 1-13  
 Security Assistance, 4-4  
 Security Checks, 8-18  
 Security Element, 8-6  
 Security Fundamentals, 5-2  
 Security Halt, 8-27  
 Security Measures, 8-39  
 Security Operations, 1-19, 5-1  
 Security Team, 6-18  
 Seize, 1-13, 2-30  
 Seize, Retain and Exploit the Initiative, 1-6  
 Sequel, 2-22  
 Shaping Operation, 1-19  
 Show of Force, 4-5  
 Site Sterilization, 8-36  
 Special Purpose Attacks, 6-1  
 Stability Operations, 4-1  
 Stability Tasks, 1-9, 4-2  
 Staggered Column Attack Formation, 8-15  
 Star Method, 8-35  
 Striking Force, 3-6  
 Strongpoint, 3-25  
 Subsequent Positions, 3-12  
 Supplementary Positions, 3-12  
 Support Area, 1-19

Support by Fire, 1-13, 2-31  
 Support by Fire Position, 2-5b  
 Support Efforts, 1-19  
 Support Element, 8-6  
 Support Team, 6-18  
 Support to Insurgency, 4-5  
 Suppress, 2-30  
 Sustaining Operation, 1-19

## T

Tactics, 1-1  
 Tactical Doctrinal Taxonomy, 1-14  
 Tactical Enabling Tasks, 5-1  
 Tactical Level of War, 1-1  
 Tactical Mission Fundamentals, 1-1  
 Tactical Mission Tasks, 1-11  
 Tactical Problems, 1-3a  
 Tactical Road March, 5-29  
 Tactical Victory, 1-3b  
 Task-Organizing, 1-22, 1-47  
 Threat, 7-8  
 Time of Attack, 25b  
 Transition, 2-5c, 3-4  
 Traveling Overwatch, 8-8  
 Traveling Techniques, 8-7  
 Traveling, 8-8  
 Trench Systems, 7-20  
 Triangle Method, 8-38  
 Troop Leading Procedures, 1-25  
 Troop Movement, 5-29  
 Turn, 1-12  
 Turning Movement, 2-4

## U

Uncertainty, 1-3  
 Understand, 1-15  
 Unified Land Operations, 1-5  
 Unity of Effort, 4-16  
 Urban Environments, 7-1, 7-6  
 Urban Operations, 7-3, 7-4

## V

Visualize, 1-16

---

**W**

Wagon Wheel Method, 8-30

Warfighting Functions, 1-23

Warning Order (WARNO),  
1-38

Wedge Attack Formation,  
8-16

Wide Area Security, 1-5

Withdrawal, 1-11, 3-21

---

**Z**

Zone Reconnaissance, 5-14

Sample



**The Essentials of Warfighting**

# Military SMARTbooks

**SMARTbooks - The Essentials of Warfighting!** Recognized as a doctrinal reference standard by military professionals around the world, SMARTbooks are designed with all levels of Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Civilians in mind.



[www.TheLightningPress.com](http://www.TheLightningPress.com)

SMARTbooks can be used as quick reference guides during combat operations, as lesson plans in support of training exercises and as study guides at military education and professional development courses. Serving a generation of warfighters, military reference SMARTbooks have become "mission-essential" around the world:

- Military education and professional development courses/schools: officer and noncommissioned officer basic and advanced courses, NCO Academy, West Point and ROTC, Command & General Staff College (CGSC), Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) and the War College
- National Training Center (NTC), Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and Battle Command Training Program (BCTP)
- Active, Reserve and Guard units across the full-spectrum of operations
- Global War on Terrorism operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Asia-Pacific
- Combatant Command (COCOM) and JTF Headquarters around the world
- Allied, coalition and multinational partner support and training to include NATO, Iraq and the Afghanistan National Army

# Military SMARTbooks

SMARTbooks...military reference as easy as 1-2-3!

**SMARTbooks -- The Essentials of Warfighting!** Applying informational art to military doctrinal science, the SMARTbook series really does make military reference as easy as 1-2-3.

## 1. Joint/Service Titles

Our joint/service titles form the foundation for our series of mutually-supporting military reference titles. Paired with our multi-service/specialty titles, they comprise a complete professional military library.



## 2. Multi-Service/Specialty Titles

Designed to work hand-in-hand with our joint/service titles, our multi-service/specialty titles cover specific topic areas to provide ready reference across all military forces, services and applications.



## 3. Digital SMARTbooks

SMARTbooks are now offered in your choice of hard copy, digital, or both formats! Digital SMARTbooks are designed to be side-by-side digital companions to our hard copy SMARTbooks. Access your entire SMARTbook digital library on your portable device when traveling, or use the hard copy edition in secure facilities (SCIF), combat or field environments.



With one file, you can read and transfer our digital SMARTbooks (eBooks) across 85+ devices and applications that support Adobe eBook DRM, including smartphones, tablets (via apps on devices like the iPad® and Galaxy Tab) as well as dedicated reading devices like the Sony Reader or the Barnes & Noble NOOK®. Our digital SMARTbooks are authorized to a user's Adobe ID and can be transferred to up to six devices and six computers via Adobe Digital Editions.

View, download samples and purchase SMARTbooks online at: **www.TheLightningPress.com**. Register your SMARTbooks to receive email notification of SMARTupdates, new titles & revisions!



SMARTbooks

# The Essentials of Warfighting

## Step-by-step visual approach

Step-by-step approach makes military doctrine and reference as easy as 1-2-3. Dozens of charts and diagrams show you exactly what you need to know.

## Comprehensive quick reference guide

Look up what you need and then get straight to work. SMARTbooks are written from the warfighter's perspective, concentrating at the tactical & operational levels of war. Compiled directly from the latest U.S. Army publications; complete doctrinal references are provided for documentation.

## Straightforward

Written in simple language that gets straight to the point. Thousands of pages were condensed to provide concise information in a single SMARTbook.

## Portability means accessibility

Taking the place of multiple field manuals and publications, SMARTbooks fit easily into a leader's bag, the back of a rucksack, or even the cargo pocket of ACU's.

## SMARTregistration

Keep your SMARTbook up-to-date with e-mail notification of updates and doctrinal changes. Register online at: [www.TheLightningPress.com](http://www.TheLightningPress.com)

## The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook (2nd Rev. Ed.) Leader's Reference Guide to Conducting Tactical Operations



**Tactics** is the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other. Through tactics, commanders use **combat power** to accomplish missions. The tactical-level commander uses combat power in battles, engagements, and small-unit actions.

Establishing a common frame of reference, **doctrine** provides a menu of practical options based on experience. It provides an authoritative guide for leaders and Soldiers but requires original applications that adapt it to circumstances.

The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook **translates and bridges** operational-level doctrine into tactical application -- in the form of tactics, techniques and procedures -- and provides the "how to" at the small-unit level as a ready reference at the battalion, company, platoon, squad and fire team level.

## For use in tactical units and professional development courses

The Lightning Press



Military Reference  
SMARTbooks  
24-hour Voicemail/Fax/Order:  
1-800-997-8827

[www.TheLightningPress.com](http://www.TheLightningPress.com)

ISBN 13: 978-1-935886-28-0



9 781935 886280